Plato’s *Republic*

Reading Notes

Week 1: Thrasymachus' Definition of Justice

An Introduction to Plato's Republic

Julia Annas, Oxford University Press, 1981 (2009 Reprint)

Chapter 1: Introduction

- "Plato is writing a manifesto, but he is too good a philosopher not to raise important and difficult philosophical issues in the process, and sometimes to develop a point at the expense of his declared aims." (p.1)
- Plato intends for us to be shocked (perhaps at how authoritarian the ideal state is) in order to capture our attention (p.2)
  - Plato intends for us to be triggered and think back to why; essentially he is making us do philosophy
- Plato's background (p.3)
  - Born in or about 427 BC and died in 347 BC
  - From an old and powerful Athenian family, and was closely related to some powerful politicians at the time
  - Became a full time philosopher and founded a philosophical school called the Academy
- Socrates was an older contemporary of Plato's (p.3)
  - Accounts of Socrates diverge throughout the literature
  - In the beginning of Plato's dialogues, which are short and dramatic, Socrates appears in a role suited to the historical Socrates
    - "he questions people and deflates their pretensions to knowledge, but puts forward no explicit systematic doctrine of his own, and represents his own task as being merely that of goading people into realising the confused and baseless nature of many of their beliefs" (p.3)
  - In Plato's middle dialogue, Socrates diverges from the historical account into someone who has positive and dogmatic things to say (p.4)
  - (later dialogues have their own problems not mentioned in this part of Annas' book)
  - "The general consensus is that Plato moved from presenting something like Socrates' actual procedure to putting forward his own views, which went beyond anything he derived from Socrates; but that he continued to use Socrates as his mouthpiece, because he regarded his own idea as the result of Socrates' influence, and as carrying on his intellectual spirit and task." (p.4)
  - Socrates was tried and put to death in 399 BC for "ostensibly for corrupting the young by his teaching, but really because he has been associated with some of the most notorious enemies of the democracy" (p.6)

- Athens in Plato's time was a direct democracy (p.5)
  - All adult males can vote (but slaves and women were excluded from voting)
  - Athens ruled many Greek cities and is proud of democracy, as seen by its rivalry against the more oligarchic and authoritarian enemy Sparta
  - Plato's family disliked democracy
    - The Seventh Letter (of which there are many arguments against) claimed that Plato was glad when his oligarchic relatives were overthrown and democracy was restored
- Plato's dialogues were set in the late fifth century BC (500 BC - 401 BC; much earlier than the time of their composition)
  - At the time Athens felt tension between traditional and more cosmopolitan ways
  - "Many traditional values and patterns of behaviour, hitherto treated as 'natural', part of the inevitable order of things, were now suddenly thought of as conventional, part of fallible human endeavour which might well have been ordered otherwise (and was, in other parts of the world)." (p.7)
- Plato's primary job was to convince sceptics that there are objective moral truths worth adjusting their behaviour to follow as these truths can be relied upon (p.8)
- The bulk of the book is dedicated to argue against Thrasymachus who claims that the life of injustice is more worthwhile than the life of justice (p.8)
- Justice is a reasonable translation of *dikaiosunē*, which covers justice and right conduct in general; the word better translates to 'righteousness' as it is more closely related to morality than to justice (p.11)
  - Plato has no word for 'rights' and justice is a particular virtue whose vice it is opposed to is *pleonexia* – having or wanting more than what one is entitled to
  - There is no Greek word for moral; Annas uses 'morality' for the area of practical reasoning carried on by an agent which is concerned with the best way for a person to live
  - Plato slides between the definition of *dikaiosunē* in the broader sense as meaning law-abidingness and virtuous behaviour and the narrower sense as meaning justice (p.12)
    - This point is reflected in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
    - Plato's idea of justice by the end of the Republic is an expansive theory of justice – "He does not think that matters of what is just and unjust can be settled in a way which will leave untouched other central moral questions that arise in society."

Chapter 2: Book One

- Book 1, unlike the rest of the Republic, is almost Socrates' monologue with no strongly characterised interlocutors

CEPHALUS AND POLEMARCHUS: MORAL COMPLACENCY

- Socrates and Glaucon are visiting the Piraeus (port of Athens) and meets Cephalus (p.18)
- Cephalus is father of Polemarchus and Lysias (p.18)
- Cephalus is not Athenian (from Syracuse) and has renounced all the rights, duties and activities of a citizen (against what is vitally important for self-respect by most Greeks) by living abroad, dedicating his life to making money (p.18)
  - Since the Republic was written much later than when it was set, the audience knows that Cephalus' money making would then be useless with the family torn apart at the fall of Athens
- Cephalus invites Socrates to visit more often because he enjoys discussion more as he loses capacity for bodily pleasures (p.19)
  - This is an insult to Socrates since for him discussion and philosophy are the most important things in life
  - Cephalus does not resent old age and so seems to be near philosophical detachment, but when probed by Socrates, it is revealed that he thinks riches are not sufficient for a man to be just but they do help.
    - Being rich is neither necessary nor sufficient to being just, but is helpful nonetheless
    - Socrates' concern with philosophy kept him poor, so this comment could actually be quite insensitive
    - Cephalus is concerned about living rightly but in a very limited sense – i.e. not lying and giving back what is not yours. (p.20)
- Cephalus loses interest once the questions forces him to think (p.20)
  - He depicts an ordinary person's view of justice – a standpoint Polemarchus will come to articulate
  - Polemarchus comes to say that the only reason for being just is that it is better for you in the long run (p.21)
    - Problem 1: It leads to complacency and justice probably needs more effort
    - Problem 2: Because people become complacent, no need is felt to think about it much and so their beliefs lack intellectual backing
    - Problem 3: Once complacency is shaken (people realise you have to try to be just) there is nothing that can be put in its place apart from scepticism – nobody envisages any coherent alternative
- Cephalus does not explicitly define justice but it is clear that justice to him is no more than a list of duties (p.22)
- Polemarchus seems to admit to the idea, by implication of accepting the analogies although not explicitly, that justice is a skill (perhaps the skill to give others what is due to them?) (p.24)

- This is a fault because he should have said that justice is about following certain rules rather than about having expertise
- "A Kantian would say that Polemarchus goes wrong right from the start in letting the maxims of justice by compared to those of skills. A skill is dependent on its end; if you don't want to achieve the end then you lose any reason for exercising the skill. But moral rules have an unconditional force; they apply whether you want to achieve any given end of yours or not." (p.27)
- Polemarchus' argument is open to moral complacency, but Plato thinks that it is essential to justice that you are aiming at some good in performing a just action (p.28)
  - (1) Plato thinks Polemarchus should retain the intuitions that justice concerns a person's goodness or badness, not their contribution towards a personal project, but Thrasymachus thinks Polemarchus should abandon these intuitions (p.30)
  - (2) Plato later connects knowledge with goodness – the good person must be someone with knowledge
    - "For Plato, there is no such thing as 'natural virtue', an untrained disposition to do the right thing unaccompanied by any ability to explain and defend what is done." (p.31)

- Socrates gets Polemarchus to accept that justice is the same as excellence (335c) (p.31)
  - Dryness makes things dry, not wet; excellence makes things excellent, not the opposite (p.32)
  - In the same way, a just person cannot make another person unjust
  - Hence, Polemarchus' argument that justice is to be good to one's friends and bad to one's enemy fails
  - Problems with the argument
    - (1) Polemarchus agrees that justice is the human excellence or *arête* and that justice is to people what being a good specimen of its type is to a horse or a dog
      - BUT we ought to think what makes a good specimen should also depend on some physical characteristics, not merely what the being does
    - (2) The analogies are odd
      - Heat and dryness are not examples of rational capacities
      - Musical skill and skill in horsemanship are impartible skills and can be passed over from one person to another without them having to share a common aim; justice cannot be passed on irrespective of motivation
- Polemarchus represents the common sense view of justice, which, to a philosopher like Plato, is not very much. He is silenced at 336b and Thrasymachus breaks in. (p.34)

THRASYMACHUS

- Thrasymachus was a real person and evidence points to Plato wanting us to dislike him (p.35)
  - He makes long speeches, after which he tries to leave without being questioned about it; this is in contrast with Socrates' method, consisting of short questions and answers that are aimed at discovering the truth. (p.44)
- Thrasymachus presents inconsistent arguments
- Thrasymachus argues that justice is the interest of the stronger, but also that justice is to obey the law (p.40-41)
  - Thrasymachus makes the conventionalist suggestion that justice is the interest of the stronger and the stronger always rules, so justice is the interest of the ruler (p.40)
    - Note: Thrasymachus actually rejects the conventionalist position but Cleitophon argues that Thrasymachus is a conventionalist (p.42)
    - Cleitophon says what Thrasymachus meant was 'what the rulers thought was in their interests'
  - Socrates challenges Thrasymachus' idea by pointing out that rulers too can make mistakes
  - Thrasymachus replies that the rulers can amend the laws to correct for their mistakes
  - BUT then the new laws are not in the interests of the ruler, and the ruler, despite being stronger, still seems to be under the rule of law
- Thrasymachus compares the ruler to a shepherd who takes care of his flock but has an exploitative attitude (p.44)
  - He characterises justice as acting in a way which defers to and promotes the interest of others, and injustice is acting to promote your own interests, at others' expense if need be, which it probably will be. (p.45)
    - This characterisation makes injustice seem reasonable; Why let others take advantage of you, when you could be defending your own interests?
- So what is Thrasymachus really saying? (p.46)
  - According to Annas, "Thrasymachus' real position is that justice is another's good, whereas injustice is acting in the vigorous pursuit of your own interest." (p.46)
  - First Formulation: Justice is the interest of the stronger
  - Second Formulation [implied by the first]: Justice is obeying the laws
    - Cleitophon says to support this formulation is to be conventionalist so Thrasymachus abandons this definition for a broader version
  - Third Formulation: Justice is another's good
    - Encapsulates what Thrasymachus really wants to say
  - The fact that it took so many attempts presents Thrasymachus' character as being too hasty
- Thrasymachus' view is similar to Callicles' view in the *Gorgias* (p.48)

- They hold the similar view that “the admirable life is the life of the person who disregards justice and goes ruthlessly and unjustly after his own interests.” (p.48)
- Differences between Thrasymachus and Callicles’ views
  - (1) Callicles makes a distinction between natural and conventional justice but Thrasymachus does not (p.48)
    - Natural justice = the strong should make use of their strength to exploit the weak
    - Conventional justice = the weaker should restrain the stronger
    - Callicles can say that justice as formulated is naturally just, though conventionally unjust; Thrasymachus just has to accept that the admirable life is a life of injustice.
  - (2) Callicles forms his argument with respect to the individual gratifying his desires, but Thrasymachus forms his argument from a political position (p.49)
    - Thrasymachus is pro-tyrant
    - Thrasymachus is more realistic than Callicles because he speaks not of gratifying desires but of getting as much power as possible

- Socrates’ argument against Thrasymachus’ position
  - 341a-342e and 345e-347c attempts to make Thrasymachus clarify his position (p.49)
  - “Regarded as a skill, ruling is not essentially exploitative, as Thrasymachus had claimed.” (p.49)
  - In the book, such replies to Thrasymachus were able to bring Thrasymachus to defeat, but it is not convincing enough for readers of the Republic.
  - First Argument: Skill
    - Socrates’ suggestion of the skill parallel is extremely weak but Thrasymachus still accepts it
    - Problem: employs an analogy of acceptance of which carries the acceptance of the conclusion (p.55)
  - Second Argument: Thrasymachus wants injustice to be associated with strength (p.52)
    - Socrates argues that nobody can develop purely competitive virtues if he needs the help of others to achieve his ends
    - BUT Thrasymachus is very willing to be unjust (justice is not a requirement for a good life in his view – the good life is the life of the tyrant)
    - Socrates then comes to argue that injustice pulls apart the individual as well as the group; this rhetoric is strange and unconvincing (p.53)
    - Problem: limited and not very effective point (p.55)
  - Third Argument: Functions (352d-354b)
    - Various things have a function and whatever does has a corresponding virtue (p.53)

- Socrates claims that the soul has a function – to direct and guide the body and to be its principle of life (p.53)
- "The excellence of the soul is agreed to be justice." (p.53)
- BUT why do we need to have a function?
- ALSO at 335e10-11 Plato uses 'soul' and 'man' to mean the same thing, implying he thinks a person is his soul, which is a very strong assumption to make (p.54)
- Problem: question-begging premise that soul = person (p.55)

Chapter 3: The Form of Plato's Argument

- Plato makes clear his dissatisfaction of the methods of Book 1 at the beginning of Book 2 through Glaucon and Adeimantus' voices
- Glaucon divides goods into three types (p.60)
  - (1) Things we find desirable in themselves
  - (2) Things we find desirable in themselves and for their consequences
    - E.g. knowledge, sight and health
  - (3) Things we find desirable only for their consequences
    - Most people would put justice in the third class, desirable only for their consequences, but Socrates and Glaucon agree that justice belongs to the second, and fairest, class of things desirable in themselves and for their consequences.
    - The second class does not fit into neither the consequentialist nor deontological moral theories (p.62)
      - Consequentialists would treat (2) and (3) the same
      - Deontology just disregards (2) and (3)
      - BUT these are only two moral theories and are not necessarily exhaustive
    - Normally moral arguments end with a compromise not an alternative, but the Republic's argument is interesting because it offers an alternative – the alternative that justice is in category (2) not (3) (p.63)
- Glaucon brings up the story of the ring of Gyges to show that what is valued is not justice but the reputation of being just (p.65)
  - Glaucon's account disregards the consequences of being just; his demand is the deontological one – to put justice in category (1) (p.66)
  - Normally people would argue that the average Joe would not have the ring so the Gyges' example is irrelevant, but Plato is unaware of this kind of argument (p.69)
  - Plato, instead, accepts Glaucon's challenge to show that it is desirable to be just even if one has an absolute guarantee that one's injustice will not be found out (p.70)
    - Plato's account of justice is not going to be realistic and should also hold for extreme hypothetical cases (p.70)

- Adeimantus says that Glaucon has not stated the case completely because some people, like teachers and parents, still tell us to value justice for its consequences (p.65)
  - Adeimantus wants to put justice into category (2) (p.66)
- Both Glaucon and Adeimantus demand exclusion of the artificial consequences of justice (that may go to an unjust person with a reputation of justice) (p.66)
  - Complication: justice has both natural and artificial consequences (p.68)
  - How does this fit into the threefold classification? (p.67)
    - Things that we find desirable in themselves and for their consequences like health and knowledge do not have artificial consequences
    - Things in (3), like dieting, do not have artificial consequences either

Plato's Republic

G.M.A. Grube, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992

Book I

- Socrates and Glaucon were at a port town when a Polemarchus' slave stopped them and asked them to wait for Polemarchus
- Polemarchus catches up and invites them to his father's home
- Cephalus greets Socrates as invites him to come over more often because his ageing body would not allow frequent visits to town where they would normally meet
- Socrates likes talking to old people: "we should ask them, as we might ask those who have travelled a road that we too will probably have to follow, what kind of road it is, whether rough and difficult or smooth and easy" (328d)
- Cephalus tells Socrates about how he has been talking to many friends his age about what getting old has done to them; one common point they note is the loss of sexual desires, which some of his friends find troubling while some find it liberating
  - Sophocles, a poet and one of Cephalus' friends, was very glad to lose his sexual desire "like a slave who has escaped from a savage and tyrannical master" (329c)
  - "When the appetites relax and cease to importune us … we escape from many mad masters"
  - PP adds: this is a foreshadowing of the tyrant who, on the opposite end as Sophocles, is driven by eros and is mad
- Cephalus claims that having money helps people bear old age more easily (330a)
  - When someone thinks his end is near, they start to fear the after life and think about the injustices they have done (330d)
  - Being wealthy helps because it saves one from having to cheat or deceive someone against our will, hence from having to depart for "that place" (i.e. the underworld) knowing that one owes a god sacrifice and a person money.
  - The is taken to be the idea that to be just is to give back what one owes
- Socrates question Cephalus' logic
  - "Everyone would surely agree that if a sane man lends weapon to a friend and then ask for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend shouldn't return them, and wouldn't be acting justly if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone who is out of his mind." (331c)
  - Socrates then concludes that "the definition of justice isn't speaking the truth and repaying what one has borrowed" (331d)
- Cephalus leaves to take care of the sacrifice and nominates Polemarchus to continue with his argument (331d)

- Polemarchus argues that one should give back what one owes but whether what one owe is good or bad depends on whether the person they are indebted to is a friend or an enemy
- Socrates then argues using a series of example
- Polemarchus is puzzled by the seemingly irrelevant questions Socrates has raised
  - Socrates asks what the craft of justice does, to which Polemarchus replies it treats friends well and enemies badly; Socrates raises the following issues against Polemarchus
    - Problem 1A: Justice is useless unless at war
      - A doctor is best at treating friends well and enemies badly in matters of disease and health, just as the ship's captain can when people are at sea (332d)
      - BUT if people are not sick the doctor's craft would be useless and unless people are at sea, the captain's craft would also be useless; in the same vein, unless the city is at war, the just man is useless
    - Problem 1B: Justice is useless when they are in use but useful when they are not used
      - Polemarchus disagrees with Socrates' suggestion that the just man is useless in times of peace (333a)
      - A lyre-player is better than the just person when it comes to hitting the right notes
      - Even when money is involved, for example in buying a horse, it would be better to partner with a horse-breeder than a just person
      - The just person, then, is a strategic partner only for when we want to deposit money (not use it)
      - Similarly, when one wants to keep a shield or a lyre safe (and not use them), justice is a useful thing; yet, when one wants to use a shield, it is soldiery and musicianship, not justice, that is useful
      - So, "justice is useless when they are in use but useful when they aren't"
    - Problem 2: The just person is also good at stealing
      - Someone who is good at something will also be good at doing the opposite
      - "the one who is most able to guard against disease is also most able to produce it unnoticed" (333e)
      - By this logic, the just person – best at guarding gold and silver – will also be best at stealing, and the kind of stealing the just person does is to the benefit of their friends and to the detriment of their enemies (334b)
      - Puzzled, Polemarchus rephrases his argument, stating that justice is "to benefit one's friends and harm one's enemies" (334b)
    - Problem 3: Polemarchus' account of justice is self-contradictory

        - Upon being asked, Polemarchus defines a friend as being someone who the person believes is good and useful to them and an enemy vice versa, although they may be mistaken about their beliefs (334c)
        - On Polemarchus' account, then, it would be just for someone to benefit an enemy who they made mistaken judgements about usefulness and thought to be a friend
        - Polemarchus concedes that his account if flawed (334d)
    - Polemarchus tries to rescue his argument by redefining what is meant to be a friend/enemy; on this new account, a friend is not merely someone who is believed to be useful but is also, in fact, useful
        - While able to defang Problem 3 it is unable to escape Problem 4
        - Problem 4: A just man can do no harm
            - When something is harmed it becomes less with respect to its virtue; for example, when dogs are harmed, they become worse in the virtue that makes dogs good (355b)
            - If a person is harmed they become worse in human virtue
            - Justice is a human virtue
            - In the same way that musicians cannot make people unmusical through music, the just person cannot make people unjust through justice
            - So, a just person cannot harm anyone, not even their true enemies
- Thrasymachus interjects (336a-338d)
    - Here there is a description of why Thrasymachus was dissatisfied with the argument; it portrays Thrasymachus' character and other interlocutors' reaction to him very well
- Thrasymachus' definition of justice
    - (1) Justice is to the advantage of the ruler who is surely the stronger; justice is the advantage of the stronger (339a)
        - Socrates points out that if the ruler is mistaken about what is in their advantage, then they would be commanding people to do something that is not in their advantage but it would be just for others to follow through with the command
        - The person acting in accordance with the command would then be just in doing something to the ruler's advantage
        - Hence, justice is not the advantage of the ruler
    - Thrasymachus replies by claiming that rulers will never err, for if they err they would cease to be a ruler in that moment
        - He challenges Socrates: "Do you think I'd call someone who is in error stronger at the very moment he errs?" (340c)
    - (2) "A ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and this his subject must do. Thus, as I said from the first, it is just to do what is to the advantage of the stronger" (341a)

- Both sailors and captains sail in a boat; a ship's captain is called a captain not a sailor because of their craft and the fact that they rule over the sailors
- A craft is sufficient in itself and does not need further virtue, unlike the eyes that need sight (342a-342b); our bodies are deficient so we need crafts like sight and medicine to provide what is advantageous to it (341e)
- The craft of medicine does not seek its own advantage but the advantage of the body; "no other craft seeks its own advantage – for it has no further needs – but the advantage of that of which is the craft" (342c)
- Ship captain would seek benefit for sailors and since, as established earlier, captains are not sailors, they would not be seeking benefit for themselves
  - PP adds: BUT to "sail" seems to be part of being a ship's captain so it would be more sensible to view the captain as being in part a sailor but more than just a sailor; on this view, if the captain were to benefit sailors, they would also benefit a part of themselves
- So in practicing the craft of ruling, rulers – the stronger per Thrasymachus' precise idea – do not seek their own advantage

- Thrasymachus is dissatisfied and thinks Socrates is too naive; he asks if Socrates still needs a wet nurse (343a)
  - Shepherds do not seek the good of their sheep; they only fatten them and care for them not for the sake of their sheep but for themselves (343b); this argument is expanded on later
- (3) "justice is really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves"

- Thrasymachus argues that people would prefer to be unjust although Socrates thinks otherwise
  - "A just man will always get less than an unjust one" (343d)
    - No just person would enter an unfair contract where they get more than their partner
    - The just person pays more taxes while the unjust make a large profit
  - People are just because they fear the consequences of injustice, not because they think injustice is inherently bad (344c)
    - Socrates disagrees (345a)
- Socrates then rebuts Thrasymachus' suggestion
  - The shepherd takes on the role of a money-maker as well as someone who cares for sheep (345d)
  - "Then, it is clear now, Thrasymachus, that no craft or rule provides for its own advantage, but, as we've been saying for some time, it provides and orders for its subject and aims at its advantage, that of the weaker and not of the stronger. That's why I said just now, Thrasymachus, that no one willingly chooses to rule and to take other people's troubles in hand and straighten them out, but each asks for wages" (346e)

