

Plato's *Republic*: Glaucon and Adeimantus

Questions

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#	Year	#	Questio...	Aa	Name	☰	Topics	☰	Tags	+
	2020	2	What must be true of justice if it is a good that is valued 'because of itself' (book 2.358a)? Does Socrates ever successfully prove that justice is a good of this sort?	2.	G&A		2b. Glaucon's classification 2d. Socrates' response			
	2018	3	Does Socrates' account of justice succeed in answering Glaucon's and Adeimantus' challenge?	2.	G&A		2d. Socrates' response			
	2017	10	Critically assess one of Socrates' arguments that the life of the just person is more pleasant than that of the unjust, and explain how his interest in arguing for this point is consistent with Glaucon's original request for him to ignore the consequences of justice.	2.	G&A		2d. Socrates' response			
	2016	2	What is Socrates' response to the challenge posed by Glaucon and Adeimantus? Is his response a success?	2.	G&A		2d. Socrates' response			
	2015	1	Why is Glaucon dissatisfied with Socrates' response to Thrasymachus? How do the new arguments he and Adeimantus present attempt to address this dissatisfaction?	2.	G&A		2a. Thrasymachus 'renewed'			
	2014	2	Does Socrates ever succeed in dealing properly with Glaucon's thought experiment suggested by Gyges' ring?	2.	G&A		2c. Gyges' ring			
	2013	2	Where, if anywhere, does Socrates give his answer to Glaucon and Adeimantus?	2.	G&A		2d. Socrates' response			
	2010	2	'I've yet to hear anyone defend justice in the way I want, proving that it is better than injustice. I want to hear it praised by itself (Glaucon, in Book II, 358c-d). Does Socrates meet this challenge in the <i>Republic</i> ?	2.	G&A		2d. Socrates' response			
	2009	2	Can Glaucon's three classes of goods be satisfactorily defined?	2.	G&A		2b. Glaucon's classification			
	2008	4	'So, if you agree, I'll renew the argument of Thrasymachus' (<i>Republic</i> , 358b). Does Glaucon do this? How good is Socrates' answer?	2.	G&A		2a. Thrasymachus 'renewed' 2d. Socrates' response			
	2006	2	'Only by redefining justice can Socrates argue that it benefits its possessor.' Is this criticism fair?	2.	G&A		2d. Socrates' response			
	2004	3	What does it mean for something to be good 'for its own sake' (<i>hautou heneka</i>)?	2.	G&A		2b. Glaucon's classification			
	2003	1	In what sense does Glaucon renew the argument of Thrasymachus?	2.	G&A		2a. Thrasymachus 'renewed'			
	2002	2	Is the task of showing that justice is a good in itself a logically impossible one?	2.	G&A		2b. Glaucon's classification			
	2000	2	What is the difference between goods welcomed for their own sake, and those welcomed for what comes from them? Is this distinction maintained in Socrates' defence of justice?	2.	G&A		2b. Glaucon's classification 2d. Socrates' response			

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Building Blocks

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1.1 What happens at the beginning of book II?

- In *Republic*, Thrasymachus argues that “justice is the good of another, the advantage of the stronger, while injustice is one’s own advantage and profit, though not the advantage of the weaker.” (367c) When burdened with questions, Thrasymachus refuses to reformulate the argument and leaves.
- Glaucon refuses to accept Thrasymachus’ abandonment of the argument (357a). He renews the argument by introducing a threefold classification of goods.
 - In the first category are goods that we desire for its own sake, such as joy and some harmless pleasures.
 - In the second category are goods that we like for its own sake and for what that comes from it.
 - Finally, in the third category are goods that we desire for the sake of the rewards and other things that come from them. These are such as ways of making money, physical training and medical treatment (357b–357c).
- Glaucon (and presumably Thrasymachus) would place justice in the third category – as a good desired only for its consequences.
- Socrates, Plato’s voice in the dialogue, argues that justice is of the second (and finest) category: for its own sake and for what that comes from it. It then becomes Plato’s challenge for the rest of the book and for most of the *Republic* to show that this is the case
- In book II, Glaucon challenges Socrates to show that justice is preferable to injustice, even if the just person has all the (social) disadvantages of injustice, and the unjust person has all the advantages of justice
- By the end of book IV, justice is defined as psychic health or harmony, and this is said to be good for the individual; reason is in control