- Rulers must not love money or honour otherwise they would be accused of coming up to rule because of the money and honour offered (347b)
- In a good city, people would be fighting not to rule (ruling is seen as something that is necessary rather than something that is desirable) so it would be clear that rulers do not seek their own advantages
  - Disagree with Thrasymachus: justice is not to the advantage of the stronger (347e)
- Why the just person is happy
  - Justice is a virtue while injustice is a vice
    - The just person would not outdo other just as how a musician would not try to tighten the strings on the lyre more than needed but they would want to outdo their opposite (349e)
    - The just person would not try to outdo fellow just people whereas the unjust tries to outdo everyone (350b)
    - “Then, a just person has turned out to be good and clever, and an unjust one ignorant and bad” (350c)
    - The effect of injustice is to produce hatred whenever it occurs (351d)
  - A soul can never perform its function well if it is deprived of virtue
  - So the just person is happy and the unjust one wretched (354a)

Week 2: Glaucon's Challenge

Plato's Republic

Plato, Translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992

Book 2; 357 - 367

- Glaucon refused to accept Thrasymachus' abandonment of the argument (357a)
- Three kinds of goods
  - (1) Goods we desire for its own sake (357b)
    - E.g. joy, harmless pleasures
  - (2) Goods we like for its own sake and for the sake of what comes from it (357c)
    - E.g. knowing, seeing, being healthy
    - Socrates puts justice in this finest category (358a)
  - (3) Goods we desire for the sake of the rewards and other things that come from them (357c)
    - E.g. physical training, medical treatment when sick, medicine, ways of making money
    - Thrasymachus puts justice in this category and praised injustice (358a)
- Glaucon is unsatisfied by Thrasymachus' response to Socrates, claiming that Thrasymachus had given up on the argument too early on. (358b)
  - He announces he will renew Thrasymachus' argument by: (358c)
    - (1) Stating what kind of thing people consider justice to be and what its origins are
      - The origin and essence of justice
        - Glaucon says to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer from injustice is bad, but the badness of suffering far exceeds the good (358e)
        - People who have tasted both but lack the power to commit injustice and avoid suffering form it come together and agree to neither do injustice nor suffer it (359a)
        - This results in laws (359a)
      - Justice is the intermediate between the best and the worst (359a)
        - Best to do justice without paying the penalty
        - Worst is to suffer from injustice without being able to take revenge
        - People value justice not because it is a good but because they are too weak to do injustice without impunity

    - If they could, they would not agree to the laws (359b)

- (2) Arguing that all who practice justice do so unwillingly, as something necessary, not something good
    - Glaucon argues that those who practice justice do it unwillingly and because they lack the power to do injustice (359c)
    - “if in our thoughts we grant to a just and unjust person the freedom to do whatever they like. We can then follow both of them and see where their desires would lead. And we'll catch the just person red-handed traveling the same road as the unjust. The reason for this is the desire to outdo others and get more and more.” (359c)
    - Gyges of Lydia (359d - 360c)
        - Shepherd in the service of the ruler of Lydia
        - Found a ring that could make him invisible
        - With the power of the ring, the seduced the kind's wife, attacked the king with her help, killed him and took over the kingdom
        - A just person would follow the same path had they had access to the ring (360c)
            - “every man believes that injustice is far more profitable to himself than justice”
- (3) Arguing that those people have a good reason to act as they do, for the life of the unjust person is much better than, they say, that of a just one
    - Comparing two lives (360e - 361d)
        - Glaucon compares the following
            - Unjust man who is able to cover up all his unjustices like a skilled craftsman can save the situation even when things go wrong (361a - 361b)
            - Just man who does not want to be believed to be good but to be so (361b)
                - Follows what Aeschylus says in *Seven Against Thebes*: "he did not wish to be believed to be the best but to be it”
            - Socrates says this is a very clean comparison
                - "how vigorously you've scoured each of the men for our competition, just as you would a pair of statues for an art competition” (361d)
                - Scour = to clean or brighten the surface of (something) by rubbing it hard, typically with an abrasive or detergent
                - PP adds: Glaucon takes it as a compliment but Socrates was perhaps being sarcastic and instead meant that the comparisons are unrealistic
            - The just person would be punished and come to realise that they shouldn’t want to be just but merely to be believed to be just (361e)
            - Aeschylus’ words are far more correctly applied to unjust people than to just ones

        - Unjust people just want to have a reputation for justice but really want to be unjust
        - They can use unjust powers to win over his enemies and be successful (362b- 362c)
        - The unjust person can make more offerings to the Gods and so the Gods will favour them more (362c)

- Glaucon's brother, Adeimantus, interjects
    - Socrates encourages Adeimantus to support Glaucon's case but he instead presents opposing arguments in attempt to try to tease out what Glaucon really meant (362d)
    - Adeimantus argues that when people tell others to be just, they do not stop only at the consequences of a reputation for justice as Glaucon listed. They also reason that when people die they are led to Hades to judge whether their lives have been just. If they were unjust they get buried into the mud of Hades. The post-humous consequences of being unjust are what drives people towards justice and away from injustice. (363a- 363e)
    - Adeimantus continues to point put that people and poets say that "unjust deeds are for the most part more profitable than just ones" (364a)
        - Poets also say that Gods sometimes punish those who are just and assign good fate to the unjust (364b)
            - They also say that Gods can be convinced by means of sacrifice (365a)
        - Adeimantus asks how these stories would affect young people
            - They would be motivated to keep up a reputation of virtue to hide their vice (365c)
            - Hiding vices is not easy so people would form secret societies to teach people to persuade others that they are not committing a vice (365d)
            - BUT gods know if we have done wrong?
                - If gods don't exist or don't care about what humans do, why should we care about what they think (365d)
                - If gods exist and are concerned about humans, all we know about them came from poetry, which tells us that "they can be persuaded and influenced by sacrifices, gentle prayers and offerings." (365e)
                - So someone who practices injustice with such a false facade would do well with both humans and gods (366b)
                    - PP adds: because they can use the fruits of their injustice to give more offerings to the gods
            - If someone still thinks that justice is best, they would be forgiving towards the unjust (unless they are god-like and have a disgust for injustice) because they would know that no-one is willingly just. (366c)

- Old people or cowards object to injustice but only because they lack the power to do injustice; people who are unjust first are the first to gain and can do as much injustice as they can (366d)

  - Adeimantus continues to say that poets have never said that justice is the best and injustice is bad, for if they have done so and persuaded people from youth, we would not have to guard against each other's injustices for one would be one's own guardian against injustice out of fear. (366d - 367a)

- Adeimantus challenges Socrates to give a response

  - Socrates should follow Glaucon's suggestion and not take reputations into account, otherwise it would be the same to encourage people to be unjust in secret (367b)

    - If Socrates considers reputation, "we'll say that you agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the good of another, the advantage of the stronger, while injustice is one's own advantage and profit, though not the advantage of the weaker." (367c)

  - Socrates should praise justice as a good of the second kind, valuable for itself and for its consequences. He should explain how justice – for its very self – benefits its possessors and show how injustice harms them. (367d)

  - Socrates should argue beyond a theoretical argument and show what effect each of justice and injustice has because of itself and on the person who has it, and whether it remains hidden from gods and human beings or not. (367e)

Book 4; 444e - 445a

- Fine ways of living leads to virtue and shameful ones to vice (444e)
- BUT vice destroys the soul

  - So someone with lots of money, food and drink, and can do whatever he wishes can actually be ruined for the soul is ruined

Book 10; 612

- "haven't we found that justice itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and the soul – whether it has the ring of Gyges or even it together with the cap of Hades – should do just things?" (612b)

  - The cap of Hades also makes the wearer invisible

- This conception of justice allows justice to be distinguished from injustice in the eyes of gods, regardless of reputation (612d - 612e)
- Socrates argues that this allows the just to be awarded and the unjust to be punished

Glaucon's Challenge

Christopher Kirwan, Phronesis, 1965, Vol.10(2), pp.162-173

- Glaucon challenges Socrates to refute the Thrasymachean view of justice more effectively than he has done in Book I. (p.162)
- Glaucon: Commend that feature of justice by which it benefits the man who has it itself on its own account, and injustice harms him; leave to others to commend rewards and reputations. (367d)
  - Possible conflict: If Socrates praises justice for the benefits then it is to praise justice for its consequences (p.162)
    - Happiness is one of the benefits of justice
      - PP adds: benefit ≠ consequence; e.g. a benefit of being just may be happiness but being praised for being just would be a consequence
    - BUT the conflict might not be real because one could say 'Hurrah for justice. What a good and splendid thing it is.' without having to mention the consequences of justice
    - Socrates was not after this kind of praise.
    - "What are required of him are *reasons for thinking* that justice is a good and splendid thing. But, in the second place, these reasons need not mention consequences." (p.163)
    - "One may recommend justice by comparing it with something admitted to be worthy of pursuit. So Socrates recommends it (again the point is Mabbott's) at the end of Book IV (444 d-5 b), comparing justice with health: if a just man is a man with a healthy soul, then of course one will want to be such. It follows that praise, even reasoned praise, of justice need not praise its consequences" (p.163)
      - If Glaucon and Adeimantus insist Socrates also has to praise justice for its consequence, it would be inconsistent with Glaucon's original request
    - If praising justice in terms of itself is, then, to include praising it for the consequence that it makes men happy, Glaucon and Adeimantus must imply a distinction between different kinds of consequence: some are to be excluded, others not.
      - Characteristics of the consequences Adeimantus and Glaucon wants excluded, according to Foster
        - (1) Consequences that are artificial, not natural: that is, they do not follow the possession of justice without human intervention.
          - They are rewards in the sense in which a prize or a bribe is a reward for work or service
          - Mabbott notes that natural ≠ inevitable: Relief of headache is the natural of taking aspirin, since no one has to intervene in order that it shall have this

effect. But the relief does not always come, and could easily be prevented. (Mabbott, p.470) (p.164)

- (2) Consequences that follow from the appearance, even if it is a pretence, of justice rather than from the thing itself.
  - i.e. consequences that follow from the reputation of justice rather than justice itself
- “These two distinctions seems to me, as evidently to Plato, to be coincident. What is the natural consequence of an action or character will never be the consequence of its counterfeit, and artificial consequences will always follow successful pretence.” (p.164)

- Glaucon’s challenge to Socrates/Plato (showing that a thing is good for its own sake will be the same as praising it 'itself in terms of itself’) can be taken as praising it for its natural consequences.
  - His classification will therefore need some paraphrase to match it with the language he and Adeimantus employ later in their speeches: (p.165)
    - For 'good for its own sake' we must tacitly supply 'good for its natural consequences',
    - For 'good for what comes from it' we must supply 'good for its artificial consequences'.
  - Some problems with the above formulation
    - (1) The goods cited in Glaucon's second class have, normally, no artificial consequences. (p.165-166)
      - It would be odd (though admittedly possible) to recommend health or seeing since men do not normally offer prizes for keen observation or physical fitness.
    - (2) More importantly, the things cited in the classification as good only for what comes from them, the third class, include some which are good not (only) for artificial but for natural consequences. (p.166)
      - I do not mean the practice of medicine and other money-making professions, since the good things which Plato evidently has in mind as coming from them are fees, and fees do not come naturally but by human intervention. => artificial
      - The rewards of medical treatment and exercise are natural
      - What distinguishes these two things from the goods in Glaucon's class is that they are disagreeable, distasteful and irksome.
        - E.g. a surgical operation is something we are willing to undergo and tolerate, but health is something we welcome
  - Socrates’ challenge then becomes that he must show that justice is good for its natural consequences and is agreeable (unlike medical treatment or exercise)
    - Foster does not think that this is conceivable (p.166-167)
    - Adeimantus’ conditions are actually less stringent that Glaucon’s (p.168)

    - A thing can be beneficial but not agreeable and so can be placed in the third classification of goods
    - Happiness is argued to be a consequence of justice. Having good consequences such as happiness is compatible with it being disagreeable, so it, again, fits into Glaucon's classification.

- Reformulation: (p.169)
    - (1) Desired for itself = agreeable
    - (2) Desired for itself and its consequences = agreeable and beneficial
    - (3) Desired for its consequences = disagreeable but beneficial
        - Problem: two senses of "beneficial"
            - Narrow sense used in (1) => "All agreeable things are indeed beneficial, because agreeableness is one way (or one set of ways) of being beneficial." (p.169)
            - Later the word beneficial is taken in a broader sense
            - "Glaucon's three divisions can still be separated: his first comprises things beneficial in one way, his third things beneficial in the other way, and his second things beneficial in both ways." (p.169)
        - Mabbott's objection
            - "Socrates' proof that the just man is happiest is not, according to Mabbott, part of his proof that justice is higher than the third class. Pointing to the passage I mentioned earlier from the end of Book IV, where Socrates recommends justice as the health of the soul, Mabbott contended that that constitutes the whole of Plato's proof that justice is good for its own sake, i.e. that it is agreeable." (p.170)
            - ALSO this is an unlikely doctrine
                - "For it requires him to hold that if you have shown that justice is agreeable (good for its own sake) it remains to be shown that it makes men happy." (p.171)

The Good of Others in Plato's "Republic"

Sarah Waterlow, Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, 1 January 1972, Vol.73, pp.19-36

- There is necessarily, for common sense morality, a gap between agent and action, and whatever theory of moral judgment fails to take account of this gap fails to that extent to be a theory of morality in the sense in which it could have application to the ordinary moral consciousness. (p.20)
  - Plato's argument in the Republic fails to acknowledge this gap
    - while maintaining an agent to be something more than his actions, it is not able to offer an account whatever of their relation nor even indicate a basis for the existence of such a relation
    - "For instance, the definition of justice in the soul has been condemned on the ground that it provides no conceptual basis for expecting from someone whose soul is in the state defined such behaviour as we ordinarily consider just or morally good." (p.20)
  - The objective of Waterlow's paper is to show that nonetheless, the Republic does indicate a conceptual connexion (p.21)
- The Republic's definition of a just man: (p.22)
  - "Each individual one of us in whom each of the elements within him performs its proper function will be a just man and one who performs his proper function" (441d - 441e)
  - BUT one may be active and we may deem them functioning as they should, but we would not attribute that to someone with wisdom, since they might not be active
- The role of justice is "to rule, being wise and having forethought on behalf of the whole soul" and calls it "that small part which rules in him and transmits these commands, it too having within itself knowledge of what is to the interest of each part and of the common whole composed of the three of them" (442c) (p.23)
  - This suggests that the just man as defined not only could be but must be governed entirely by self-interest; which is to say not only that morally inferior individuals logically could count as Platonically just, but that morally good ones logically couldn't!
  - In Plato's ideal society matters are so arranged as to guarantee that action in one's own interest never conflicts with, and perhaps even promotes, the interests of others
    - Even this cannot save Plato from the charge of distorting to absurdity the concept of justice. Why? (p.23)
      - (1) He does not mean his definition of the just man to apply only within the context of the ideal state
        - It was meant to show that even in a society of injustice, the just man is better off.

    - (2) Even in the ideal situation, the behaviour of a man who acts regardless of all but his own interest, has, to ordinary understanding, no moral value despite the fact that what he does (in one sense of "does") is identical with what, if he had been a different character, he would have done out of consideration for interests other than his own; for ordinary understanding judges by what he would have done if this ideal identity did not hold.
        - Morally considering, the just person would be no different in intentions from a selfish person

- "Plato would himself agree that there is no purely conceptual connexion between his definition of justice and the kinds of action and refraining from action Socrates mentions in the passage just referred to. The reason is that there cannot be." (p.25)
    - From a true definition of justice (i.e., a formula revealing its eternal and necessary nature) it cannot follow that such and such specific sorts of action are just, since if this were to follow, it would be as necessary a truth as the definition itself.
    - What the just man does depends not only on his inner nature but on contingent circumstance (not determined *a priori*)
- Plato will maintain that it is precisely that state of the healthily functioning organic soul that he calls justice (p.25-26)
    - Assume for a moment that the second is true, namely that a man's welfare is indeed the condition in which each psychic element performs as it should (p.26)
    - In so far as moral goodness can be analysed in terms of acting for others' welfare, this state could properly be called moral goodness, since to reproduce itself in others is, *ex hypothesi*, to produce others' good.
    - It only can work, of course, if it can be shown that the inner state of justice has this self-replicating property. This is Waterlow's topic for the rest of this paper.
    - Justice is an internal state (p.27)
        - Justice is primarily a condition of the man himself, not any action of his or quality of actions. This is what provides Plato with a basis for his ultimate equating of justice with well-being.
        - BUT conceptualising justice in this way cuts its tie from moral actions
        - "As justice is primarily an inner state, a just action is and is called just only derivatively, by virtue of some relation it bears to it. But what relation? So far the action has been obscurely thought of as springing from the state of the agent, and our trouble all along has been to see why that particular state logically should cause any action we should ordinarily want to call just." (p.27)
- Plato's idea of justice as well being within the soul works because we can conceive the just person as wanting to continue that state of well-being (p.28)
    - The just man, the one whose psychic elements function as they should, acts justly; and to act justly is to act so as to promote this condition of psychic well-being.
    - Justice is self-propagating within the same soul.
    - Problem: how does this extend to a concern for the welfare of others as claimed?

- “While health is not health if it cannot maintain itself under normal conditions, it does not depend on its possessor's seeking to promote the physical welfare of others. Why then should Plato's justice logically be any more concerned with their psychic welfare?” (p.28)

- Plato never abandons the analogy of justice with skill (p.28-29)
  - “the practical expert of whatever kind is as such equally concerned to exercise his skill on any suitable material. His objective (which is also what defines him) is the realisation of a specific form and although the form cannot be practically realised except in actual individual cases, there are no particular cases towards which rather than others he will, as expert, be drawn for the realising of it.” (p.29)
  - Continue with the justice-health analogy
  - BUT if so, only healthy men are doctors and that a doctor's primary and defining function is to make men doctors
  - ALSO if being healthy were a way of being rational, then a healthy person as such would impartially propagate health. As things are, if a medical expert does this, it is not because he is healthy, but because he is rational.
  - The crucial concept is now that of justice as a mode of rationality. (p.29)
- Reason
  - In the Republic Plato also contrasts reason (alias intellect, knowledge) in its highest sense with what he thinks of as typically mathematical thinking. (p.30)
  - Reason = a principle which explains and unifies the initial data
  - Two contrasts (p.30)
    - (1) We start from a number of different cases of some property P, and reason is what looks beyond each to the ideal nature by virtue of which each of these is P and one among other P thing
    - (2) Reason starts from data which are already ideal rather than empirical but which in one respect are for the mathematician what sensory objects are for the ordinary man
      - The mathematician as such does not care, for instance, whether his basic concepts are simple or complex; they are concerned of reason at the highest level (p.30-31)
  - “the practical faculty Plato calls reason functions on formally very similar lines to his cognitive reason; similar enough certainly to justify classifying it as reason.” (p.31)
- “it is one thing for someone to have as his rational end the maintenance of a certain healthy order within himself: it is another for him to extend such care to other” (p.32)
  - “from the fact that he seeks it in his own case it does not follow that he seeks it in any other; which is not to say that he does not, but that if he does, it is not as a mere logical continuation of his own case.” (p.32)
- Plato would not disagree that there is a difference between self-directed and other-directed activity (p.33)

- If, as it seems he must, Plato would say that the self or person is the soul, not has it, then souls and selves are actually the product of reason (p.35)
- To say that individuals must be prior, for while individuals make society nothing in the same way makes individuals, is just to beg the question. (p.35)

Week 3: The Ideal City

Plato's Republic

Plato, Translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992

Book 2; 368 - 383

- Socrates says we should tackle the scenario like someone with bad eyesight would
  - Letters analogy (368d)
    - "we were told to read small letters from a distance and then noticed that the same letters existed elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface. We'd consider it godsend, I think, to be allowed to read the larger ones first and then to examine the smaller ones, to see whether they really are the same." (368d)
    - Socrates' strategy is to look at justice in the state first, since that is larger, and then examine what it would look like in the individual, which is a smaller unit (368e - 369a)
- The city (*polis*) is a collection of people, not of buildings (369c)
- Socrates develops the idea of a state (369c - 371e)
  - Socrates argues the city develops out of co-dependence because people need many things
  - It was initially suggested that the minimum requirement for a city is a group of 4-5 people (369d)
  - This suggestion was rejected subsequently when specialisation was introduced because 4-5 people are still insufficient to specialise and provide properly for the community (370d)
  - Socrates suggests that "citizens must not only produce enough for themselves at home but also goods of the right quality and quantity to satisfy the requirement of others" in order to enable trade (371a)
- City of Pigs
  - Socrates looks into the sort of lives the citizens of the described city would live. It turns out to be quite modest. (372a - 372b)
  - Glaucon points out that "It seems that you make your people feast without any delicacies" (372c)
  - Socrates adjusts the model to include salt, desserts etc. (372c)
  - Glaucon says "If you were founding a city for pigs, Socrates, he replied, wouldn't you fatten them on the same diet?" (372d)
  - Glaucon insists we should also give them couches and tables etc.

- Socrates reflects that it seems that they are coming up with the idea of not just a city but of a *luxurious* city (372e)
- Socrates says the true city, in his opinion, is the healthy one. He calls the luxurious city is a city with fever. (372e)

- The need for guardians
  - The city's increasing demands leads to war (373e)
  - This brings in the need for an army, but the army would also have to be specially trained since people cannot just pick up a weapon and be good at using it
  - "Then to the degree that the work of the guardians is most important, it requires most freedom from other things and the greatest skill and devotion." (374e)
  - Guardians would need to be fierce to enemies but gentle to people. Socrates compares this nature to that of a pedigree dog: "he is gentle as can be to those he's used to and knows, but the opposite to those he doesn't know" (375e)
- Education
  - Training of the soul through music and poetry is to be provided before physical training (376e)
  - Stories (also included under music and poetry) can be true and false
    - "the beginning of any process is most important, especially for anything young and tender" (377a)
    - Socrates argues we must supervise storytellers against telling false stories (377c - 377e)
    - E.g. gods must never be represented as doing harm (379c) => we demonstrated that it is impossible for the gods to produce bad things (391e)
    - Socrates will not allow Homer's poetry to be used in the education of the young, so that the guardians will be as god-fearing and godlike as humans can be (383c)

Book 3; 386 - 417

- Plato gives examples of lines he would censor out of Odyssey and Iliad (386c - 387a)
- "We'll ask Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we delete these passages and all similar ones. It isn't that they aren't poetic and pleasing to the majority of hearers but that, the more poetic they are, the less they should be heard by children or by men who are supposed to be free and to fear slavery more than death." (387b)
- If anyone but the ruler uses falsehood, it is punishable
  - "Then if it is appropriate for anyone to use falsehoods for the good of the city, because of the actions of either enemies or citizens, it is the rulers. But everyone else must keep away from them, because for a private citizen to lie to a ruler is just as bad a mistake as for a sick person or athlete not to tell the truth to his doctor or trainer about his physical condition or for a sailor not to tell the captain the facts about his own condition or that of the ship and the rest of its crew – indeed it is a worse mistake than either of these." (389c)

- Imitation
  - It seems that Homer and other poets effect their narrative through imitation (393c)
  - Types of poetry (394c)
    - Only imitation – tragedy and comedy
    - Only narration by the poet – dithyrambs (Choral songs to the god Dionysus)
    - Both imitation and narration by the poet – epic poetry etc.
  - The task is now to figure out whether or not to allow poets to narrate through imitation, and if so, will they be allowed to imitate some things but not others? (394d)
    - Socrates proposes that guardians, if they were to be allowed to imitate, must only imitate the courageous (395c)
    - A moderate person will happily imitate a good person (396d)
    - A bad person, on the other hand, would imitate everything (397a)
    - Socrates compares it to the moderate person following some musical rules whereas the bad person would imitate by using all kinds of musical modes and rhythms => the results will be very messy (397c)
    - Adeimantus thinks that only the pure imitator of a decent person should be allowed (397d) => pure imitator as in only imitate no narration
  - Socrates discusses the musical modes that are suitable and unsuitable (398a - 398e)
    - Musical modes and the meter needs to be regulated for the luxurious city to be purified (399e)
- Education
  - Reasons to provide education in music and poetry (401e)
    - (1) Rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything else
      - Someone educated in music and poetry would be graceful; if not, the opposite
    - (2) Anyone who has been properly educated in music and poetry will sense it acutely when something has been omitted
      - Has the correct distastes => will praise fine things and object shameful ones
  - Returning to the letters analogy
    - Our reading ability was not adequate until we realised that there are only a few letters that appear in all sorts of different combinations (402a)
    - So we give them attention, knowing that we wouldn't be competent readers until we knew our letters (402b)
    - We would have to be able to tell which letter it is when reflected etc.
    - So, in the same way, "neither we, nor the guardians we are raising, will be educated in music and poetry until we know the different forms of moderation, courage, frankness, high-mindedness, and all their kindred, and their opposites

too, which are moving around everywhere, and see them in the things in which they are both themselves and their images, and do not disregard them, whether they are written on small things or large, but accept that the knowledge of both large and small letters is part of the same craft and discipline" (402c)

- Physical education
  - A fit soul makes one fit for physical education: "a good soul by virtue makes the body as good as possible" (403d)
  - Medical treatment
    - By making his dying a lengthy process, Asclepius lived a life in medical treatment (406b)
    - Asclepius failed to teach this type of medicine to his sons, not because he was ignorant or inexperienced, but because he knew that everyone in a well-regulated city has his own work to do and that no one has the leisure to be ill and under treatment all his life (406c)
    - "It's absurd that we recognise this to be true of craftsmen while failing to recognise that it's equally true of those who are wealthy and supposedly happy." (406c)
    - Carpenter has no time to be ill so he tells the doctor to get rid of his sickness through surgery (406d)
    - "excessive care of the body over and above physical training, is pretty well the biggest obstacle of all" (407b)
    - Asclepius only treated people if their bodies were healthy in nature and habits, but for those whose bodies were riddled with disease, he did not try to help prolong their misery. (407c - 407e)
      - It was commented that Asclepius was quite a statesman for that (407e)
  - Doctors and judges
    - Doctors will need to treat bodies with their souls, and it isn't possible for the soul to treat anything well, if it is or has been bad itself (408e)
    - The judge will similarly have to have a good soul (409a)
    - A good judge must be an old one who has learned late in life what injustice is like and who has become aware of it not as something at home in his own soul, but as something alien and present in others (409b)
      - Know that injustice is bad through knowledge not experience (409c)
  - The person trained in music and poetry will choose to make no use of medicine except when unavoidable (410b)
  - "a god has given music and physical training to human beings not, except incidentally, for the body and the soul but for the spirited and wisdom-loving parts of the soul itself, in order that these might be in harmony with one another, each being stretched and relaxed to the appropriate degree." (411e - 412a)
- Who rules?

- “we must choose from among our guardians those men who, upon examination, seem most of all to believe throughout their lives that they must eagerly pursue what is advantageous to the city and be wholly unwilling to do the opposite.” (412d -412e)
- We need to observe them at all ages to make sure neither compulsion nor magic spells would get them to discard or forget their belief that they must do what is best for the city (412e)
- Property
  - Socrates proposes to Glaucon that if rulers did not live under the following conditions, they would become hostile (416d - 417b)
    - (1) no private property beyond what is wholly necessary
    - (2) none of them should have a house or a storeroom that is not open for all to enter at will
    - (3) receive salary for guardianship from taxes as sustenance
    - (4) they will have common messes and live together like soldiers in a camp
    - (5) it is unlawful for them to touch gold or silver; they will be told they have divine gold
  - Glaucon agrees with this idea (417b)

Book 4; 417 - 427

- Adeimantus makes the observation that the city belongs to the rulers, yet they derive no good from it. Everyone else seems happy but rulers seem not to enjoy the state of affairs (419a)
- Both poverty and wealth makes a craftsman and his products worse (421e)
  - “The former makes for luxury, idleness, and revolution; the latter for slavishness, bad work, and revolution as well.” (422a)
- If children of guardian are inferior, they must be sent off to join the citizens; able offsprings of others can become guardians (423c - 423d)
- “Good education and upbringing, when they are preserved, produce good natures, and useful natures, who are in turn well educated, grow up even better than their predecessors, both in their offspring and in other respects, just like other animals.” (424a)
  - The final outcome of education, according to Socrates, is a single newly finished person, who is either good or the opposite. (425c)
- Socrates is convinced that the city they imagined, if indeed it has been correctly founded, should be completely good (427e)
  - It is wise, courageous, moderate and just (427e)

The Open Society and Its Enemies: New One-Volume Edition

Karl Popper, Princeton University Press, 1994, Accessed via: https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2200/princetonup/view/title/542518

Plato's Sociology; Chapter 4: Change and Rest

- Popper comments that Plato successfully applied his idealist method to an analysis of the social life of man, and of the laws of its development as well as the laws and conditions of its stability. (p.35)
- Plato's theory of social change
  - There is the world of unchanging Forms or Ideas, of which the world of changing things in space and time is the offspring. (p.35-36)
  - "The more closely a sensible thing resembles its Form or Idea, the less corruptible it must be, since the Forms themselves are incorruptible. But sensible or generated things are not perfect copies; indeed, no copy can be perfect, since it is only an imitation of the true reality, only appearance and illusion, not the truth." (p.36)
  - Good imitations of the form change very little at first but may change a lot afterwards => *The Laws* describes the process of degeneration to be slow at first but more rapid afterwards
  - Aristotle paraphrases Plato as: 'Things are generated by participating in the Form, and they decay by losing the Form.' (p.36)
  - Law of increasing corruptibility but not necessarily corruption: "the danger or the likelihood of corruption increases, but exceptional developments in the other direction are not excluded.Thus it is possible, as the last quotations indicate, that a very good soul may defy change and decay, and that a very evil thing, for instance a very evil city, may be improved by changing it." (p.37)
- Plato as a sociologist (p.38)
  - Ideas based on observations
  - E.g. theory the primitive beginnings of society, of tribal patriarchy, and, in general, his attempt to outline the typical periods in the development of social life
  - E.g. Plato's sociological and economic historicism, his emphasis upon the *economic background* of the political life and the historical development; a theory revived by Marx under the name 'historical materialism'
  - E.g. law of political revolutions => all revolutions presuppose a disunited ruling class (or 'élite')
- Plato discusses these ideas in three of his works [presented here in chronological order]
  - (1) the *Republic*

    - the *Republic* give, in a more abstract way, a systematic outline of the development of government (p.39)
  - (2) the *Statesman* (the *Politicus*)
    - the *Statesman*, still more abstract, gives a logical classification of types of government, with only a few allusions to historical events (p.39)
  - (3) the *Laws*
    - The *Laws* , for instance, present the story of the decline and fall of human society as an account of Greek prehistory merging without any break into history (p.39)
- "According to the *Republic*, the original or primitive form of society, and at the same time, the one that resembles the Form or Idea of a state most closely, the 'best state', is a kingship of the wisest and most godlike of men." (p.39)
  - BUT a change still takes place (best imitation but not perfect)
    - "According to Plato, internal strife, class war, fomented by self-interest and especially material or economic self-interest, is the main force of 'social dynamics'." (p.39)
    - Order of change
      - Ideal state
      - Timocracy/timarchy => the rule of the noble who seek honour and fame;
        - The main difference between the best or ideal state and timocracy is that the latter contains an element of instability (p.40)
      - Oligarchy => the rule of the rich families;
        - With the establishment of the oligarchy, a state of potential civil war between the oligarchs and the poorer classes is reached (p.41)
      - Democracy => the rule of liberty which means lawlessness;
        - Plato's description of democracy is a vivid but intensely hostile and unjust parody of the political life of Athens (p.41)
      - Tyranny – the final illness of the city
- Plato's description is a brilliant piece of political propaganda (p.41)
- Plato aimed at setting out a system of historical periods, governed by a law of evolution; in other words, he aimed at a historicist theory of society (p.40)
  - Plato's description of the perfect or best state has usually been interpreted as the Utopian programme of a progressivist many characteristics of his best state, especially as described in Books Two to Four of the *Republic*, are intended (like his accounts of primitive society in the *Statesman* and the *Laws*) to be historical, or perhaps prehistorical (p.44)
- The *Statesman* (p.43)
  - Three forms of government, the rule of one man, of a few, and of the many.

- Each of these is then subdivided into two types, of which one is comparatively good and the other bad, according to whether or not they imitate ‘the only true original’ by copying and preserving its ancient laws .
- In this way, three conservative or lawful and three utterly depraved or lawless forms are distinguished; monarchy, aristocracy, and a conservative form of democracy are the lawful imitations, in order of merit.
- BUT democracy changes into its lawless form, and deteriorates further, through oligarchy, the lawless rule of the few, into a lawless rule of the one, tyranny, which, just as Plato has said in the *Republic*, is the worst of all.

- How does Plato avoid the class war?
  - “Plato’s best state is based on the most rigid class distinctions. It is a caste state.The problem of avoiding class war is solved, not by abolishing classes, but by giving the ruling class a superiority which cannot be challenged.” (p.45)
  - Plato distinguishes three classes in his best state, the guardians, their armed auxiliaries or warriors, and the working class. But actually there are only two castes, the military caste—the armed and educated rulers—and the unarmed and uneducated ruled, the human sheep; for the guardians are no separate caste, but merely old and wise warriors who have been promoted from the ranks of the auxiliaries (p.45)
  - Plato is only interested in the rulers (p.45)
    - Rulers are subject to communism: “This communism is confined to the ruling class, which alone must be kept free from disunion; quarrels among the ruled are not worthy of consideration.” (p;.46)
    - This communism entails common ownership of women and children. (p.47)
    - It is important to avoid prosperity as well as poverty. (p.47)
  - Slavery
    - “It is true that Plato discusses nowhere explicitly the status of slaves in his best state, and it is even true that he says that the *name* ‘slave’ should better be avoided, and that we should *call* the workers ‘supporters’ or even ‘employers’. But this is done for propagandist reasons. Nowhere is the slightest suggestion to be found that the institution of slavery is to be abolished, or to be mitigated.” (p.46)
    - Plato says of the timocratic man: ‘He will be inclined to treat slaves cruelly, for he does not despise them as much as a well-educated man would.’ But since only in the best city can education be found which is superior to that of timocracy, we are bound to conclude that there are slaves in Plato’s best city, and that they are not treated with cruelty, but are properly despised (p.46)
  - Class rigidity
    - “pressure from without the class is as necessary as are the ties between the members of the class. This pressure can be secured by emphasising and widening the gulf between the rulers and the ruled.” (p.47)
    - “We arrive in this way at the fundamental principle, announced only after some hesitation, that there must be no mingling between the classes:‘Any meddling or

changing over from one class to another', says Plato, 'is a great crime against the city and may rightly be denounced as the basest wickedness.'" (p.47)

- Plato tries to justify that rulers are vastly superior in three respects—in race, in education, and in their scale of values (p.47)
  - BUT Most people in civilised countries nowadays admit racial superiority to be a myth; but even if it were an established fact, it should not create special political rights, though it might create special moral responsibilities for the superior persons (p.48)
- Breeding
  - The race of the guardians must be kept pure (p.49)
  - Plato demands that the same principles be applied to the breeding of the master race (p.49)

- Education
  - "The breeding and the education of the auxiliaries and thereby of the ruling class of Plato's best state is, like their carrying of arms, a class symbol and therefore a class prerogative. And breeding and education are not empty symbols but, like arms, instruments of class rule, and necessary for ensuring the stability of this rule." (p.49)
  - The main difficulty which besets Plato is that guardians and auxiliaries must be endowed with a character that is fierce and gentle at the same time. (p.50)
  - Plato's educational aim is the purely political aim of stabilising the state by blending a fierce and a gentle element in the character of the rulers. (p.50)
  - "some god must have given man these two arts, music and gymnastics; and their purpose is not so much to serve soul and body respectively, but rather to tune properly the two main strings', i.e. to bring into harmony the two elements of the soul, gentleness and fierceness. 'These are the outlines of our system of education and training', Plato concludes in his analysis." (p.51)
  - Comparison
    - "Plato's political principles of literary education are based upon a simple comparison. Sparta, he saw, treated its human cattle just a little too harshly; this is a symptom or even an admission of a feeling of weakness, and therefore a symptom of the incipient degeneration of the master class. Athens, on the other hand, was altogether too liberal and slack in her treatment of slaves. Plato took this as proof that Sparta insisted just a little too much on gymnastics, and Athens, of course, far too much on music." (p.51)
  - "The political principle that determines the education of the soul, namely, the preservation of the stability of the state, determines also that of the body." (p.52)
  - "Children of both sexes, we are told twice, 'must be taken on horseback within the sight of actual war; and provided it can be done safely, they must be brought into battle, and made to taste blood; just as one does with young hounds'" (p.52)

Plato’s Political Programme; Chapter 6: Totalitarian Justice

- Plato’s fundamental demands can be expressed in either of two formulæ, the first corresponding to his idealist theory of change and rest, the second to his naturalism. (p.83)
- Plato’s political programme are based upon his historicism; and they have to be combined with his sociological doctrines concerning the conditions for the stability of class rule. (p.83)
- Principal elements (p.83)
  - (1) Strict division of classes
    - the ruling class consisting of herdsmen and watch-dogs must be strictly separated from the human cattle.
  - (2) The identification of the fate of the state with that of the ruling class
    - the exclusive interest in this class, and in its unity; and subservient to this unity, the rigid rules for breeding and educating this class, and the strict supervision and collectivisation of the interests of its members.
  - These elements are then derived from the principal elements (p.84)
    - (3) The ruling class has a monopoly of things like military virtues and training, and of the right to carry arms and to receive education of any kind; but it is excluded from any participation in economic activities, and especially from earning money.
    - (4) There must be a censorship of all intellectual activities of the ruling class, and a continual propaganda aiming at moulding and unifying their minds.
      - All innovation in education, legislation, and religion must be prevented or suppressed.
    - (5) The state must be self-sufficient.
      - It must aim at economic autarchy; for otherwise the rulers would either be dependent upon traders, or become traders themselves.The first of these alternatives would under- mine their power, the second their unity and the stability of the state.
- “This programme can, I think, be fairly described as totalitarian. And it is certainly founded upon a historicist sociology.” (p.84)
  - “I believe that Plato’s political programme, far from being morally superior to totalitarianism, is fundamentally identical with it.” (p.84)
  - Popper’s thesis is that Plato's political demands are purely totalitarian and anti-humanitarian (p.85)
- What do normal people mean by justice? (p.86)
  - (a) an equal distribution of the burden of citizenship, i.e. of those limitations of freedom which are necessary in social life
  - (b) equal treatment of the citizens before the law, provided, of course, that

- (c) the laws show neither favour nor disfavour towards individual citizens or groups or classes
- (d) impartiality of the courts of justice; and
- (e) an equal share in the advantages (and not only in the burden) which membership of the state may offer to its citizens.
- If Plato meant justice of this kind he would not be a totalitarian
- BUT "Plato identifies justice with the principle of class rule and of class privilege. For the principle that every class should attend to its own business means, briefly and bluntly, that *the state is just if the ruler rules, if the worker works, and*[7] *if the slave slaves*." (p.87)
  - Comparing the humanitarian view of justice with Plato's view of justice
    - The humanitarian theory of justice makes three main demands or proposals, namely
      - (a) the equalitarian principle proper, i.e. the proposal to eliminate 'natural' privileges,
      - (b) the general principle of individualism, and
      - (c) the principle that it should be the task and the purpose of the state to protect the freedom of its citizens.
    - To each of these political demands or proposals there corresponds a directly opposite principle of Platonism, namely
      - (a^1) the principle of natural privilege,
      - (b^1) the general principle of holism or collectivism, and
      - (c^1) the principle that it should be the task and the purpose of the individual to maintain, and to strengthen, the stability of the state

- Equality
  - Plato "in the dialogue *Gorgias* (which is earlier than the *Republic*), speaks of the view that 'justice is equality' as one held by the great mass of the people, and as one which agrees not only with 'convention', but with 'nature itself'." (p.88)
  - "Aristotle says that it is the task of the judge to 'restore equality'. He tells us that 'all men think justice to be a kind of equality', an equality, namely, which 'pertains to persons'. He even thinks (but here he is wrong) that the Greek word for 'justice' is to be derived from a root that means 'equal division'." (p.88)
  - Plato's views in the *Laws* (p.88)
    - There are two kinds of equality in the distribution of spoils and honours are distinguished—'numerical' or 'arithmetical' equality and 'proportionate' equality;
    - Proportionate equality takes account of the degree in which the persons in question possess virtue, breeding, and wealth—and where this proportionate equality is said to constitute 'political justice'.

- Popper thinks that “the holistic and anti-equalitarian interpretation of justice in the *Republic* was an innovation, and that Plato attempted to present his totalitarian class rule as ‘just’ while people generally meant by ‘justice’ the exact opposite.” (p.89)

- “we cannot doubt that Plato knew the power of faith, and, above all, of a faith in justice. Nor can we doubt that the *Republic* must tend to pervert this faith, and to replace it by a directly opposite faith.” (p.89)
- “Equalitarianism proper is the demand that the citizens of the state should be treated impartially.” (p.91)
  - “it does not recognise any ‘natural’ privileges, although certain privileges may be conferred by the citizens upon those they trust.” (p.91)
  - “Later, in the *Laws*, Plato summarises his reply to equalitarianism in the formula: ‘Equal treatment of unequals must beget inequity” (p.92)
    - i.e. equal treatment of unequals bring about inequity
- Individualism
  - “The term ‘individualism’ can be used (according to the *Oxford Dictionary*) in two different ways: (*a*) in opposition to collectivism, and (*b*) in opposition to altruism.” (p.95-96)
  - Popper’s interpretation (p.96)
    - (a) Individualism is opposed to (a′) Collectivism.
    - (b) Egoism is opposed to (b′) Altruism.
  - “Collectivism is not opposed to egoism, nor is it identical with altruism or unselfishness.” (p.96)
    - E.g. group egoism
  - ALSO an anti-collectivist, i.e. an individualist, can, at the same time, be an altruist;
    - he can be ready to make sacrifices in order to help other individuals.
  - “Individualism was part of the old intuitive idea of justice. That justice is not, as Plato would have it, the health and harmony of the state, but rather a certain way of treating individuals, is emphasised by Aristotle, it will be remembered, when he says ‘justice is something that pertains to persons’” (p.97)
- Training
  - “Plato urges that the all-important requirements of military discipline must be paramount, even in peace, and that they must determine the whole life of all citizens; for not only the full citizens (who are all soldiers) and the children, but also the very beasts must spend their whole life in a state of permanent and total mobilisation.” (p.98-99)
  - “he should teach his soul, by long habit, never to dream of acting independently, and to become utterly incapable of it” (p.99)
- “the *Republic* develops a new doctrine of justice which is not merely incompatible with such an individualism, but utterly hostile towards it.” (p.100)

    - “Because of his radical collectivism, Plato is not even interested in those problems which men usually call the problems of justice, that is to say, in the impartial weighing of the contesting claims of individuals.” (p.101)
    - “Plato’s moral code is strictly utilitarian; it is a code of collectivist or political utilitarianism. *The criterion of morality is the interest of the state*. Morality is nothing but political hygiene.” (p.102)
    - “the virtue of keeping to one’s place will be common to all of them; and it will at the same time be a virtue of the whole: that of being properly fitted together—of being in harmony.” (p.103)
- Protectionism (p.107)
    - Lycophron (p.108)
- “Plato’s theory of justice, as presented in the *Republic* and later works, is a conscious attempt to get the better of the equalitarian, individualistic, and protectionist tendencies of his time, and to re-establish the claims of tribalism by developing a totalitarian moral theory.” (p.113)

Week 4: City-Soul Analogy

Plato's Republic

Plato, Translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992

Book 2; 367e—368e

- Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates to give an argument for why justice is to be preferred over injustice (367e)
  - Not just a theoretical argument but also show effects
  - Show that there are good effects for people who are just and bad effects for people who are unjust
  - Also show whether the effects remain hidden from gods and human beings or not
- "Sons of Ariston, godlike offsprings of a famous man" (368a)
  - Seems to show already that one is affected by the divine otherwise Glaucon's lover would not make such a statement
  - Note: Ariston is Plato, Adeimantus and Glaucon's father
- Socrates acts like he is not very capable; he claims that if he was capable the brothers would have been convinced since he rebutted Thrasymachus (368b)
- Letters analogy (368d)
  - If we are told to read some small letters we might not be able to discern them clearly
  - BUT we could look at bigger letters first and then try to figure out if they are the same as the small letters
  - THEN we can read the smaller letters
  - Examine justice in the city (larger) first then examine the justice in a man (smaller)

Book 4; 427c—445e

- After constructing the idea of the state, Socrates invites the brothers to examine where justice and injustice might be in it, what sorts of consequences each have and whether or not they are recognised by the Gods (427d)
  - Glaucon argues that it was Socrates' job to tell them but Socrates said that he needed their help to figure it out (427e)
- The city, if correctly founded, would be wise, courageous, moderate and just (427e)
  - If we looked and found any three of the four then the one that is left over must be the other (428a)
- Wisdom

- Wisdom seems to arise from having good judgement
  - BUT having knowledge ≠ being wise
  - E.g. carpenter knows how to use wood well = skilled carpenter ≠ wise carpenter
- There is “some knowledge possessed by some of the citizens in the city we just founded that does not judge about any particular matter but about the city as a whole and the maintenance of good relations, both internally and with other cities” (428c)
  - This is the knowledge of guardianship
  - Possessed only by a minority of people in the city
- “a whole city established according to nature would be wise because of the smallest class and part in it, namely, the governing or ruling one. And to this class, which seems to be by nature the smallest, belongs a share of the knowledge that alone among all the other kinds of knowledge is to be called wisdom.” (428e - 429a)

- Courage
  - Glaucon agrees with Socrates that if we were to assess whether or not a city is courageous we should look at the part which fights on behalf of the citizens, not at citizens in general (429b)
  - Socrates sees courage as a kind of preservation (429c)
  - Dye analogy
    - A carefully prepared dyeing process will result in the colours staying
    - Without careful preparation the dye would wash away
    - The soldiers in the ideal state are selected and educated carefully with music and physical training
      - “they would absorb the laws in the finest possible way, just like a dye, so that their belief about what they should fear and all the rest would become so fast that even such extremely effective detergents as pleasure, pain, fear, and desire wouldn’t wash it out” (430a)
  - Glaucon accepts Socrates’ account of courage but Socrates reminds him that this is only an account of civic courage (430c)
- Moderation
  - Self-control implies there is a better part of the person that is in control of the worse (431a)
  - In the city, those that have various desires, pleasures, pains etc. (producers) are controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few (guardians) so the city is in control of itself and its pleasures (431d)
  - Hence the city is moderate
  - “this unanimity, this agreement between the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which of the two is to rule both in the city and in each one, is rightly called moderation” (432a)

- Justice
  - "justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what isn't one's own" (433a)
  - Since we have found the other three, justice is said to have been found (433c)
  - Socrates argues that justice is the most important of the four virtues of the city (433d)
- Class relations
  - It would not be damaging for a cobbler to trade roles with a carpenter but it would be very damaging to the city if unworthy guardians tried to become rulers (434a - 434b)
  - "Meddling and exchange between there three classes, then, is the greatest harm that can happen to the city and would rightly be called the worst thing someone could do to it." (434b)
  - The worst thing someone can do to the city is injustice so exchange and meddling between classes is injustice (434c)
- Applying justice in the city to justice in the soul
  - Socrates applies the idea of justice in the city to the individual; if this becomes problematic then one must return to the idea of justice in the city and modify it (434d)
  - Things are "called by the same name, whether they are bigger or smaller than one another, like or unlike with respect to that to which that name applies" so the just man will be like the city (435a)
    - "if an individual has these same three parts in his soul, we will expect him to be correctly called by the same names as the city if he has the same conditions in them" (435b)
  - Spirit comes to be present in cities from individuals as the Thracians or Scythians whereas the love of learning is displayed by the Phoenicians and Egyptians (435e - 436a)
- The parts of the soul
  - Socrates asks Glaucon whether the soul has three parts, but Glaucon says he does not know (435c)
  - Socrates tells Glaucon that in his opinion, "we will never get a precise answer using our present methods of argument – although there is a longer and fuller road that leads to such an answer" (435d)
    - PP adds: it seems that despite Socrates saying that he is not very good and needs Glaucon to help him prove his point, he actually knows what he is doing, so when Glaucon does not follow, he takes charge
  - Socrates asks if we learn, get angry and desire the pleasures of food, drink and sex with the same parts (436a)
    - "It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if we ever find this happening in the soul, we'll know that we aren't dealing with one thing but many" (436b)
  - Spinning top analogy (436d - 436e)

    - The peg is fixed in the same place
    - The top spins
    - Top revolves >> circular motion on the same spot
    - So one thing can undergo opposites at the same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same thing (436e)
- Appetite
  - Thirst does not specify whether to drink hot or cold water (437d - 437e)
    - When it's hot we want do drink cold things and when it is cold we want to drink hot things
    - BUT "thirst itself will never be for anything other than what it is in its nature to be for, namely, drink itself, and huger for food" (437e)
    - Glaucon summarises this as: "each appetite itself is only for its natural object, while the appetite for something of a certain sort depends on additions" (437e)
    - PP adds: appetite is quite primitive
- Reason
  - Everything is related to something, if not, then it is related to itself (438d)
    - Knowledge too: "Knowledge itself is knowledge of what can be learned itself (or whatever it is that knowledge is of), while a particular sort of knowledge is of a particular sort of thing. For example, when knowledge of building houses came to be, didn't it differed from the other kinds of knowledge, and so was called knowledge of building?" (438c - 438d)
    - Related but does not have to be of the same sort (438e)
      - E.g. knowledge of health or disease is not healthy or sick
      - E.g. knowledge of good and bad does not become good or bad
  - Thirst is related to drink
    - So something that draws one back when one is thirsting would be different from whatever thirst drives one to drink (439b)
    - In the same way, "it's wrong to say of the archer that his hands are at the same time push the bow away and draw it towards him. We ought to say that one hand pushes it away and the other draws it towards him" (439b)
    - The thirsty person who does not drink has another part of him opposing the appetitive
      - "We'll call part of the soul which it calculates the rational part and the part which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites the irrational appetitive part, companion of certain indulgences and pleasures." (439d)
- Spirit
  - Socrates asks if the spirited part by which we get angry a third component or one of the two (439e)

- Leontius saw some corpses and has a (sexual) appetitive to look at them. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face but then gives in to his appetite. When he does look, he pushed his eyes wide opens and said “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!” (439e)
    - PP adds: Leontius is angry he cannot resist his appetite
    - Glaucon agrees that “anger sometimes makes war against the appetites, as one thing against another.” (440a)
    - In this case, spirit is aligned with reason
- Spirit can also align with appetite
    - E.g. when a person believes someone has been unjust to him he becomes angry (440c - 440d)
- Spirit ≠ rational for children are spirited yet lack rational calculating capabilities (441a)
- Spirit ≠ appetite as in the Leontius case
- So there is a third part to the soul – the spirit

- “We are pretty much agreed that the same number and the same kinds of classes as are in the city are also in the soul of each individual.” (441c)
    - Socrates reminds Glaucon that “each one of us in whom each part is doing its own work will himself be just and do his own.” (441d)
    - The rational part should rule because it is wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the soul (441e)
        - Wise
    - The spirited part should obey and be the rational part’s ally (441e)
        - Courageous
    - The rational and spirited part, nurtured by music and having truly learned their own roles and been educated in them, will govern the appetitive part (442a)
    - Harmonious parts => moderation
    - So since the person is wise, courageous and moderate, we know that they, like the city, are just (442d)
    - Socrates: “Then the dream we had has been completely fulfilled – our suspicion that, with the help of some god, we had hit upon the origin and pattern of justice right at the beginning in founding our city.” (443b)
    - Description of the just man
        - “One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself.” (443d)
- Injustice
    - Injustice would be a civil war between the parts of the soul (444b)

- Virtue is health of the soul while vice is disease (444d)
- Is it more profitable to live justly or unjustly? (445a)
  - It seems that there is one form of virtue and unlimited number of forms of vice, four of which are worth mentioning (445c)
- There are the same number of types of soul as the number of types of political constitutions: 5 forms of constitutions; 5 forms of souls (445c)
- The state described could be a kingship if there is only one ruler (445d)
  - If more than one ruler => aristocracy
  - “Therefore, I say that this is one form of constitution. Whether one man emerges or many, none of the significant laws of the city would be changed, if they followed the upbringing and education we described.” (445d)

Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays

Richard Kraut (ed.), Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997, Accessed via: http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2091/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=6fc2afae-3dc7-4e5e-a1a4-8d17e1c011fe%40sdc-v-sessmgr01&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=18600&db=nlebk

Inside and Outside the *Republic* by Jonathan Lear

1 Introduction

- The paper focusses on the following (p.44)
  - The analogy between the city and the psyche
  - Plato’s critique of the poets

2 Internalisation

- For Plato, humans enter the world with a capacity to absorb cultural influences. The young human psyche is like a resin, able to receive the impress of cultural influences before it sets into a definite shape. And it is clear that, for Plato, the stakes are high. (p.45)
- Plato seems to be saying that through proper imitations from youth, one actually constitutes oneself as a certain type of person. (p.45)
  - Whether one develops into a noble and brave person, at one extreme, or a base coward, at the other, depends significantly on the myths one has heard from youth, the education one has received, the models one has been given to imitate.

- Culture penetrates so deeply, that a fractured polis will produce a fractured psyche. (p.45)
- For Plato, it is only the ideal polis that can properly be called a polis or a city. Other actual cities or poleis are only apparently such. (p.45)
- Plato argues that for every pathological polis there is a pathological psyche, which is in fact made of various psychic parts (p.45)
  - E.g. oligarchy is made up of rich and poor parts so oligarchic psyche is made up of two psychic parts – a ruling part and a ruled
  - Plato argues that the parts in the oligarchy are not sufficiently integrated to become a psyche (p.46)
- Internalisation = taking cultural influences into the psyche (p.46)
  - A fundamental psychological activity (p.46)
  - We are culture-vultures: we 'feed' our psyches by internalising cultural influences (p.46)
- Although Plato did not have an articulated theory, he did think that imitation *(mimesis)* was a paradigmatic means of internalisation (p.46)
  - Youthful imitations shape one's character
    - Hence musical education is very important
- Plato thought that internalisation was a largely unconscious process (p.46)
  - "lawlessness, Plato says, easily creeps into music without our noticing and, "having little by little settled in there it *flows into the characters* and pursuits" of people"
  - So, in our education and rule of children, one should not let them be free until "a constitution is set up inside them just as in the polis"

3 Externalisation

- Plato suggests that culture is formed by an inverse process of psychological activity, moving outwards from psyche to polis (p.46)
  - As many types of constitutions as people since constitutions come from people not from stone
  - The shape of the polis has to be understood as deriving from the shape of the psyche
- The just polis (p.47)
  - The just city is shaped by a philosopher-king
  - Philosopher studies the realities and imitating them
  - By studying the realities he has made himself as divine as it is possible for a human to be

    - There is no ideal polis on earth and thus no ideal cultural template to internalise, but by studying the ideal state in heaven, a person studying it can constitute himself its citizen
    - “Only after the philosopher has shaped his own psyche by internalising divine order is he then able to shape the polis according to what has now become the order in his psyche” (p.47)
- Externalisation = the process by which Plato thought a person fashions something in the external world according to a likeness in his psyche (p.47)
- “the polis is formed by a process of externalisation of structures within the psyches of those who shape it. And, more generally, *externalisation is a basic psychological activity*. For Plato suggests that cultural products in general are externalisations.” (p.47)
- Education
    - Plato believes that education should begin with telling children false tales that are imitations of the psyche
        - These myths are acceptable because
            - (1) there is some truth in them
            - (2) it is a reflection of the poet’s psyche
            - unacceptable myths are externalisations of the falsehood in the psyche
        - “this merely verbal falsehood is an externalisation of something true within the poet’s psyche, that it can be used, with caution, as a medicine” (p.47)
- “In the ideal polis, after we internalise our cultural roles by a process of education, we then externalise them in our social roles. It is by a process of internalisation and externalisation that we are able to conform to the rule of each performing his own task.” (p.47)
- “Internalisation is primarily going on in unformed youths, externalisation is going on primarily in adults who have already formed themselves through prior cultural internalisations. Psyche and polis are mutually constituted by a series of internalisations and externalisations, with transformations occurring on both sides of the border” (p.47)
- Plato is not relying on a mere analogy “of polis and psyche, but on an isomorphism which must hold due to the way we function psychologically. Psyche and polis, inner world and outer world, are jointly constituted by reciprocal internalisations and externalisations; and the analogy is a byproduct of this psychological dynamic.” (p.48)

4 The Analogy of Psyche and Polis

- If Bernard Williams was right then Plato’s analogy is a mess. Lear tries to rescue Plato’s argument from Williams by attending to the psychological principles which underlie it. (p.48)
- The analogy is founded on two principles (according to Williams) (p.48)
    - (1) The whole-part rule: A city if F if and only if its men are F.

- (2) The analogy of meaning: The explanation of a city's being F is the same as that of a man's being F (the same *eidos* [form] of F-ness applies to both).
    - Socrates: "things called by the same name are alike in respect to which the name applies" (p.49)
- Problem (according to Williams): the whole-part rule defeats the analogy of meaning
    - If we accept the whole-part rule, by saying a city is F we already accept that its men are F so it's pointless to think otherwise
    - BUT to accept that the city is F, we find that the common account for it is "x if F iff x has constituent parts which are F"
        - Leads to regress
    - Reply: Plato does not in fact think that F is applied to a polis "just because" it is applied to its citizens but rather because of some causal-psychological transactions
        - "The isomorphism depends on psychological relations Plato believed to hold between inside and outside. If justice, for example, can be found outside (in the polis) it must have come from inside (i.e. it must be a causal outcome of just men shaping the polis according to their conception of justice). Given the psychologically dynamic relations between inside and outside, a weak version of a whole-part rule will follow as a corollary" (p.49)
        - Plato uses psychology to legitimise isomorphism
- Williams says there is a contradiction in the *Republic* (p.49)
    - (1) The whole-part rule: A city if F if and only if its men are F.
        - PP adds: ∀x (Fx <-> ∀yFy)
    - BUT most of the people in the ideal state are of the producing class and not just in themselves, but are nonetheless doing their own tasks
    - Solution: adjust the rule to (1') If a polis is F, then some of its men are F
        - PP adds: ∀x(Fx -> ∃yFy)
        - BUT Williams thinks that the appetitive (epithymetic) class must exercise some reason *(logistikon)* of its own, even if it is only in the service of obeying its rulers, sticking to its tasks, etc. (p.49)
            - Solution: In an ideal polis, then, an appetitive person will be brought up so as not to have unnecessary appetites. (p.50)
                - "The necessary appetites are either unavoidable (e.g. for basic nourishment) or they are for things which do us some good. Unnecessary appetites, by contrast, are both avoidable by proper training from youth and they lead to no good (or even to bad)." (p.50)
                - "Such a person will only have appetites for the bare necessities of life and for things which genuinely do him good. In the well-ordered polis, Plato says, each class will enjoy the happiness that suits its nature." (p.50)

- BUT the psychic parts are already isolated to be the essential conditions in which they must operate so appetite cannot “harken to reason” (listen to reason), yet it seems that appetite is now responsive to reason in the psyche
    - Reply: “once we recognise internalisation and externalisation as basic psychological activities, we can see that the psychic parts can be shaped, and thus that the conditions under which we first identify them need not be the conditions under which they operate” (p.50)
    - Culture can permeate into the lower elements of the psyche: “The appetitive personality will organise his personality around his appetites; and a paradigm, for Plato, is the money-lover who devotes himself to the pursuit of wealth: reason will be directed instrumentally toward figuring out ways of satisfying this desire, he will feel honour in achieving wealth-related goals, and there is a peculiar pleasure in achieving them” (p.51)
    - “given that this appetitive person has been brought up to have just the appetites which the well-ordered polis can satisfy, his reason ought to be telling him that the best way to satisfy his appetites is to harken to the reason manifest in the laws of the philosopher-king.” (p.51)
- Auxiliaries
    - “they will be educated so as to be free of unnecessary appetites and to have their other appetites disciplined to the pursuit of honour. Their reason too will be directed towards honour, but they will have been educated so as to understand that the way to achieve true honour is to defend and safeguard the law (laid down by the philosopher-rulers)” (p.51)
- Pathology
    - “Plato does not merely want to show that the same neurotic structure can exist in both psyche and polis, but that the pathology in each helps to bring about pathology in the other.” (p.52)
    - “degeneration occurs through a dialectic of internalisation of pathological cultural influences in individuals which provokes a degeneration in character-structure (as compared to the previous generation) which is in turn imposed on the polis, which thus acquires and provokes deeper pathology.” (p.52)
- Plato’s account of the rise of democratic man (p.52)
    - The son of the oligarch did not have proper upbringing and so did not internalise true culture
    - He keeps his unnecessary appetites in check through brute force
    - Contradictory demands in the Oligarch’s family
        - demand *inside* his family for frugality so as to accumulate wealth
        - BUT to pursue wealth is to organise the family around the appetites, yet to insist on frugality is to hold those appetites in check
        - SO the child is brought up in a miserly fashion without real education

    - ALSO oligarch encourages others to be wasteful and hopes to eventually acquire their property
        - These people, made poor, will eventually revolt and usher in democracy
        - Prodigality (excessive or extravagant spending) cannot be kept outside
            - "The prodigal youths, encouraged by the oligarch, are an externalisation and inter-psychic correlate to the unnecessary appetites within the oligarch's psyche. Because the son's appetites have been both encouraged and held back, he is susceptible to appetitive influences around him." (p.52)
    - Problem: Williams thinks that Plato has confounded as state with people of various characters with a state in which most of the people have a various character (p.53)
        - The democratic polis is one which contains every sort of character, like a garment of many colours. Williams points out, the democratic man is described as always shifting, following the appetite of the moment, without any expertise. (p.53)
        - Solution: characters might not shift but are shiftable
            - "humans need a socially grounded culture to internalise" (p.53)
- "The point of Plato's argument is to show that there is only one relatively stable equilibrium position between inside and outside. Only the just polis and its citizens are so structured that the various internalisations and externalisations will maintain harmony in each and harmony between them. Justice, for Plato, is a certain harmony within the psyche; it is also a certain harmony within the polis." (p.54)

5 Poetic Justice

- Two features of poetry which make it an especially potent (effective) drug (p.54)
    - (1) the music and rhythms with which poetry is expressed pour directly into our psyches
    - (2) poetry tends to be expressed in imitative style: the characters speak as though from their own first-personal perspectives
- "By pretending to be these characters, we unconsciously shape our characters around them." (p.54)
- "Poetry feeds our psychological hunger to take things in, but it feeds us a diet of fantasy" (p.54)
    - Able to bypass reason to the appetites
    - "Poetry thus sets us up for intrapsychic conflict" (p.55)
- "Only after the polis is rid of poets who tell tales of gods eating, fighting and deceiving each other, does Plato conclude that he has purged the fevered polis." (p.55)
- Myths
    - "These poetic myths provide a cultural template for youths to internalise, thus inverting their own psyches and, inevitably, the societies in which they live" (p.55)

- “Tyranny is an imitation of the Homeric divine: but there is nothing praiseworthy about that” (p.55)
    - Poets not only provide an externalisation of appetite but also a legitimation for them (p.55)
- The young are not able to distinguish myths from reality (p.56)
    - “if we already have a falsehood inside our psyches, even in mythic form, we will end up taking in more and more falsehood (as though it were true) and getting rid of more and more truth (as though it were false).” (p.56)

- “Poetry thus provides both a legitimation of the appetites, and a cultural template for tyranny” (p.56)
- The rise of the tyrant (p.56)
    - The tyrant is the child of the democratic man
    - “dread magicians” both whet (ลับคม) his lawless appetites and encourage him to expel from his psyche any remnants of shame which would keep the appetites in check.
    - “just as, *intra*psychically, the lawless appetites overtook the original, better ones in his psyche, so, *inter*psychically, the tyrant comes to feel justified (ó) in taking over his parent’s estate; and then going on to rob, punish and enslave family, friends and fellow citizens” (p.56)
    - He recreates the polis in the image of his psyche.
    - “the poet gives him the cultural vehicle by which he can, at least to his own satisfaction, legitimise his acts” (p.56)
    - From Plato’s perspective, poet and tyrant are the same type of person: a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde of the appetites.
        - Both have organized themselves around their appetites, though they have different strategies for dealing with them.
        - “Poet and tyrant ultimately enslave us, but while the tyrant enforces external compliance, poetic enslavement reaches inside the psyche and reorganises it so that we remain unconscious of our slavery.” (p.57)

Inside and Outside the *Republic* by Jonathan Lear

- Plato implies in the Letters Analogy that the larger inscription will help with the smaller only if they present the same message.
    - This message is that justice applies to both cities and men (p.38)
- Analogy of meaning: “let’s apply what has come to light in the city to an individual, and if it is accepted there, all will be well.” (434e)

- The whole-part rule: “Then, if an individual has these same three parts in his soul, we will expect him to be correctly called by the same names as the city if he has the same conditions in them.” (435e)
  - The argument at 435e defeats the analogy of meaning (p.38)
    - if we say that “F” is applied to the city just because it is applied to the men, we have already explained how the term can be applied to both cities and men, and to go on from there to look for a similar explanation of how “F” applies to men is at least pointless, since the phenomenon which set off the search for the analogy in the first place, viz. the fact that “F” applies to both cities and men, has already been explained.
    - If, moreover, the rule for applying “F” to cities is taken as itself the common [account] that we were looking for, then we have not just pointlessness but absurdity, since the common [account] will have to be something like “x is F if and only if x has constituent parts which are F,” which leads to a regress.
  - Not everything follows the rule of 435e
    - At 419a, “Socrates says that a city’s being sublimely happy does not depend on all, most, the leading part, or perhaps any, of its citizens being sublimely happy, just as a statue’s being beautiful does not depend on its parts being severally beautiful.” (p.38)
    - ALSO we can certainly agree that a large crowd of sailors is not necessarily a crowd of large sailors, while an angry crowd of sailors, on the other hand, is a crowd of angry sailors.
    - “So what Plato has here are two classes of term: one class (“angry,” “spirited,” etc.) obeys the rule of 435E, which we may call *the whole-part rule;* while the other class (“large,” “well-arranged,” etc.) does not.” (p.38)
- Terms (p.39)
  - logistic = rational
  - thymoeidic = spirited
  - epithymetic = appetitive
- Contradiction in Plato’s argument (p.39)
  - The argument
    - Plato wants to hold that (a) A city is F if and only if its men are F;
    - and (b) The explanation of a city’s being F is the same as that of a man’s being F
      - i.e. that the same form of F-ness applies to both
    - The explanation of the just man is given by (c) Each of the elements – reason, spirit, and appetite – does its job.
    - This implies that (d) reason rules
    - Applying (a), we get (e) A city is just if and only if its men are;

- Applying the whole-part rule, it follows that (f) An element of the city is logistic, thymoeidic, or epithymetic if and only if its men are.

- Problem: a just city must have a majority of epithymetic (appetitive) men. But an epithymetic man—surely—is not a just man; if he is not, then the city must have a majority of men who are not just, which contradicts (e).

- Problem: it seems that the appetitive people must also have a bit of reason but appetitive is presented as being contradictory to reason (p.40)

- From 433-434, it seems that Plato wants us to accept (e) that a city is just only if its men are, but he does not explicitly say so (p.40)

- Suppose we give up the whole-part rule for the predominant section rule

  - Predominant section rule: (g) A city is F if and only if the leading, most influential, or predominant citizens are F.

  - Degenerate cities (p.40)

    - "With the degenerate cities, it is clear in general that not all the citizens are of the same character as the city, and there are references to citizens of a different character"

    - E.g. "there may be a minority of citizens of a character inferior to that of the city as a whole: there may be a few men of tyrannical character in cities where the majority is law-abiding" (p.40)

  - Democracy (p.41)

    - "Plato seems disposed to confound two very different things: a state in which there are various characters among the people, and a state in which most of the people have a various character, that is to say, a very shifting and unsteady character." (p.41)

    - These people also consist of the lowest class (the majority)

    - "The essential analogy here might be claimed to be this: just as there is a difference between a man who is controlled by reason and a man who is controlled by appetite, so there is such a difference between states, and to try to infer the condition of the epithymetic class when it is ruled from its condition when it is not ruled is like trying to infer the condition of a man's appetites when *they* are ruled from their condition when they are not." (p.41)

    - Is the difference between people of the same nature when they are ruled and when they are not ruled that different? What about the violent people that kept their place in the good city?

  - "Criticism of Plato often concentrates on his opinion that ruling is a matter of expertise; but he needs more than that opinion to reach his results in the *Republic*, and has to combine with it a set of views about what characteristics and talents generally co-exist at the level of individual psychology." (p.42)

    - "In that area, he has to believe not only that reason comes in two sizes (as we might say, regular size and king size), but also that the talents and temperament that make good soldiers go with thymoeidic motivations, and the talents and temperament that make good workers go with epithymetic motivations." (p.42)

- “So what we have to believe, it seems, is that cobblers are characteristically men of powerful passions—of more powerful passions, indeed, than soldiers—who nevertheless have enough rational power to recognize the superiority of philosopher kings when there are philosopher kings, but become unmanageably volatile when there are no philosopher kings.” (p.42)

- “there are grave obstacles to Plato’s reading back into the city what he needs for his political conclusions, obstacles to some extent concealed by his use of the tripartite analogy.” (p.43)

Week 5: Knowledge and Belief

Plato's Republic

Plato, Translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992

Book 5; especially 473c—480

- Adeimantus and Glaucon challenge Socrates to explain more about the ideal state's organisation of common property – including women and children (449d)
  - Socrates was reluctant saying that he had omitted the explanation in the first place to "save us a lot of trouble" but he is willing to give the brothers what they want (450a)
  - Thrasymachus does not want to go into detail claiming it is like searching for gold (450b)
    - Searching for gold is a proverbial expression applied to those who neglect the task at hand for some more fascinating but less profitable pursuit
- Socrates claims that it is less of a crime to involuntarily kill a man than to mislead people about fine, good, and just institutions (451a)
  - The involuntary killer freed from guilt when absolved by the injured party (451b)
  - Plato argues we can apply the same principle in the case of common property
- Men and women should have the same upbringing
  - The initial argument set up men as guardians of the herd
  - It was agreed that the wives of the guardians should stay at home because females are weaker and males stronger
    - PP adds: another naturalist argument
  - Apart from where the work is (inside or outside the house), everything should be in common
  - So if we expect them to fulfil the same tasks, we would have to give both males and females the same upbringing and education (451e)
  - It is suggested that it would be strange to have naked women in the training ground, which would be the case if women were to receive education in music and gymnastics like men (452a - 452e)
    - Socrates says we must find out which class to which the act of waging war belongs (453a)
    - Later is is suggested: "Then the guardian women must strip for physical training, since they'll wear virtue or excellence instead of clothes. They must share in war and the other guardians' duties in the city and do nothing else. But the lighter parts must be assigned to them because of the weakness of their sex. And the man who laughs at naked women doing physical training for the sake of what is best is "plucking the unripe fruit" of laughter and doesn't know, it seems, what he's

laughing at or what he's doing, for it is and always will be the finest saying that the beneficial is beautiful, while the harmful is ugly." (457a - 457b)

- A woman is by nature different from a man but nonetheless has to 'fight the same battle' (453b -453e)
  - "We've agreed that different natures must follow different ways of life and that the natures of men and women are different. But now we say that those different natures must follow the same way of life." (453e)
  - Socrates is convinced in order to classify the class to which the act of warfare belongs one must look at the forms (454a - 454b)
    - Long-haired man and bald man are opposites; if the bald one is a cobbler then we would forbid the long-haired man from being a cobbler and vice versa (454c)
    - This is a ridiculous suggestion (454c)
    - Socrates suggested that we should look at the forms that matter instead of looking at every difference and sameness (454c)
    - Socrates: "Therefore, if the male sex is seen to be different from the female with regard to a particular craft or way of life, we'll say that the relevant one must be assigned to it. But if it's apparent that they differ only in this respect, that the females bear children while the males beget them, we'll say that there has been no kind of proof that women are different from men with respect to what we're talking about, and we'll continue to believe that our guardians and their wives must have the same way of life." (454d)
    - Socrates: "There is no way of life concerned with the management of the city that belongs to a woman because she's a woman or to a man because he's a man, but the various natures are distributed in the same way in both creatures. Women share by nature in every way of life just as men do, but in all of them women are weaker than men." (455d)
    - Some women may have a guardian nature and others not, but even inside the class women are always inferior to men (456a)

- Women and children should be held as common property
  - "all these women are to belong in common to all the men, that none are to live privately with any man, and the children, too, are to be possessed in common, so that no parent will know his own offspring or any child his parent" (457c - 457d)
  - Glaucon thinks having sex is a necessity, but is an erotic necessity, not a geometric one (458d)
  - Socrates says that promiscuity is disallowed in the ideal state since it is impious so marriages must be sacred, and the most sacred marriages are those that are most beneficial (458e)
  - Human cattle
    - The best offspring are made when their parents are in their prime
    - Rulers will have to use a lot of drug to ensure this => falsehoods are useful as a form of drug

- PP adds: the noble lie?

- Socrates suggests, and Glaucon agrees that “It follows from our previous agreements, first, that the best men must have sex with the best women as frequently as possible, while the opposite is true of the most inferior men and women, and, second, that if our herd is to be of the highest possible quality, the former’s offspring must be reared but not he latter’s. And this must all be brought about without being noticed by anyone except the rulers, so that our herd of guardians remains as free from dissension as possible.” (459d -459e)
- The goal of breeding is to “keep the number of males as stable as they can, taking into account war, disease, ad similar factors, so that the city will, as far as possible, become neither too big nor too small.” (460a)
  - PP adds: only control the number of males?
- Marriages will be decided by means of a sophisticated lottery so people will blame luck rather than rulers (460a)
- Children of good parents will be taken to a nursing pen whereas defective children and children from inferior parents will be sent to a “secret unknown place” (460c)
  - Plato is suggesting infanticide
- Children in the nursing pen will be cared for by wet nurses
- Children’s parents should be in their prime, physically and mentally (460d)
  - Socrates suggests that a woman’s prime is from 20-40 and a man’s from the time that he passes his peak as a runner until he reaches 55 (460e)
  - Beyond the prime men can have sex with whoever they want apart from their family members but no children are to be made. If a child is born then the child must be killed. (461b -461c)
  - A man is ‘father’ to all children born in the tenth or seventh month after he became a bridegroom (461d)
    - “the law will allow brothers and sisters to have sex with one another if the lottery works out that way and the Pythia approves” (461e)
    - Children are to show respect, solicitude and obedience to their ‘fathers’ (463d)
- The best city is one where “all the citizens rejoice and are pained by the same successes and failures” which happens when “mine” and “not mine” are used in unison (462b - 462c)
  - Like a single person whose parts are all aware and in pain when one part suffers (462c - 462d)

- Addressing the parts (463a - 463b)
  - Rulers = preservers; auxiliares
  - People = providers of upkeep and wages
  - People of other cities = slaves
  - Rulers call each other co-rulers

- How to protect the city from violence
  - It is fine and just for people to defend themselves against other of the same age but there would be an older person authorised to rule and punish all the younger ones (464e - 465a)
- Abolishment of private property
  - The guardians are to have everything (upkeep of public funds) yet have nothing (465c - 465d)
- Warfare
  - Children will be taken to observe some campaigns (war) with the correct, capable tutors who can ensure their safety (466e - 467e)
    - “We must mount them on horses as early as possible – not on spirited or aggressive horses, but on very fast and manageable ones – and when they’ve learned to ride, they must be taken to observe a war.” (467e)
  - Attitudes
    - Attitudes towards fellow soldiers
      - “insofar as good people have shown themselves to be good, we’ll honour them at sacrifices and all such occasions with hymns” (468d)
      - Honour those who have died as we would honour those who had lived an outstandingly good life (469b)
    - Attitude towards enemies
      - A law is to be imposed on guardians to “neither ravage the country not burn the houses” of fallen enemies (471c)
        - The ideal city is a Greek one
        - Socrates: “And being Greeks, they won’t ravage Greece or burn her houses, not will they agree that in any of her cities all the inhabitants – men, women and children – are their enemies, but whatever differences arise are caused by the few enemies that any city inevitably contains. Because of this, because the majority are friendly, they won’t ravage the country to destroy the houses, and they’ll continue to quarrel only to the point at which those who caused it are forced to pay the penalty by those who were its innocent victims.” (471a - 471b)
- Glaucon asks Socrates how likely is it for the described constitution, which he agrees on, to be realised (471d - 471e)
  - Painting analogy
    - Socrates asks Glaucon: “Do you think someone is a worse painter if, having painted a model of what the finest and most beautiful human being would be like and having rendered every detail of his picture adequately, he could not prove that such a man could come into being?” (472d)
      - Glaucon says no

        - Socrates replies that he was in the process of making a theoretical model of the good city (472e)
    - Socrates argues, and Glaucon agrees, that practice grasps the truth less well than theory does (472e)
    - Socrates claims that we should try to discover what is keeping us from the ideal state and make adjustments accordingly (473b)
    - “Until philosophers rule as kings in cities or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophise, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race.” (473c - 473d)
        - Until philosophers become kings, the constitution of the ideal state will not be realised
- The nature of the philosopher
    - Boy-love analogy (474d - 474e)
        - Boy-lovers love all boys just as wine lovers love all kinds of wine (475a)
        - Honour lovers desire the whole of honour (475a)
        - Philosophers desire the whole of wisdom and is not picky on which kind of knowledge to have (475b - 475e)
    - Philosophers love the sight of truth
        - Non-practical unlike craftsmen (476a)
        - “The lovers of sights and sounds like beautiful sounds, colours, shapes, and everything fashioned out of them, but their thought is unable to see and embrace the nature of the beautiful itself.” (476b)
    - Opinion VS Knowledge
        - Someone who believes in beautiful things, but doesn’t believe in the beautiful itself and isn’t able to follow anyone who could lead him to the knowledge of it is living in a dream (476c)
            - Opinion
            - PP adds: cannot get to the forms; “isn’t able to follow anyone” = no one to teach or even if taught they still do not have the capacity to follow
        - Someone who believes in the beautiful itself, can see both it and the things that participate in it and doesn’t believe that the participants are it or that it itself is the participants is awake (476d)
            - Knowledge (since this latter person knows)
        - Power
            - Knowledge and opinion is of different power
            - “Opinion, then, is set over one thing, and knowledge over another, according to the power of each.” (477b)

- "A power has neither colour nor shape" (477c)
- "What is set over the same things and does the same I call the same power; what is set over something different and does something different I call a different one." (477d)
- "if a different power is set over something different, and opinion and knowledge are of different powers, then the knowable and the opinable cannot be the same." (478a)
- Opinion is the intermediate between knowledge and ignorance (478d)

- Since knowledge ≠ opinion then philosophers are not lovers of opinion (480a)

Aristotle's Metaphysics

Aristotle, Translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing Company, 2016, Accessed via: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/reader.action?docID=4426659&ppg=69

Book A6; 987a32

- Plato's philosophy is different from the Italians in that "all perceptibles are always flowing, and that there is no scientific knowledge concerning them" (987a)

Book Γ5; 1010a10

- "It is not possible to step into the same river twice, since he thought that we could not do so even once" (1010a10)
  - PP adds: things constantly in flow

Knowledge and Belief in *Republic V*

Gail Fine, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 1978, Vol.60(2), pp.121-139, Accessed via: https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2200/view/journals/agph/60/2/article-p121.xml

- Plato distinguishes between knowledge and beliefs (p.121)
  - One can have knowledge, but not beliefs, about forms
  - One can have beliefs, but not knowledge, about sensibles
- Two Worlds Theory (TW) (p.121)
  - There is no knowledge of sensibles and beliefs about forms (p.122)
  - If I know I can only know a form
  - I have a belief, it must be directed to sensibles

- Plato did not always accept this theory throughout his career, but it was generally upheld in the Republic (p.121)
  - Apart from at 506c where he Claims to have beliefs, but not knowledge, about the Form of the Good

- Fine argues that "although Plato in some way correlates knowledge with Forms, and belief with sensibles, he does not say that there is knowledge only of Forms or belief only about sensibles." (p.122)
  - "All he argues is the weaker claim that to know, one must, first of all, know Forms; restricted to sensibles, one cannot achieve knowledge." (p.122)
  - If this is right, the Republic does not commit Plato to the Two Worlds Theory

I

- Plato argues that only philosophers know forms – a knowledge without which no other knowledge is possible (p.122)
- Plato correlates… (p.123)
  - Knowledge with what is
  - Belief with what is and is not
  - Ignorance with what is not
- Plato's Strategy (p.123)
  - (1) Whoever knows knows something (ti) (476 e 7—9).
    - Two possible reading, which to choose depends on (2)-(6) where difficulties emerge (p.124)
      - (1a) Whoever knows knows some existent thing
      - (1b) Whoever knows has some content of his knowledge
  - (2) Whoever knows knows something that is (on ti); for one could not know a thing that is not (mē on ti) (476 e 10—11).
    - If (1a) (p.124)
      - (2a) Whoever knows knows something that exists [existential]
      - (2b) Whoever knows knows something that is (really) F [predicative]
    - If (1b) (p.124)
      - (2c) Whoever knows knows something that is true [veridical]
    - Can lead to Degrees of Existence (DE) and Degrees of Reality interpretations, both of which are problematic (p.125)
      - DE: knowledge is of what exists, that belief is of what half exists or what both exists and does not exist, and that ignorance is of what does not exist or is not anything at all.

- DR: knowledge is of what is really F (for some predicate F), belief is of what is F and not F, and ignorance is of what is not F
- Problematic because they violate the condition of non-controversiality
  - Why can I not know of a particular action, for example, that it is just and not just? Why in between?

- (2c) yields the Degrees of Truth (DT) readings
  - Reading T: some of my beliefs are true, others false
  - “For DT, 'belief' acquires a specialized sense, not elsewhere accorded it, as being "near the mark"; false beliefs are not beliefs at all. Moreover, the contents of knowledge and belief will be irreducibly different: knowledge will range over truths, and belief over partial truths.” (p.126)
  - This reading is the most plausible and would not commit Plato to the Two Worlds Theory

- (3) What completely is is completely knowable; what in no way is is in no way knowable (477a 2—4).
- (4) If anything is and is not, it lies between what really is and what in no way is (477 a 6—7).
- (5) Knowledge is set over (epi) what is; ignorance (agnōsia) is set over what is not (477a 9—10).
- (6) Something between knowledge and ignorance is set over what is and is not (477a 10—b1).

II

- Plato argues that belief is the middle state between knowledge and ignorance (p.126)
- Next steps to his argument (p.127)
  - (7) Belief is a different capacity (dunamis) from knowledge (477b3-6)
  - (8) Therefore, belief and knowledge are set over different things, each according to its capacity (477b7-8)
  - (9) Knowledge is set over what is, to know what is is (gnōnai hōs esti to on) (477b10-11)
  - (10) Capacities are a kind of thing by which we are able (dunametha) to do what we are able to do, and by which everything else can do what it can do (477c1 — 4)
  - (11) Capacities are distinguished by (a) what they are set over (epi) and by (b) what work they accomplish. What is set over one thing and what accomplishes one thing is one capacity; those things which are set over different things and accomplish different things are different capacities (477c6— d5).
    - This leaves out two possibilities (p.128)
      - (i) x and y do the same thing to different things, and

- (ii) x and y do different things to the same thing
- Why should knowledge and belief not be different capacities with different work on the same things?
  - A difference in their work does not entail a difference in their objects.
  - “To say that knowledge is set over pieces of knowledge, and that belief is set over beliefs, does not restrict the objects these propositions are about; husbandry and butchery are concerned with different sorts of facts, but these different facts could equally well be about the same domestic animals. The objects of knowledge and belief need not be separated ; indeed, they are not relevant to the argument at all. Ascribing to Plato a valid argument, then, goes hand in hand with rejecting TW.” (p.129)

- (12) Knowledge is a capacity (477d7— 9)
- (13) Belief is a capacity, since it is that by which we are able to believe (477e1-3)
- (14) Knowledge and belief are different capacities, since knowledge does not err (anhamarteton) but belief may err (477e6— 7)
- (15) Therefore each of them, being capable of something different, is set over something different (478a3— 4).
- (16) Knowledge is set over what is, to know how what is is (to on gnōnai hōs echei) (478a6)
- (17) Belief believes (478 a 8)
- (18) Since knowledge and belief are different capacities, and are set over different things, what is known (gnōston) and what is believed (doxaston) cannot be the same (478al2 —b2).
- (19) Since what is known is what is, what is believed must be something other than what is (487b3-5) (p.128)

III

- Plato distinguishes belief from ignorance (p.130)
  - (20) Whoever believes believes some one thing (478 b 6—10).
  - (21) What is not is not one thing, but nothing (478 b 12—c 1).
  - (22) We assign ignorance to what is not, and knowledge to what is (478 c 3—4).
  - (23) Therefore we do not believe either what is or what is not (478 c 6).
  - (24) Belief is neither knowledge nor ignorance (478 c 8). (p.131)
  - (25) Belief is neither clearer than knowledge nor more obscure than ignorance; it is more obscure than knowledge, but clearer than ignorance (478 c 10—14) (p.132)
  - (26) Belief lies between knowledge and ignorance (478d1 — 4). (p.132)

- (27) We have said before (in (6)) that what is and is not will be between what is and what is not, and will have some state between ignorance and knowledge set over it (478 d 5 — 9). (p.132)

- "In assigning what is not to agnoia, Plato assigns not false beliefs but nothing to it. Agnoia is then something like blank ignorance, and there is no determinate content of the mental condition. True and false beliefs are still the correlate of belief, as we claimed; agnoia consists not of false beliefs but of ignorance or lack of awareness. If one is ignorant of p, one cognizes nothing true of p; there is no content of the mental condition." (p.131)
  - "Plato has not asserted that every false belief is a content of ignorance. Although ignorance has as its Contents only very false beliefs, not every false belief need be assigned to ignorance." (p.131)

IV

- Next (problematic) steps to Plato's argument (p.133)
  - (28) It remains, then, to find what partakes of what is and is not so that we may say it is believed (478 e l —4). (p.132)
  - (29) Each of the many Fs is no more F than not F (479 e 5 —479 b 8). (p.132)
  - (30) Therefore, each of the many Fs is and is not (470 b 9 — 10)
  - (31) The many Fs, therefore, are between being and not being (479c6-d1)
  - (32) We have found, then, that the many nomima of the many about the beautiful and the rest roll about between what is not and what fully is (479 d 3—5).
  - (33) We agreed that if any such thing appeared it would be assigned to the intermediate capacity and be something believed and not known (479 d 7—9).
  - (34) Therefore, those who look on the many Fs have only belief, and not knowledge (479 e l—5).
  - (35) Those who look on the Fs which always stay the same have knowledge (479 d 7 —8).
  - (36) Knowledge is set over Forms; belief is set over the many Fs (479 d 10—480 a 4).
- "it now looks as if Plato has specified Forms and sensibles as the correlates of knowledge and belief; he seems to be concerned with objects and not, as we thought, with contents." (p.133)
- "if we use DE or DR here, Plato's argument is either fallacious or unfair. I then argue that although (29) —(31) shift away from is-v, they explain, and do not controvert, T" (p.133)
- What makes something beautiful may be the same thing that makes it ugly e.g. bright colours (p.133-134)
  - "Any observable property F is both F and not F, since it collects F as well as not F cases. The sight-lovers can be expected to agree, and so (29) does not violate the condition of non-controversiality" (p.134)

VI

- “I suggested that Plato's argument could be interpreted in another way, so that it is free of controversial premises, involves no equivocation on ‘esti', and is valid.” (p.139)
- “The price of ascribing to Plato a valid argument whose premises are noncontroversial is the loss of the two worlds theory. It is a price I am quite willing to pay.” (p.139)

Propositions or Objects? A Critique of Gail Fine on Knowledge and Belief in *Republic V*

Francisco J. Gonzalez, Phronesis, 1996, Vol.41(3), pp.245-275, Accessed via: https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2675/view/journals/phro/41/3/article-p245_2.xml

- Plato’s conception of knowledge is not in line with contemporary epistemology (p.245)
  - Contemporary epistemologies hold that the distinction between knowledge and true beliefs are about proportions, not objects
    - Knowledge does not depend on some direct relation to the object but on the justification of the propositions
    - Knowing something is rendered completely disanalogous with seeing something
  - Plato relates knowing with seeing
    - One can know only intelligible forms and that nothing more than belief is possible with regard to sensible objects
    - Knowledge and belief as direct cognitive relations to objects and as restricted to certain kinds of objects
    - Gail Fine defends Plato by saying he is not “object-oriented” but is “content-oriented”

I The Argument (476e7-479e1)

- Before the argument Socrates distinguishes between philosophers and lovers of sights and sounds (p.246)
  - Only philosophers can distinguish beauty from beautiful sensible objects
  - Lovers of sights and sounds cannot make this distinction so Socrates claims they only possess belief and no knowledge
- Four premises which Socrates gets Glaucon to agree to (p.247)
  - (1) Knowledge is of something, of what is. It is therefore “set over” what is (477a9)
  - (2) Ignorance is of what is not (477a2-4), is “set over” what is not (477a9-10)

- (3) If something both is and is not, then it lies between pure being and absolute not-being (477a6-8)
- (4) We must search for something between knowledge and ignorance, if there is such a thing, to be set over being and not being

- Argument to prove that there is something between knowledge and ignorance – belief
  - (5) Different powers do different work and are set over different objects (477c6-d6)
  - (6) Knowledge and belief are different powers because they are infallible and fallible, respectively (477e6 - 478a2)
  - (7) Therefore, belief and knowledge must do different work and be set over different objects (478a3-b2)
    - What is known cannot be the same as what is believed (478b1-2)
  - (8) Since according to (1) knowledge is set over what is, and since according to (7) what is known cannot be the same as what is believed, what is believed cannot be what is (478a10-b5)
  - (9) Belief also cannot be set over what is not, since it cannot believe nothing (478b10-c8)
  - (10) Since according to (2) ignorance is set over what is not, belief can no more be identified with ignorance than with knowledge (478c8)
  - (11) Belief is darker than knowledge and brighter than ignorance (478c10-15)
  - (12) Therefore, belief must be between knowledge and ignorance, rather than above knowledge or beneath ignorance (478d1-4)
- Socrates appeals to (3) and (4) to conclude (p.247)
  - (13) Belief is set over what is between pure being and absolute not-being i.e. what both is and is not (478d5-12)
- Socrates still has not proved two things (p.247)
  - (i) That there is such a thing as “what is and is not”
  - (ii) That the sights and sounds which they love fall into this category
- Further premises to prove the point above (p.247-248)
  - (14A) The beautiful things loved by the lovers of sights and sounds are also not beautiful, the just things are also not just, the pious things are also not pious etc.
    - The objects of their love both are and are not and thus are between being and not-being (479a5-d2)
      - PP adds: opinion vs universal fact => knowledge requires universalisability?
  - (14B) Socrates equates this conclusion with a discovery that “the many conventional opinions of the many concerning beauty and other things are tossing about somewhere between not-being and pure being” (479d3-5)
    - PP adds: BUT opinion can affect whether something is being or not-being

    - E.g. “most people think that …” only becomes a fact when sufficient people have the same opinion/belief/thought
    - So individual beliefs can impact whether a collective proposition about belief is being or not-being
    - Nevertheless in the middle ground for it is not always the case that it is being
- Socrates’ conclusion (p.248)
  - (15) From (13) and (14), Socrates can conclude that the lovers of sights and sounds, in contemplating only things that both are and are not, have no more than belief (479d7-e6)
    - Conversely, those who contemplate the things themselves which are always and in every way the same have knowledge (479e7-9)

II Fine’s Interpretation

- Fine endorses the veridical reading of “is” (p.248)
- She rejects the Degrees of Truth (DT) reading (p.248)
  - DT: each proposition contained in the content of belief is both true and false
  - Fine, instead, maintains that the set of propositions included under belief is disjunctively true and false
    - i.e. some bits are true and other bits false
    - It’s the content that matters
- According to Fine’s reading, knowledge is the collection of only true propositions while belief collects both truths and falsehood, so belief is fallible while knowledge is not (p.248)
- “Knowledge is set over true propositions that can be about either forms or sensibles; however, its power of infallibility collecting only true propositions depends on knowledge of forms. Belief is set over both true and false propositions that can be about either forms or sensibles; the fallibility of its power in collecting false as well as true propositions, however, is all that is possible for someone restricted to sensibles.” (p.249)

III The Dialectical Requirement

- Fine calls the same thing by two names (p.249)
  - 1978: principle of non-controversiality
  - 1990: the dialectical requirement
  - The principle that an argument should use only claims that are believed to be true and that the interlocutors accept

- “The only opening premise identified by Fine that violates the dialectical requirement has been seen not to be an opening premise at all, but a demonstrated conclusion.” (p.253)
- “Therefore, to the extent that Fine's interpretation is supported by an appeal to the dialectical requirement - and it in large part is - it collapses.” (p.253)

IV The Predicative Reading

- Two questions (p.254)
  - (1) What does knowing what F is have to do with knowing what is truly and only F?
    - “Knowledge of what is (truly) F is not simply, nor even primarily, knowledge that F belongs to some x as a property, but rather knowledge of what F itself is.” (p.254)
    - “The predicative "is" in this case does not assign the F to the x but rather the x to the F: it is the "property" that is here primary, while the "subject" is secondary.” (p.254)
  - (2) As long as I know that something is F, why should the fact that it is also not F prevent it from providing me with knowledge of what F is? (p.255)
    - Book 7; 524a
    - What is “set over” the hard is also “set over” the soft
    - The hard and soft are confounded
    - The perplexed soul is the same
    - “perception of what is not truly F (i.e., is no more F than not-F) is for Plato equivalent to confused and contradictory perception of what F is” (p.255)
- Doxa (p.256)
  - Doxa concerning what F itself is
  - Doxa is characterized by a failure to distinguish what F itself is from the things that only imitate and participate in F, and thus by a failure to see clearly, with waking vision, what F is (476c2-8)
  - “If we consider Socrates' critique of the lovers of sights and sounds prior to the present argument, we see that his reason for attributing only doxa to them is not that they affirm false or unjustified propositions about what things are beautiful, but that they fail to see (476b7, b10, d1) what beauty itself is.” (p.257)
- The predicative reading assigns knowledge to objects (p.257)
  - “the conception of knowledge required by the predicative reading not only does not contradict, but complements the one required by the existential reading: namely, the conception of knowledge as some sort of direct acquaintance with objects analogous to perception”

V The Compatibility of the Existential with the Predicative Reading

- Fine’s objections against the existential reading
  - (1) It requires a notion of degrees of existence that makes no sense
    - “Something either exists or does not exist; to claim that it “half-exists” is, we are told, to talk nonsense. A thing's properties can vary in degree, e. g., it can be more or less beautiful, cold, red, hard, etc., but a thing's existence cannot in the same way be more or less.” (p.259)
  - (2) The existential reading would have to see the argument as inferring, from the claim that a sensible object both is and is not F (14A), that it both exists and does not exist. But such an inference is clearly invalid since "is-p does not carry existential import in this way. (p.259)
    - One cannot infer from the fact that xis not F that x does not (fully) exist.
- A thing's existence is not, for Plato, sharply distinguishable from its being what it is, e.g., beautiful
  - BUT things can perfectly exist without being perfectly beautiful
  - For Plato to say x is beautiful, it means that x must exist
  - Lesley Brown has rightly pointed out, Plato “nowhere allows that X is F does not entail X is but is consistent with X is not.” (p.258)
  - “if to exist is to exist as a determinate something, and if a sensible object is no more F than not-F, then this indeterminacy of its F-ness prevents it from fully existing. On the other hand, to be fully F is to exist fully. On this view, what is absurd is not the notion of degrees of existence, but the modem notion that a sensible object can be imperfectly beautiful and yet perfectly exist, that its beauty and existence can be kept so distinct that the imperfection of the one does not affect the other.” (p.261)
  - It follows that “I can only have belief about what beauty is in perceiving things that only imperfectly exist by being only imperfectly beautiful.” (p.262)
    - PP adds: BUT lovers of sights and sounds can have beliefs about beauty over perfectly beautiful objects too, just not knowledge?
      - “the difference between what is believed and what is known is reduced to a difference between the property of being believed and the property of being known” (p.266)

VI The Incompatibility of Fine’s Reading with the Text

- Gonzalez shows that Fine's propositional reading is not compatible with the text. (p.262)
- Four objections; the last two objections are by themselves sufficient to render Fine’s interpretation untenable. (p.262)
  - (1) Fine's propositional reading is at least hard to square with some of the language of the argument that is more suggestive of objects
  - (2) Difficulty of fitting Fine's propositional reading into the broader context of the argument. (p.263)

- Michael C. Stokes => the dispute with the lovers of sights and sounds concerns the knowledge of beauty itself and the existence of beauty itself, not the truth of propositions
    - Lovers of sight and sound think that in perceiving beautiful sights and sounds they know exactly what beauty is; the philosophers tell them that such objects do not provide knowledge

- (3) The first major difficulty is reconciling Fine's interpretation with what the present argument is in large part meant to prove: that knowledge, belief and ignorance are "set over" different "things" (this is Fine's word and I use it so as not to assume what Fine denies, i.e., that these things are objects rather than contents). (p.263)
    - Fine: ”For why should knowledge and belief not be different capacities with different work on the same things?" (1978, 128; see also 1990, 90).
    - Fine is wrong in suggesting that the existential and predicative readings cannot answer this question.
        - Sight and sound also do different work over different things; one cannot see sound
    - Fine's "contents analysis” cannot make sense of the present passage nor of the argument's general thesis that knowledge, belief and ignorance are "set over" different things. (p.264)
    - “On her interpretation, as we have seen, knowledge and belief can have exactly the same propositional content. What then is left for "epi" to range over? Only formal sets.” (p.267)
    - “Socrates says not simply that what is believed is other than what is not, but that it is impossible (478b6, 478b9) to believe what is not, since this would be equivalent to believing nothing.” (p.268)
        - “But if all beliefs are necessarily true, then the only distinction Fine recognises between belief and knowledge is collapsed,” (p.268-269)

- (4) Fine’s interpretation of the argument can work only by reading into it two assumptions that clearly violate the dialectical requirement, as she virtually acknowledges (p.270)
    - If the argument does not rule out knowledge of sensible objects, how can the lovers of sights and sounds be persuaded that such knowledge requires knowledge of a form, something that they claim does not even exist? (p.270)
    - Fine’s assumptions
        - (1) there is just one property, the F, the same in all cases, in virtue of which all and only F things are F
        - (2) we cannot know anything about F things unless we can define what F is (1990, 92-3).
    - “Would the same people who deny that beauty itself exists grant that all beautiful things are beautiful in virtue of one property, beauty, that remains the same in all cases?” (p.271)

VII The Two Worlds Theory

- Fine's objections to the Two Worlds Theory (p.271)
  - (i) It leads to the patently absurd consequence that "No one can know, for example, what actions are just or good; no one can know even such mundane facts as that they're now seeing a tomato, or sitting at a table" (1990, 86). (p.271)
    - Nothing Socrates says rules out the possibility of our having justified true belief that we are seeing a tomato
    - Does not concern "whatness" e.g. what is justice; what is beautiful
  - (ii) It contradicts Socrates' claim to have only doxa concerning the form of the good (506c-e)
  - (iii) It contradicts the description of the philosopher who returns to the Cave as knowing the sensible things there (520c).
  - To reject (ii) and (iii)
    - The relation between forms and sensibles is not one between two completely distinct worlds, since sensibles do not exist independently of the forms, but are only their images or imperfect instantiations. (p.272)
    - It is inaccurate to say that the objects of this knowledge are the sensibles per se (p.273)
      - "Imagine two people looking at a portrait: person A knows the man of whom it is a portrait, person B does not; in fact, person B does not even recognize that it is a portrait of anyone, but believes it to be a mere product of artistic fantasy. In this case, we can indeed say that person A knows what the portrait is, while person B does not. Yet the knowledge that A has and B lacks is not a knowledge of the portrait per se as a sensible object: A and B can be imagined to perceive the sensible properties of the portrait with equal accuracy and vividness." (p.273-274)
      - What allows the philosopher, unlike the prisoner, to see the shadows for what they truly are is not a knowledge of the shadows themselves, but a knowledge of the originals that cast them. (p.274)
    - "Fine attempts to bridge the two-worlds dichotomy by making propositions, which can indifferently be about either sensibles or forms, the immediate intentional content of both knowledge and belief. Such a bridge, however, is provided by the objects themselves" (p.274)

Knowledge and Belief in Republic V

Derek Baltzly, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 7*9, pp.239-272, Walter de Gruyter, 1997

Introduction

- In Republic V (475e-480a) Plato argues that knowledge is set over what is and belief is set over what is and is not (p.239)
  - Object reading (existential or predicative reading)
    - belief is set over what is F and not F or that it is set over what, in some way, both exists and does not exist
  - Content reading (veridical)
    - knowledge is of what is true; belief somehow concerns both truth and falsehood.
- The predicative and veridical readings of *objects* should be combined (p.240)
  - Plato's view involves a parallel between truth an being
    - When we know >> either TRUE or FALSE
    - Opinion is no more TRUE than FALSE
- A possible reading of the Two Worlds thesis: "one knows what F is only if one grasps a content which is related to a Form. Opinion is the state in which one's answer to the 'What is F?' question is no more true than false. Such contents are made true, to the extent that they are so, by sensible things." (p.240)
- A. Fine's Content Interpretation
  - Fine's interpretation makes the mistake of seeing the object and content interpretations as unalterably opposed. When faced with a choice between the two readings, Baltzly argues we should insist on both. (p.241)
  - According to Fine, Plato's premises at 476e-477c ought to be read as (p.241)
    - (1) The set of propositions which can be known includes only those that are true.
    - (2) The set of propositions which can be believed includes both truths and falsehoods.
  - Fine claims this reading is preferred because…
    - The premises are uncontroversial and can be used to persuade sight-lovers who do not have a philosophical background
    - It makes the argument at 477c valid
      - Plato argues that if two faculties or powers are distinct, then they are distinguished both by the work that they do and by that over which they are set.
      - BUT "Why cannot two arts have different functions and yet be set over the same objects, as husbandry and butchery are?" (p.242)
      - So it is rather the case that the set of all the contents which can be known is simply a subset of the set of all the contents which can be opined. The two sets are not disjoint. (p.242)
  - Plato moves from the veridical use of *objects* to a predicative one in the next premise (p.242)
    - (3) Each of the many F's is both F and not F.

- “the many” refers to the sensible properties (e.g. shape, colour)
- Object is not beautiful unless all the sensible properties are true
- Plato holds a Priority of Knowledge of a Definition claim according to which one must know what the definition of F is in order to know that x is F
  - Sight lovers may have true beliefs about something being beautiful but they do not have knowledge that it is beautiful because they lack the definitional understanding Plato requires

- Plato moves back to the veridical use (p.242)
  - (4) The sight-lovers' beliefs about the many F's both are and are not true.
  - (5) Therefore, the sight-lovers have belief, not knowledge, about the many F’s.
- Plato does not hold the Two Worlds theory: some of the very same contents can be the object of belief, in one person’s case, and knowledge in another’s. (p.242)
- Degrees of Being doctrine: the objects of knowledge really are in the simple sense that, as knowables, they are all true, while the objects of opinion both are and are not simply by comprising a set some members of which are true while others are false. (p.242)

- B. Criticism
  - Baltzly rejects what Fine calls the Dialectical Requirement (p.243)
    - Dialectical Requirement: the premises in the argument must be acceptable to those who do not hold a Platonist metaphysics and epistemology
    - Baltzly thinks Plato does not give the lovers of sights and sounds a fair fight; he suggests pacifying and persuading those who disagree >> not argumentative as arguments are meant for people who are in their right mind
    - Baltzly argues that the sight-lovers are people who do not share Plato's foundational presuppositions about what is required to answer a 'What is it?' question
      - If one can answer the 'What is it?’ questions then one is familiar with the forms, which would beg the question against sight-lovers
      - Sight-lovers are not lovers of wisdom
  - “Fine is right to point out that it would be a mark in favour of any interpretation that it makes Plato's principle about the individuation of capacities or faculties non-question-begging.” (p.244)
    - PP adds: The fallacy of **begging the question** occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it.
    - BUT Fine’s argument, and even Plato’s arguments, are question begging
  - Fine claims a benefit of her reading is that it shows that Plato is not committed to the Two Worlds thesis, which is both counterintuitive and contradictory to the later accounts in the *Republic* (p.244)

- Fine’s version of the non-identity of the opinable with the knowable seems to be too weak

Philosophers and Sight-lovers

- The philosopher is an omnivore of learning (p.246)
- “The lover of sights and sounds lives in a kind of dream state in which she fails to recognise likenesses as likenesses and, instead, mistakes them for the thing which they resemble. As a result, she has opinion and not knowledge.” (p.246 - 247)
  - PP adds: ดูหนังมากจนชินชา มิได้พิจารณาอย่างลึกซึ้ง
- A. A Speculative Identification
  - Plato’s target, according to Baltzly’s speculation, may be called the dilettante (people with an insatiable desire for the arts) (p.247)
  - “Such people hire out their eyes and ears in the sense that they allow the spectacle which they have just seen to dominate their thinking about moral and aesthetic problems.” (p.247)
  - Discussions these people have about the arts are on what the show suggests beauty is rather than their own view
- B. Answers to ‘What is F’ Questions
  - The lovers of sights and sounds Baltzly speculates about would reject if he or she thought about it, the constraints on answers to 'What is F?' questions that the Socratic dialogues presuppose. (p.248)
    - E.g. the singularity requirement: there is one single thing by virtue of which all F things are F.
  - They don’t act like they are searching for the logical cause while rejecting Socrates’ conditions (p.251)
    - Their lack of enthusiasm for philosophy as Plato understands it makes it as if they rejected these pre-theoretical starting points for Socratic questions (p.251)
  - In many ways the sight-lover's behaviour would resemble that of the democratic man. (p.251)
    - Unsystematic way of organising information and so may change their mind frequently
  - “Plato, by placing the dilettante's activity into the context of his own methodological presuppositions, attempts to counter this by impugning his claim to knowledge. Yet it would be counter-productive to deny completely that this person has some sort of insight. Hence the position of opinion between knowledge and ignorance.” (p.252)
- C. Overview of Plato’s Strategy
  - Plato is concerned to show that those people who do not carry on inquiry in the manner in which he does are not genuine wisdom lovers (p.252)

- Plato is not fair to the sight and sound lovers because his premises are unpacked in such a way that they express the very methodological commitments that they do not share (p.252)
  - He never clearly articulated the conditions of adequacy on answers to 'What is F?' questions
    - The conditions had to be extracted by looking at Socrates' argumentation in the dialogues of search
    - Plato and perhaps Socrates probably thought these conditions were too obvious
    - Because he never articulated them, he never really defended them either
  - Plato is explicitly concerned to show that those who refuse or simply fail to accept an ontology of Forms do not have knowledge (p.253)

Relatives and the Objects of Knowledge and Opinion

- A. What Entirely Is, 476e6-477b3
  - What is known when one knows the answer to a 'What if F?' question is a content which is about an object (the logical cause) (p.254)
  - The logical cause of F is entirely knowable (p.254)
  - "a candidate for the logical cause of F that fails the complete-being requirement would not be entirely knowable because there would be some context or way in which it fails to be F. But this cannot be, for the logical cause of F is precisely what it is to be F and it is unthinkable that what it is to be F should not be itself" (p.254)
- B. What Is and Is Not
  - Plato would regard 'the capable is the beautiful' as a single unit for the purposes of evaluating its truth or falsity and this is so even with the shift between a plural and singular definite article in Greek. (p.256)
    - BUT 'the capable is the beautiful' is false when it means that the capable is the logical cause of the beautiful, precisely because the negation is true when the … qualifier is added
  - "The lovers of sights and sounds can make some astute observations about the conjunction of various features of the world, e. g. that many beautiful things share the use of colour and form that one finds in a Kandinsky. But what they observe is just that - a conjunction ,of features - not a universal cause of beauty. Thus, there is some sense in which they are right, but not completely right." (p.256)
  - "things that are F but fail to be-completely F are no more F than not F. Plato. will extend the same treatment to statements about such things. 'The capable is the beautiful' is no more true than not true and the person who thinks this thinks what both is and is not." (p.258)
  - Plato imagined a correlation between statements and objects in matters of knowledge and opinion (p.259)
    - Knowledge (p.259-260)

- Let w be the logical cause of F
- w is completely F
- ‘the w is F’ is completely true

- Opinion (p.260)
  - z is not the logical cause of F
  - Some of the F things are z and so that which is z is F (in part, at least) but it fails to be-completely F. In such a case, 'the z is the F' is no more true than false.
- Ignorance (p.260)
  - z is not the logical cause of F
  - No F thing may turn out to be z. In this case the z is in no way F and the statement 'the z is the F' is only false.

- C. The Argument from Different Capacities, 477c10-478e
  - At 477c Socrates views knowledge and opinion as capacities (p.261)
    - The capacity to carry or to burn is the very capacity that it is only by virtue of the relation that it stands in to what has the capacity to be carried or to be burned.
    - BUT knowledge and opinion are special capacities. Not only do they each have a characteristic effect, but they are also intentional relatives. Knowledge, like master, is always knowledge of something.
  - The Argument (p.262)
    - (I 1) D 1 = D2 if and only if D 1 and D2 have the same object and D l and D2 do the same work, i. e. r = (p & q)
    - (I 2) If Dl is not identical to D2, then they do not have the same object and they do not do the same work, i.e. ~ r ⊃ ~ p & ~q
      - BUT different work can be done over the same object, e.g. butchery and husbandry
    - (I 3) If D 1 is not identical to D2, then either they do not have the same object or they do not do the same work, i.e. ~r ⊃ ~p v ~q
      - Follows from (I 1)
    - Fine suggests the following premise should be included further to resolve Plato’s begging of the question
      - (I 4) The work that knowledge does differs from the work that belief does in such a way that they must have different objects, i.e. ~q ⊃ ~p
      - Knowledge and opinion have different work because they are set over different objects
      - Knowledge is fallible while opinion is not

        - “knowledge is set over all and only true contents, but belief is not. This is why the one, but not the other, is truth-entailing.” (p.262)
    - “even though vision is of colour and hearing is of sound, it does not follow that the very same object cannot be both seen and heard. We see its colour and hear the noise that it makes. This is so even if what it is to be visible is distinct from what it is to be audible.” (p.263)
        - BUT “Unlike colour and sound, the very same objects cannot have the features that are distinctive of the knowable and the opinable. That which is knowable - the logical cause - is-completely F, but that which is opinable fails to be-completely F.” (p.263)
- D. Finale: The Eunuch
    - The riddle
        - “the eunuch is a man in one way (e.g. in his relation to his appearance) but not a man in another way (e.g. in relation to his ability to reproduce). Thus, when one says "the man threw the stone", this is not partially true (whatever that might mean), but instead it is true when the word 'man' is taken one way and false when it is taken the other way.” (p.264)
        - No more true than false

The Two Worlds Thesis

- A. A More Modest TW
    - Traditional interpretation: only Forms can be known and only sensibles can be the objects of opinion (p.265)
        - The Philosopher still struggles upon the return to the cave
            - So the philosopher cannot have knowledge of the sensibles otherwise they would not struggle
    - “the image [of the sun] is undoubtedly supposed to reveal something about the relation of the Good to the other Forms and it is not presented as knowledge that Socrates has about the Form. The most natural thing, it seems to me, is to suppose that it reveals something of the content of Socrates' beliefs about the nature of the good” (p.266)
    - Fine’s strategy is to reject TW but Baltzly thinks this is too weak: the only separation between what opinion and knowledge are set over is the one between a set of contents which are true and a subset of that set, which includes contents which can be either true or false.
    - Baltzly wishes to modify TW to TW* as follows… (p.267)
        - Where C is a content which is alleged to answer a 'What is F?’ question and O is the object or objects which correspond to C:
            - (a) if C is no more true than false, then C can only be the object of belief and O cannot be a Form, and

        - (b) if C is completely true because O is the logical cause of F, then C can only be known and O may be a Form.
    - “nothing in TW*precludes the possibility that one might know a content which is about a sensible. What it does preclude is that this content is a true answer to a 'What is F?' question, where this is a request to provide the logical cause of F” (p.267)
- Julia Annas => though I may know that Socrates is a man because there is no respect in which he fails to be one, I may only have beliefs about Socrates' beauty, for he is both beautiful and not beautiful. (p.268)
    - Baltzly => better to go back to ‘What is F?’ accounts (p.268)
    - David Armstrong => while it might be true that Socrates is beautiful in a certain respect, Socrates cannot be the truthmaker for the exceptionlessly true account of what beauty is (p.268)

- B. The Range of Forms
    - “Plato might have been led to generalise his argument in such a way as to include Forms for non-relative terms.” (p.269)
    - “*Republic* is principally a work about how we ought to live. Because the nature of the world in which we live is important to the way in which we ought to structure the conditions of our existence, both communally and individually, Plato must spell out enough of his world view to justify the normative claims that he wants to make.” (p.270)
        - “It should not surprise if, having spelled out what he regarded as sufficient metaphysical grounds for his normative claims, Plato puts off certain difficulties relating to the Forms until a more appropriate context.” (p.271)

Week 6: The Three Images

The Sun, the Line and the Cave

Plato's Republic

Plato, Translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992

Book 6; 506 - 511

- Adeimantus agrees that the constitution of the ideal state will be perfectly ordered if a guardian who knows about the good is in charge of it (506a)
- Adeimantus asks Socrates whether he considers the good to be "knowledge or pleasure or something else altogether." (506b)
- Socrates thinks that opinion without knowledge are "shameful and ugly things" (506c)
  - At best a true opinion would be like a blind person who so happens to travel the right road
- Socrates urges the matters of the good to be dropped; he recommends looking at its offspring first (506d - 506e)
  - Adeimantus is ok and says he will save questions about "the father" – the good – for later
  - Adeimantus: "The story about the father remains a debt you'll pay another time." (506e)
  - Socrates: "I wish that I could pay the debt in full, and you receive it instead of just the interest." (507a)
- The essence of fineness present in many things is the form of the fine (507b)
- "the many beautiful things and the rest are visible but not intelligible, while the forms are intelligible but not visible" (507b)
- The sun and the good
  - "Sight isn't the sun, neither sight itself nor that in which it comes to be, namely, the eye." (508a - 508b)
    - The sun gives light, which is the intermediary thing that enables the sight of visible things
    - "The sun is not sight, but isn't the cause of sight itself and seen by it" (508b)
  - "What the good itself is in the intelligible realm, in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the sun in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things." (508b)
  - When objects are illuminated by the sun, we see them clearly, but at night we are unable to see the object clearly (508c)

- The soul “When it focuses on something illuminated by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and apparently possesses understanding, but when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to by and passes away, it opines and is dimmed, changes its opinions this way and that, and seems bereft of understanding.” (508d)
- “that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good” (508d)
  - The sun = goodness
- “Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they.” (508e)
  - “In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, but it is wrong to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to think of knowledge and truth as godlike but wrong to think that wither of them is the good – for the good its yet more prized.” (509a)
- Aside from providing visible things with the power to be seen, the sun also provides nourishment and makes things come to be (509b)
  - The objects of knowledge owe both their being known and their coming to be to the good

- The line
  - See image of line (p.183)
  - Four sections of the line corresponding to the four conditions of the soul (from lecture handout 5)
    - Imagination => visible images => visible
    - Belief => visible objects => visible
    - Thought => intermediates (?) => intelligible
    - Understanding => Forms => intelligible
- “They make claims for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw, of which shadows and reflections in water are images, they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those others themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought.” (510d)

Book 7; 514 - 518

- Prisoners in the cave
  - Humans living in an underground cave, only able to see in front of them because their bonds prevent them from turning their heads around (514a)
  - There is a fire burning above and behind them and there is a path stretching between them and the fire
  - There is a wall on the path used as a screen for puppeteers

- Prisoners would think that the name “human being” applies to the shadow of a statue of a human being
  - “the prisoners would in every way believe that the truth is nothing other than the shadows of those artefacts” (515c)

- If the prisoner was dragged out of the cave, they would find the light blinding
  - “he’d need time to get adjusted before he could see things in the world above. At first, he’d see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. Of these, he’d be able to study the things in the sky and the sky itself more easily at night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than during the say, looking at the sun and the light of the sun” (516a)
    - PP adds: so he has to learn of the ‘obscure,’ since the night is without sunlight, before he can learn the truth?
  - He would realise that the sun not only enables vision but is the cause of all that he used to see (516b)

- Returning to the cave
  - The enlightened would rather live as one without possessions and go through any sufferings that to share the opinions of the prisoners and live as they do (516c)
  - Upon the return to the cave, the philosopher’s eye must be adjusted to the darkness (516e)

- Socrates: “The visible realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the sun. And if you interpret the upward journey and the study of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you’ll grasp what I hope to convey, since that is what you wanted to hear about.” (517b)

- Education is not the process of “putting knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight into blind eyes.” (518b)
  - “the power to learn is present in everyone’s soul and that the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body … until it is able to study that which is the brightest and best thing that is, namely, the one we call the good” (518c)
  - Education is the craft of effectively turning around the soul in the cave
  - “Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn’t turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and tries to redirect it appropriately” (518d)

The Line and the Cave

John Malcolm, Phronesis, 1962, Vol.7(1-2), pp.38-45

- The Line (p.38)
  - L1: Conjecture; images, shadows, reflections in water
  - L2: Faith; material objects

    - L3: Understanding; mathematical reasoning starting from sensible figures
    - L4: Intelligence; dialectic using only forms
- The Cave (p.38)
    - C1: Watching of the shadows on the wall in the cave
    - C2: Seeing the objects in the Cave which cause the shadows
    - C3: Viewing of reflections of objects in the world above
    - C4: Contemplation of actual objects in the world above
        - Visible vs Intelligible (517b)
            - C1 and C2 are visible => fire
            - C3 and C4 are intelligible => sun
- There are unquestionably 4 divisions to the line but the question remains whether: (p.39)
    - (1) There are four divisions in the cave
    - (2) Do the divisions correspond to the division of the line
- Plato's cave allegory is used to illustrate the educational process (p.39)
    - Plato does not explicitly state there are four stages of enlightenment
    - Robinson says we should not think it would be 3 or 4 or any number of stages
- "the step from C1 to C2 must be interpreted as an advance within the realm of the Visible and while the soul gains important educational improvement its cognitive objects are still in the world of "becoming"." (p.40)
- Malcolm defends the standard interpretation of the Cave (p.40)
    - W.D. Ross suggests there are two incompatible interpretations of the cave allegory
        - Interpretation 1: 517a8 - 517b6
        - Interpretation 2: 532a1 - 532d1
            - Malcolm rejects the second interpretation in preference for the first
- While it has been argued that Plato did not intend for any correspondence between the cave allegory and the line, them both seemingly having four stages appears to be more than just a coincidence (p.41)
    - "This whole image, Glaucon, must be fitted together with what we said before." (517b)
        - "What we said before" may refer to the sun
        - Does not mean that they are parallel, but it does show that there is a unity between the two analogies
- Malcolm argues there is a persuasive parallel between the line and the Cave (p.41)
- L4 corresponds to C4

- The dialectic and resulting knowledge of L4 is surely to be identified with the dialectic of the Cave Allegory (532a).

- L3 is parallel to C3
  - At L3 the mathematicians are described as using sensible figures. These are treated as images or shadows in water of the true realities, the forms. This evidently corresponds to the objects seen by the man at C3 (516a). He is engaged in studies that "dream about being" and cannot clearly see reality until he stops using uncriticised hypotheses (511a).
  - represents the stage of enlightenment reached by someone who is following the course of study from arithmetic to harmonics (522a - 532a)
- Problem: Chained man at C1 is at L2 for he can certainly recognize "everything that grows and everything that is made. " (p.42)
  - Some attempts in solving this problem include equating L1 and L2, or dropping L1 altogether
  - Malcom's solution is to look at the different stages in terms of education
    - "C4 corresponds to dialectic, the highest level of insight; C3 to the study of mathematics where students are in the "world of the intelligible" but are still only dreaming about the forms (533b - 533c). Thus they are represented as seeing only copies or images and reflections in water. Now let us take C2, where the prisoners are released and become aware of the "more real" artefacts, as symbolising music and gymnastic, the first stage in Plato's educational program."
    - Summary of the cave allegory (p.43)
    -

Knowledge, attained through dialectic	C_4	The
The study of mathematics	C_3	Intelligible
True belief, attained through *mousike*	C_2	The
The uneducated state of the common man	C_1	Visible

    - C1 and L1 => to recognise material objects
      - "No training in "music" is needed to enable one to recognize chairs. Someone completely lacking Plato's corrective educational program may surely be expected to do this." (p.43)
    - The ordinary man is at L2
      - Can recognise particulars pertaining to material objects and are unable to recognise value-particulars

    - "If we are permitted to assume that, for Plato, particular instances of beauty and temperance are of the same ontological level as particular beds and tables, we shall find a correspondence between L2 and C2. C2 would contain a sub-class of the objects included in L2."
    - Robinson => cave and line not parallel because when prisoners exit the cave they are bewildered (p.44)
        - Malcom's reply: they adjust
  - Education in music and gymnastics is to "enable them to distinguish the true images of justice, goodness and the like, for a man needs education truly to recognise the particular instantiations of such value-forms." (p.43)

- Three levels of moral enlightenment in the Republic (p.44-45)
    - ((i) the knowledge of the philosophers who know the forms,
    - (ii) the true belief of those with proper conditioning through music and gymnastic and
    - (iii) the less Permanent, less satisfactory beliefs of the uneducated
- "The two higher levels of moral enlightenment incorporate the two higher levels of reality. I submit it is reasonable to interpret Plato as letting the lowest level of reality represent the lowest level of moral enlightenment. If this move is defensible, it follows that the traditional view of a close correlation between Line and Cave is correct." (p.45)
    - "Furthermore, the linking of both these figures with the stages in the education of the philosopher-kings is vital to an appreciation of the structure of the Republic." (p.45)

The Cave Revisited

John Malcolm, The Classical Quarterly, 1 January 1981, Vol.31(1), pp.60-68, Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association, Accessed via: https://www.jstor.org/stable/638460

- Modern texts mostly agree that the line and the cave are parallel (p.60)
    - They further agree that moral and mathematical education as a crucial step in the establishing of this fact
- Argument in the previous paper (p.60)
    - C1 – false beliefs
    - C2 – attainment of true beliefs on moral matters; enlightened by music and gymnastics
- Plato would regard false, or very inadequate, beliefs as copies of true beliefs (p.61)
- Tanner (p.61)
    - Tanner interprets musical education to occur at C1

- C2 involves mensuration and arithmetic, studies which may stimulate thought (dianoia) to transcend the limitations of sense.
  - BUT this latter activity is much better placed at C3, since it goes beyond the cave (521d-522c) and corresponds directly with the conditions described at L3 (510b-e)

- Morrison (p.62)
  - Morrison takes the puppets at C2 to symbolise 'moving *eide* [forms]', the common characteristics of physical and moral particulars, whereas the shadows at C1 are the moral and physical particulars 'which we accept at face-value in our uneducated state'
  - Morrison's interpretation cannot match L1 to C1 etc. as one would expect
    - (1) The Forms at L4, are represented by the real physical objects at C4.
    - (2) Particulars, being copies of the Forms at L4, are in the realm of the intelligible at L3, since they are used, for example in mathematics, to stimulate thought. They are represented in the Cave at C3, by reflections, or copies, of the objects at C4,.
    - (3) The particulars at L2, now treated merely as sense objects, though still copies of the Forms at L4, are represented by the images at C2 - which are copies of the real objects at C4.
    - (4) The particulars given at L2 have their shadows at L1 and these are represented at C1 by the shadows of the images given at C2
  - "the Line must be forced into allegorical labour, with the particulars of L2 symbolising immanent forms and their shadows at L1 symbolising the instances of these forms, and the Cave becomes an allegory of an allegory for it symbolises not what the line states but what it, in turn, symbolises"
  - ALSO copy of copy ≠ reflection?
  - At Timaeus 52a Plato presents us with a threefold distinction between (p.63)
    - (1) the Form,
    - (2) a second type of thing, described as homonymous with the Form and similar to it and
    - (3) Space.
    - The second sort is not named, but is characterized further as having come into being, always in motion and an object of the senses, to be grasped by belief (doxa) with the aid of sensation
    - Morrison's moving eide refers to the second sort
    - BUT this would mean a merge of C1 and C2
      - So Morrison has to introduce a fourth thing not mentioned in Timaeus – end product

- Sze (p.64)
  - Malcolm supports this interpretation, at least on the basic level

- She claims that Plato intends two distinct classes of objects of opinion comparable to the sharp distinction between shadows and objects
  - The Cave, concerned with the education of the philosopher, is followed by a discussion of the specific course of studies.
- BUT Sze understands the difference in the world of opinion between C1 and C2 as due to distinct sources of opinion. She sees the prisoners at C1 as the multitude perverted by the poets and limited by the oral poetic tradition. In contrast, the turning at C2 to view the images represents the teaching of the sophists - an effort 'to overcome the limits of understanding imposed by a view of reality based on insight and poetry'
  - Problem: The movement from C1 to C2 (education of sophists) would still be in opinion, so it cannot be part of Plato's educational programme
    - Plato does not think highly of Sophists (493 a-c)
      - "they can only reinforce the opinions of the many, and hence are like the keeper of a great beast who follows its moods and desires, knowing not whether these are good or bad, just or unjust, then they are hardly better than the poets who, unedited, do not improve the multitude" (p.64)

- Wilson (p.65)
  - Malcolm thinks Wilson correctly restricts the difference between C1 and C2 to the area of opinion (doxa) on moral matters
  - Wilson's interpretation: The images at C2, are to be understood as representing moral qualities in the soul and their shadows and reflections at C1, as standing for these moral qualities manifested in outer appearance or behaviour
    - Plato asserts that the principle that each person 'does his own' is an eidolon or image of the truth, which is that justice is not external behaviour, but inner harmony of soul (443c)
    - whereas at C2 we are shown the Socratic method of the early dialogues and Republic I, at C3, we are presented with the more constructive method, much dependent on the use of images and analogies, which obtains in Republic II-X
  - "Wilson's restriction of the Cave allegory to the apprehension of moral qualities unfortunate in that it excludes the study of mathematics and thereby undermines the parallelism between Line and Cave"
    - Wilson claims that mathematics can take one to C3 by a different route not in the cave
    - Not the most natural way to interpret the passage
- The ideal state
  - "The children in the Ideal State, on the other hand, are not in the position of having to replace well-established false beliefs with true ones, and their attainment of C2 need not be as discomforting as it would be for those who must be brought to see the deficiencies in their former convictions." (p.67)

- “Plato sees three possible levels of moral enlightenment or its lack: knowledge (C4), true belief (C2) and false belief (C1). He wishes, in fact, to involve only the first two in his educational programme but, in order to show its superiority over contemporary practices, he includes all three in his allegory. As a result the transitions from C3, to C4 and from C2 to C3, are parts of the ideal curriculum, but that from C1 to C2 is not.” (p.67)
- “The ascent portrayed in the Cave Allegory would picture one either starting at C1 with false belief and advancing to the true or, in the ideal educational situation, starting at C2 (see pp. 66-7) with true beliefs inculcated by music and gymnastic. The next stage, C3, the training in mathematics does not per se represent an advance in moral enlightenment but is a period of necessary training in abstract thinking preparatory to the critical examination of moral issues through dialectic at C4 which, it is hoped, will result in knowledge – whatever its relation to justified true belief.” (p.68)

The Forms in the Republic

Terry Penner, The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic, Gerasimos Santas (ed.), 2006

1 On What the Forms Are: The Present State of the Question

- The *Republic* does not contain anything that looks like a full-dress exposition of a “Theory of Forms.” (p.234)
  - Interpreters of Plato, like Aristotle, tell us the theory of forms
  - For Aristotle, the Forms were the product of a metaphysical confusion wherein Plato construed universals or attributes (*such*-es) as if they were objects – substances, things (*this*-es). (p.235)
- Accounts of forms
  - Abstract + ideal objects (p.234)
  - (1) the Forms are no more than universals or attributes of the sort picked out by predicates such as “just” and corresponding abstract nouns such as “justice.”
  - (2) the Forms are more like *ideal objects*, *paradigms*, or *models*. Here the Forms are not attributes so much as objects *possessing* those attributes (and to an ideal and perfect degree).
  - Aristotle => (3) = (1) + (2)
- The line
  - (4) We have, corresponding to the four types (or faculties) of cognition, four different sorts of objects, ranked in accordance with their *degree of reality*, only the highest objects being fully real – the objects of knowledge, i.e., the Forms. (p.235)



Diagram of the Divided Line

-
  - Problem: if philosophers were studying objects in a different realm, how are they supposed to know how to govern the mass given the difference in the degree of reality the two groups are accustomed to? (p.235)

- (5) Universal Literal Self-Predication (p.236)
  - ULSP: For any Form, *F*-ness, that Form is itself the one perfect instance of *F*-ness (except possibly for some other Forms), while all perceptible instances of *F*-ness are at best imperfectly *F* things.
  - In line with (2), (3) and (4)
  - BUT How could largeness be itself a large object? (A HUGE object, one would have to suppose.)
    - The form of beauty is not beautiful in one way but not another
      - The form of beauty is beautiful non-relationally and without qualification
    - Similarly, the form of the good cannot be good for someone and not for another
      - Otherwise Plato's theory would just be based on self-interest
    - Since the form is non-relational, self-predication is a good solution
  - This theory was developed based on analysing particular sentences from Plato's work
    - BUT Penner insists that what is at issue in the dialogues is not what the *sentences* of the interlocutors say, let alone "entail," as fitted into relatively brief formalisable deductions, but rather what the *interlocutors* are saying by means of these sentences.
      - Needs to go beyond semantic and linguistic analysis (p.237)

2 Sketch of the View to be Offered Here

- Forms *are* universals or attributes pertaining those that are the objects of the sciences or expertises (p.237)
- There is an underlying "real nature" that is already there prior to our thought and language, involving eternal and unchanging laws of nature, in terms of which all change in the perceptible universe takes place. (p.237)

- Support (1) and partially (2) but reject (3), (4) and (5) completely (p.237)
- "On this view, the fundamental place of the Forms in Plato's ontology implies the fundamental place of the sciences in Platonic epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy." (p.237)

3 Plan of this Discussion of the Forms

- What the characters say in Plato's work should be analysed with reference to the context of the entire book (p.238)
  - We need to consider both what the characters are saying and how they say it
- Penner looks at the following passages in this order: (p.238)
  - A
    - Republic V 472b–e
      - the Form of Justice as a model we *look to* in devising this ideal city that is itself the model of the just person that we look to in order to see what justice and injustice are
    - Republic V 454a–456c
      - on finding the right Forms for deciding whether the nature of women is as adapted to the science of ruling as the nature of men
  - B
    - Republic X 596a–602b
      - the Forms as they show up in the claim that mimetic [representational] pursuits, such as tragedy and painting, are "at the third remove from reality"
  - C
    - Republic V 475e–480b with Republic VI.484b–485b, 486d–e, 490a–b, 4293e–494a, 500b–502d
      - eternal, unchangeable Forms as objects of knowledge, contrasted with perceptible things which are merely objects of opinion [or perception: 507b, 509d–510a]: the whole range of Forms constituting the object of study for the true philosopher).
  - D
    - Republic VI.502c – Republic VII.541b
      - the Form of the Good as the *megiston mathêma* ["the greatest thing to be learned"]: the Sun; the Divided Line; the Cave; and dialectic and the theory of the sciences)

4 The *Republic*'s Project as a Whole

- Although the Republic is primarily about justice, which is what books II-IV is mostly about, the rest of the Republic is not a digression. (p.239)
- "Books VIII–IX, they are *not* digressions – merely a completion of the argument of IV.444a–445e" (p.239)
  - More like a very long footnote
- However, Book V – at least the parts concerning communism of wives, children, and property, and the equality of women – *is* a political digression. (p.239)
- "The material on the Forms is not a digression. Its primary point – largely missed by earlier interpreters (and certainly by my earlier self) – is rather to address the inadequacy Book IV notes" (p.239-240)
  - Inadequacy in the state-soul analogy
  - "What the Book IV account of justice and the parts of the soul lacks, I claim, is an account of *the knowledge of the good* which it is the function of the rational part of a completely just soul to acquire in order to rule all three parts" (p.240)
    - i.e. the connection between the Form of the Good and the function of the rational part to look to the advantage of the parts of the soul taken separately and as a whole

5 The First Group of Passages on the Forms (V.472b–e with 454a–456c)

- At 472c4 and 472d4, Plato uses the term patterns (p.241)
  - It is unclear whether patterns is to refer to justice itself or the perfectly just man, which the painter aims to depict
  - The Form would be behaving in a perfectly just pattern, which the perfect man imitates
    - Plato confuses universals or attributes with certain ideal (the just man) with perfect instances ("patterns") of those universals or properties (the Forms)
    - Self-predication
  - Penner argues that by taking a holistic view (not just reading sentence by sentence) of Plato's position, the passage should be interpreted as "the Form tells us what justice is, and we look to that account of what justice is in trying to embody justice in ourselves or in a city." (p.242)
- Looking to a Form
  - *looking to* a Form in order to embody that Form as perfectly as possible in the world of things that come-to-be. (p.242)
    - In *Cratylus*: When a (weaving) shuttle breaks, the carpenter looks to the nature of a good shuttle and tries to imitate that
  - There is a difference between a building and a blueprint of a building; the Republic does not suggest one lives in a blueprint (p.242-243)
- Some commentators argue the form of justice is self-predicated but Penner thinks otherwise

- Republic (500b-c): the true philosopher whose thoughts are directed to *the things that are* will try to be *like* these *eternal, organised, and unchangeable entities*. (p.243)
  - The humans become intrinsically good by imitating these eternal entities (the Forms) that are themselves intrinsically good
  - Thus the Form of the Good would itself be an intrinsic good, and (as suggested by 500c) the Form of Justice would itself be just – the kind of thing that would behave purely and perfectly justly. (p.243)
    - This exhibits the self-predicationist view of imitating the Forms: the Forms themselves have the very attributes we wish to have.)
      - Each Form is the perfect exemplification of itself (and indeed the only such perfect exemplification, except perhaps for certain other Forms).
  - Problem: when Socrates speaks here of the Forms to be imitated, he says not only that they do not *adikein* (*do* injustice) but also that they do not *adikeisthai* (*suffer* injustice). (p.243)
    - It was not any part of Plato's intention to suggest that in striving to be like these entities, we should strive not only to avoid *doing* injustice, but also to avoid *suffering* injustice
- F1: The Forms are the general properties or structures which it is the business of an appropriate science or expertise to study, and which the appropriate expert will look to, using them as patterns, in attempting to embody the Form (to the extent possible) in things that come-to-be. (p.243)

6 The Second Group of Passages (X.596a–602b)

- "In Book X, the Forms turn out to be central to the discussion of the short- comings of drama for purposes of the good of the ideal city (and so also, by implication, for the good of the individual)" (p.244)
- The three beds (p.244)
  - the painter stands to a painting of a bed, so
  - the carpenter stands to the bed he manufactures, and so
  - God stands to the Form of the Bed (God as the real maker of the really real bed: 597c–d).
    - The painter is third removed from reality => probably why tragedians should be banned in the kallipolis
    - Triad of makers: painter; carpenter; God
    - Flute => painter; flute-maker; flute-player
      - "the painter imitates not the physical flute the carpenter makes, but the *appearance* of the physical flute; while the flute-maker does not have knowledge of whether the flutes he makes are good or bad; rather, the *user* of the flute has that knowledge." (p.245)

- F2: The Form of certain groups of perceptible particulars is the general property or kind or abstract structure the expert maker of such objects has to *look to* in order to embody it in its material, perhaps informed by one who knows the good that is to be achieved by using such objects. Once more the Forms are the objects of sciences or expertises; but knowing the Forms requires also knowing the good it is the function of objects of that kind to achieve. One who tries to understand what the flute is, using solely existing physical flutes (some perhaps even a broken or damaged flute – compare the shuttle above) is further from the truth (or from reality). Yet further from the truth (or from reality) will be one who tries to understand what the flute is using solely *paintings* of flutes. (p.245-246)

7 The Third Group of Passages on the Forms (V.475e–480b, VI.484b–485b, 486d–e, 490a–b, 493e–494a, 500b–502d)

- The Form of Beauty exists is for beauty to be *one* (476a, 479a, 507b, 524b–c, 596a).
  - "One could not even say that beauty and ugliness are *opposites*, since there would then have to be *two* opposites, and beauty would again be one! But there is no way for beautiful perceptibles not to be *many* perceptible beautifuls." (p.247)
- Socrates distinguishes between lovers of sights and sounds and philosophers (p.247)
  - Lovers of sights and sounds are said to be dreaming
    - To be dreaming is to not believe in beauty itself (the nature of the beautiful), but only in beautiful perceptibles (color, shapes, sounds), thinking that beautiful perceptibles aren't merely *like* beauty itself, but actually *are* beauty itself (476d)
    - Socrates' strategy
      - Lovers of sights and sounds believe that beauty itself does not exist, and yet affirm that *what it is*, is the many beautiful perceptibles.
      - BUT if the beautiful perceptibles exist then beauty does exist – the lovers of sights and sounds reach a contradiction
      - Socrates gets around this problem "by supposing that what the dreamers actually think is that *all there is* to the so-called beautiful itself is the many beautiful perceptibles. For the dreamers, then, there exists no beautiful itself *in addition to* the many beautiful perceptibles themselves." (p.247)
- Plato will take these abstract objects to exist antecedently to our thought and language. They are not objects *created* by us, but objects already there awaiting our *discovery* of them. (p.247)
  - (Opposites, if thought of as each one, are abstract objects.)
- Knowledge and opinion (p.248)
  - "Socrates identifies what opinion and knowledge are with *dreaming* and *being awake* respectively, *not* with knowing certain propositions." (p.248)
  - "the talk of knowing is not talk of *knowing that some proposition or propositions are true*, but rather of knowing something that arguably cannot be encapsulated in some mere proposition or plurality of propositions – that is, knowing the Form by looking to

which alone we may come to understand what beauty is. This is the knowledge in question in this passage." (p.248)

  - PP adds: is this the existential, predicative or veridical reading?

- F3: to say that Forms such as Beauty itself and Justice itself alone have *being* is to say such things as that the Form of Beauty tells us what [perceptible] beautiful things *are*. What beauty *is*, is not reducible to perceptible beautiful things. What is more, what beauty *is* gives perceptible things such beauty as they have, as the Form of the Flute gives flutes such identity as they have. (A bit of wood is a flute only so long as it partakes of the Form of the Flute. (p.248)

8 The Fourth Group of Passages (VI.502c–VII.541b: Sun, Line, and Cave) as Describing the "Longer Road": Plato's Identification of *The Good* with The Form of the Good

- The Form of the Good is plainly identified with the good at 505a2 (p.249)
- The Sun allegorises the Form of the Good (517b–c, 532a, 532c) (p.250)
- The Longer Road (p.250)
  - (A) Neither pleasure nor knowledge is the good
  - (B) The simile of the Sun
  - (C) The analogy of the Divided Line
  - (D) The allegory of the Cave
  - (E) The education programme to educate guardians about the Form of the Good
  - "The "longer road" appears only in VI–VII because Plato needed a stretch of dialogue long enough to introduce the proper further discussion of the good which it is the function of the rational part of the soul to aim at." (p.250)
- The Form of the Good is not self-predicated
  - "if my rational part looks to the Form of the Good, it does so to bring about *my* good – not some impersonal, *moral* good – just as, in the ideal city, the guardians aim to bring about the *city's* good, not some impersonal good." (p.251)
- F4: the Form of the Good just *is* the good we all desire: the real nature or attribute which is the object of the science of the good. (p.251)

9 The Anti-reductionism of the Sun, Line, and Cave about the Real Natures of Things that Structure the Universe

- Degrees of Reality (p.252)
  - B: the Divided Line and the Cave are to be understood in terms of four kinds of cognition, and, correspondingly, four kinds of objects, each of a different degree of reality)? (p.252)
  - "each kind of cognition is as adequate as it can be for its corresponding object; and since the higher kinds of object are successively "more real" as one cognitively

ascends (in the Line or in the Cave), the higher faculty also yields a superior cognition, purely by virtue of its object being more real." (p.252)

  - Problem: in connection with the objects of intellection Plato does not appear to specify anything but the *Forms* as objects (for example, the Circle itself, the Diagonal itself).

- In the parallel allegory of the Cave, the four kinds of objects perceived by the chained prisoner in his successively improved forms of cognition: (p.253)
  - the black shapes moving on the rock,
  - the stone objects that cast the shadows on the rock,
  - the animals of which the stone objects are statues, and
  - the Sun, through which one sees best what the animals are as well as what the Sun is.
- This corresponds to four different interpretations of 'What are you seeing?' (p.253)
  - What do you see on the rock? (black shapes)
  - What do you see when freed? (shaped rocks carried in front of a fire)
  - What do you see in reflections outside the cave? (perceptible animals) and
  - What do you see in the sky outside the cave? (stars, and above all the Sun
- Each answer would be perfectly correct as answer to the corresponding question, even though at higher stages in the ascent, the objects turn out to be "more real"
  - So even at the bottom of the cave the prisoner had some sort of knowledge
    - "On the Degrees of Reality theory, why *wouldn't* geometers have mathematical knowledge of the mathematicals, even if mathematicals are not as real as Forms?" (p.255)
    - BUT "There is no such thing in Plato as knowledge, empirical or not, of the "proposition" that *the black shapes are moving across the rocks* that is compatible with almost total ignorance of what the black shapes *are*." (p.256)
      - Plato's position (p.256)
        - Plato takes it that to know what someone is saying, it is not enough to know what "proposition" the person's sentence expresses. One must know what the things are that the person intends to refer to.
        - Thus what the prisoner intends to refer to when he talks about the black shapes moving on the rock is *whatever those black shapes really are*; even if, unbeknownst to him, they are (d) shadows of (c) statues of (b) animals which embody (a) the Form, he does not know that his claim is true. Hence when he says "The black shapes are moving on the rock" he does not know *what* claim he is making.
  - Problem: the answer at each stage is more 'true' than others rather than more real (p.254)

- What the prisoners “intend to speak of is, unbeknownst to themselves, the statue-movers on the parapet behind themselves. Indeed for them to want to speak of the actual causes of the sound they hear coming off the rock is for them to have a notion of correctness that goes beyond anything they can actually conceptualise.” (p.254)
- F5: The square cannot be reduced to any shadows, to any physical objects or drawn squares, or even any entities of the sort a geometer might postulate as implicitly defined by the axioms of geometry. There are four different degrees of *truth* about what the square is, only one of which, when apprehended, gives us the actual truth (*alêtheia*) about the square. There are, if you will, four different degrees of grasp of what the square *is* (*einai, on*). There are not four different degrees of reality. And there are no “mathematicals” in the Divided Line. (p.257)
  - Not Degrees of Reality but Degrees of Truth

10 Conclusion

- Believing that there exist, antecedently to our thought and language, real natures or Forms is no more extraordinary than believing there are, antecedently to our thought and language, certain laws of nature which give the underlying structure of the universe. (p.257)
- The idea of the Form is so basic, which is probably why Plato did not say much about it

Week 7: Mathematics and Dialectics

Plato's Republic

Plato, Translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992

Book 7; 518—41

- Education is the craft of turning the soul around via studying the most brilliant thing – the good
  - "Our present discussion, on the other hand, shows that the power to learn is present in everyone's soul and that the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body." (518c)
  - "This instrument cannot be turned around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole soul until it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing that is, the one we call the good." (518c)
- Reason is a double-edged sword; it is powerful ("something more divine" than appetite and spirit which comes naturally with the body; added by habit and practice) either in a good way or in a bad way (518e)
- "It is our task as founders, then, to compel the best natures to reach the study we said before is the most important, namely, to make the ascent and see the good. But when they've made it and looked sufficiently, we mustn't allow them to do what they're allowed to do today … To stay there and refuse to go down again to the prisoners in the cave and share their labours and honours, whether they are of less worth or of greater." (519c - 519d)
  - Glaucon asks: wouldn't this be doing them an injustice by making them live a worse life? (519d)
  - Socrates: "it isn't the law's concern to make any one class in the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each other through persuasion or compulsion and by making them share with each other the benefits that each class can confer on the community." (519e)
- Returning to the cave
  - "Therefore, each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark. When you are used to it, you'll see vastly better than the people there. And because you've seen the truth about fine, just, and good things, you'll know each image for what it is and also that of which is the image. Thus, for you and for us, the city will be governed, not like the majority of cities nowadays, by people who fight over shadows and struggle against one another in order to rule – as if that were a great good – but by people who are awake rather than dreaming." (520c)

- Socrates and Glaucon set to find a subject that can draw the soul from the realm of becoming to the realm of what is (521d)
  - This subject must also not be useless to warlike men (521d)
  - The subject is not physical training because physical training concerns the growth and decay of the body – “what comes into being and dies” (521e)
  - The subject is also not music for music gives harmoniousness but not knowledge (522a)
  - Socrates reveals that the the subject is number and calculation, in which every craft and science has a share in (522b - 522c)
- “some sense perceptions don’t summon the understanding to look into them, because the judgement of sense perception is itself adequate, while others encourage it in every way to look into them, because sense perception seems to produce no sound result.” (523a - 523b)
  - Fingers analogy
    - Visible: We see all fingers as being fingers regardless of size (524c)
    - Understanding: we take the big and the small fingers as being separate (524c)
- Calculation and arithmetic are wholly concerned with numbers and leads us towards the truth (525a)
  - “They are compulsory for warriors because of their orderly ranks and for philosophers because they have to learn to rise up out of becoming and grasp being, if they are ever to become rational.” (525b)
    - PP adds: mathematics as pre-requisite to rationality
    - “Our guardian must be both a warrior and a philosopher.” (525b)
- Socrates suggests that is would be appropriate to “legislate this subject” for the ruling class and persuade them to take it up to the level of understanding, not just buying and selling things like the layman (525b - 525c)
  - Must be so sophisticated it concerns the abstract and not the tangibles (525c - 525d)
  - Socrates convinces Glaucon that mathematics is the hardest subject and so it must not be neglected and the best natures must be educated in it. (526c)
- Geometry
  - “we must require those in your fine city not to neglect geometry in any way, for even its by-products are not insignificant.” (527c)
    - by-product refers troop organisation and army formation
- Astronomy
  - It is suggested that the second required subject after geometry is astronomy, but Socrates points out this is wrong because a jump is made from planes to moving solids without considering solids (528a - 528b)
  - “Let’s put astronomy as the fourth subject, on the assumption that solid geometry will be available if a city takes it up.” (528e)

- While Glaucon thinks astronomy compels the soul to looks upward, Socrates thinks astronomy, as practiced by those who teach philosophy in the setting of the *Republic*, makes the soul look downward (528e - 529a)
    - They can't really see what's going on but make claims เป็นตุเป็นตะ
    - "If anyone attempts to learn something about sensible things, whether by gaping upward or squinting downward, I'd claim – since there's no knowledge of such things – that he never learns anything and that, even if he studies lying on his back on the ground or floating on it in the sea, his soul is looking not up but down." (529b - 529c)
    - Astronomy should be studied by means of problems like in geometry "and leave the things in the sky alone" (530b)
    - Some musicians labour in vain like 'present day' astronomers, trying to find sounds but not looking at the problem of harmonics (531a - 531c)

- Dialectic
    - Dialectic is not deductive proof, but philosophical discussion aimed at testing and securing definitions (533a - 533b)
        - (From Burnyeat, p.45)
    - Dialectic is the journey out go the cave
        - "dialectic is the only inquiry that travels this road, doing away with hypotheses and proceeding to the first principle itself, so as to be secure" (533c)
    - "whenever someone tries through argument and apart from all sense perceptions to find the being itself of each thing and doesn't give up until he grasps the good itself with understanding itself, he reaches the end of the intelligible, just as the other reached the end of the visible." (532a - 532b)
    - Dialectic must be among the subjects a future ruler must learn (534e)
- Who gets to learn
    - Philosophy is currently not valued for "she's taken up by people who are unworthy of her, for illegitimate students should not be allowed to take her up, but only legitimate ones." (535c)
    - The student should love handwork thoroughly
        - "no student should be lame in his love of hard work, really loving one half of it, and hating the other half." (535d)
        - In the same way the soul cannot hate voluntary falsehood but accept involuntary falsehood (535d)
- "calculation, geometry, and all the preliminary education required for dialectic must be offered to the future rulers in childhood, and not in the shape of compulsory learning either." (536d)
    - Because no free person should be forced to learn anything like a slave (536e)

- A couple of years after being released from compulsory physical training (e.g. at age 20) people who can form unified view of dialectic remain steadfast in their studies while others don't (537b - 537d)
- Young people are not to be exposed to argumentation
    - "when young people get their first taste of fine arguments, they misuse it by treating it as a game of contradiction. They imitate those who've refuted them by refuting others themselves, and, like puppies, they enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments." (539b)
    - "an older person won't want to take part in such madness. He'll imitate someone who is willing to engage in discussion in order to look for the truth, rather than someone who plays at contradiction for sport." (539c)
- After 5 years (number doesn't really matter) philosophers are to return to the cave for fifteen years and emerge at 50 (540a)
- Ruling women are to share everything equally with men
- Glaucon asks if the constitution is hard to come about (540d)
    - Socrates says the city can come about by sending everyone above 10 years old off and let the children be raised under the constitution of the ideal state (541a)

Week 8: Justice and the Political Systems

Plato's Republic

Plato, Translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett Publishing Company, 1992

Book 8

- Summary of the first constitution – the ideal state (543a - 543b)
  - Common wives, children and education
  - Kings must be chosen from people who proved to be best at philosophy and warfare
  - No private property for rulers
  - Rulers to receive a yearly upkeep from other citizens
- Four other types of constitutions remain to be discussed (544a - 544c)
  - The Spartan constitution (Cretan or Laconian) => timocratic
  - Oligarchy
  - Democracy
  - Tyranny
- "if there are five forms of city, there must also be five forms of the individual soul." (544e)
- Five forms of the soul (545a)
  - The soul that is like aristocracy – corresponds to the ideal state
  - Victory-loving and honour-loving – corresponds to the Spartan constitution
  - Oligarchic
  - Democratic
  - Tyrannical
- How timocracy emerges from aristocracy
  - Some children will be born when they are not supposed to (546b)
    - Plato elaborates on using numbers of how there must be perfect timings (546b - 546c)
    - Join brides and grooms at the wrong time and children will be neither good natured nor fortunate (546c - 546d)
      - These children will not pay as much attention to music and physical training as they should
      - Difficult to determine whether one is of the gold, silver, bronze or iron race

- Civil war
  - "The intermixing of iron with silver and bronze with gold that results will engender lack of likeness and unharmonious inequality, and these always breed was and hostility whenever they arise." (547a)
  - The iron and bronze type will pull the constitution towards money-making and the acquisition of land, houses gold and silver (547b)
  - The gold and silver types will pull the constitution towards virtue and the old order (547b)
  - They struggle with one another but reaches a compromise (547b)
    - "They distribute the land and houses as private property, enslave and hold as serfs and servants those whom they previously guarded as free friends and providers of upkeep, and occupy themselves with war and with guarding against those whom they've enslaved." (547b)
- Timocracy as the halfway between aristocracy and oligarchy (547c)
  - Aristocratic in the sense that rulers are respected (547d)
    - BUT rulers chosen for their spirit, not wisdom (547e)
  - Oligarchic in the sense that the rulers have a passion for wealth, which they keep hidden (548a)
    - They will like to use other people's money but will save theirs because they cannot openly acquire their private funds (548b)
- The timocrat is the "son of a good father who lives in a city that isn't well governed" (549c)
  - PP adds: "son" metaphor links to the idea that a certain kind of constitution breeds another kind of constitution
    - Intergenerational degradation
  - "His father nourishes the rational part of the soul and makes it grow; the others nourish the spirited and appetitive parts." (550b)
    - PP adds: but this imagery of upbringing does not match the family dynamics in the ideal state?
  - The timocrat ends up in the middle

- Oligarchy
  - Oligarchy = "The constitution based on a property assessment, in which the rich rule, and the poor man has no share in ruling." (550c)
  - Socrates describes the transformation from a timocracy into an oligarchy as being "clear even to the blind" (550d)
  - The rulers in the timarchy stretch the laws to facilitate their money spending then disobey the laws altogether; others follow this behaviour (550d - 550e)

- “in the end, the victory-loving and honour-loving men become lovers of making money, or money-lovers. And they praise and admire wealthy people and appoint them as rulers, while they dishonour poor ones.” (551a)
  - PP adds: BUT if everyone is interested in making their own money, should they not be against the rich? By giving the rich power they are limiting their own money-making capabilities.
    - Maybe they just become the rich themselves, utilising their incumbent positions as leverage
    - BUT the timocrat does not have a good ending “crashing against the city like a ship” (553a)
- Problem 1: the poor person might be the better captain of the ship; oligarchy may select the wrong leader (551c)
- Problem 2: rich people and poor people living in the same place would result in them plotting against each other (551d)
  - BUT oligarchs are few in number and so will not win a war, yet some are too stingy to hire mercenaries; if they hire the majority and arm them, then they will fear the majority will use their weapons against them rather than the enemy (551d -551e)
  - What if oligarchs were money-makers and soldiers simultaneously?
    - Still not good because it is meddling with others’ affairs, which goes against Plato’s idea of specialisation (551e)
- The oligarchic constitution allows for inequality
  - Adeimantus says the “almost everyone except the rulers is a beggar there” (552d)
- Drone analogy (552c - 552d)
  - Drone = male bee
  - A drone is a cell is an affliction to the hive just as the person who has sold all their possessions and spent the money an affliction to the city
  - All winged drones are stingless; some wingless ones are stingless while other wingless ones have dangerous stings
  - Stingless ones are beggars; those with stings are evil-doers (thieves)
  - The evil doers are to be kept in check by force
- Son of the timocrat
  - The timocrat falls and has his property confiscated. His son, humbled by poverty, turns greedily to making money (553b - 553c)
  - The son of the timocrat does not pay attention to education, for if he did, he would not choose the ruler based on wealthiness as a criteria (554b)
- A thrifty money maker is like an oligarchic city
  - “this thrifty man is a poor individual contestant for victory in a city or for any other find and much-honoured thing, for he’s not willing to spend money for the sake of a fine reputation or on contests for such things. He’s afraid to arouse his appetites

for spending or to call on them as allies to obtain victory, so he fights like an oligarch, with only a few of his resources. Hence he's mostly defeated but remains rich." (554e - 555a)

- Democracy
  - There will be tension between the rich and the poor in the oligarchic state
  - The struggle makes the state unhealthy and able to fall ill into a civil war without external influence (556e - 557a)
  - "democracy comes about when the poor are victorious, killing some of their opponents and expelling others, and giving the rest an equal share in ruling under the constitution, and for the most part assigning people to positions of rule by lot." (557a)
  - Under democracy, everyone will have the license to do what they want and so "it's most of all under this constitution that one finds people of all varieties." (557b)
    - "like a coat embroidered with every kind of ornament, this city, embroidered with every kind of character type, would seem to be the most beautiful." (557c)
  - One does not need to be capable to rule in a democracy, so a democracy is pleasant while it lasts (557e - 558a)
  - Son of the thrifty oligarch
    - While the thrifty oligarch is ruled by necessary desires, the spendthrift son is ruled by unnecessary desires (559c)
    - The young person reared in miserly and uneducated manner tastes honey and becomes addicted to the desires
    - "sometimes the democratic party yields to the oligarchic, so that some of the young man's appetites are overcome, others are expelled, a kind of shame rises in his soul and order is restored" (560a)
    - BUT the expelled desires grow numerous and strong (560b)
      - "these desires draw him back into the same bad company and in secret intercourse breed a multitude of others" (560b)
    - "and so he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand" (561c)
- Tyranny
  - Tyranny emerges from the insatiable desire for freedom (562b - 562c)
  - "the young imitate their elders and compete with them in word and deed, while the old stoop to the level of the young and are full of play and pleasantry, imitating the young for fear of appearing disagreeable and authoritarian" (563a)
  - Three types of people in a democratic state (564c - 565b)
    - Class of idlers
      - Manages everything in a democracy
      - Fierce
    - Class of money-makers

    - “drone-foddler” (564e)
  - Class of workers
    - The largest and most powerful class, but are not willing to assemble unless they get a share of the honey
- People are always in the habit of setting up one man as their special champion, nurturing him and making him great
  - “when a tyrant arises, this special leadership is the sole root from which he sprouts” (565d)
- The leader of the mob, without self-restraint, would become a tyrant (565e - 566a)
- The tyrant draws off the best and leaves the worst – the opposite of what a doctor does when he purges (567c)
- The tyrant dares to use violence against his father when he has seized his weapons (569b)