1.2 What happens prior, in book I?

- Thrasymachus (and others) and Socrates argue about justice
- Several definitions are proposed and eventually refuted
- Thrasymachus is unconvinced. He is explicitly said to be a grudging interlocutor (e.g. 342c-e). At one point he tries to leave (344d) and eventually adopts a strategy of compliance to draw things to a close ASAP (350e)
- Socrates is disappointed

1.3 In what sense is Glaucon dissatisfied? (357b, 358b)

- Socrates, he [Glaucon] said, do you want to seem to have persuaded us that it is better in every way to be just than unjust, or do you want truly to convince us of this?
- I think that Thrasymachus gave up before he had to, charmed by you as if he were a snake. But I’m not yet satisfied by the argument on either side. I want to know what justice and injustice are and what power each itself has when it’s by itself in the soul. I want to leave out of account their rewards and what comes from each of them

1.4 Why does Socrates give up with the likes of Thrasymachus and turn to 'easier' interlocutors? What does this say about Plato's views on the power of philosophical argument to persuade the 'entrenched' moral sceptic?

- Consider Thrasymachus: in book I, he remains intransigent and apparently unconvinced even though he has lost the argument; he is explicitly said to be a grudging interlocutor (e.g. 342c-e). At one point he tries to leave (344d) and eventually adopts a strategy of compliance to draw things to a close ASAP (350e)
 - His debate with Socrates is a failure and he remains unconvinced
- Socrates got killed, for all his devotion to moral philosophy
- Plato showed using the contrast between Thrasymachus and Glaucon how different types of audiences may respond to Socrates' argument
- However cogent the argument is, people are not going to listen

2.1 What is Glaucon and Adeimantus' challenge?

Why be just?

STAGE I: GLAUCON'S CLASSIFICATION (357a-358a)

- First class: things that are valued for themselves and not for their consequences (e.g. joy)
- Second class: things that are valued both for themselves and for their consequences (e.g. knowledge, sight, health)
- Third class: things that are valued not for themselves but for their consequences (e.g. physical training, medical treatment)
 - General opinion holds that justice is here
- The challenge: to hear Socrates refute the general opinion
 - Glaucon argues for the general opinion even if he doesn't believe it (he wants to refute it but doesn't know how so he challenges Socrates)
 - Socrates places justice in the second class

STAGE II: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE (358e-359b)

- The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge
- People who lack the power to do injustice and avoid suffering it agree neither to do injustice nor to suffer it; they make laws and covenants, and what the law commands they call lawful and just
- Implication: powerful people wouldn't make these agreements
- Justice seems to be a second-best option for the weak, a compromise. If people can commit injustice and get away with it, wouldn't they?

STAGE III: GYGES' RING (359b-360d)

- Gyges' ring renders the wearer invisible. Using this power, Gyges seduced the king's wife, murdered the king and took over the kingdom
- Glaucon: With the ring, the just person would act just like the unjust person
 - If they believe they can do injustice with impunity, they will do it
 - "The reason for this is the desire to outdo others and get more and more."
- Gyges' story separates the social consequences of justice from its intrinsic consequences
- **Implications** There is no intrinsic value to justice; injustice is the ideal

STAGE IV: THE CHOICE OF CHARACTERS (360d-361d)

- A thought experiment comparing the most just and the most unjust
- The most unjust: is believed to be just while being unjust
- The most just: is believed to be unjust while being just
- The most unjust, with his reputation for justice, outdoes his enemies, benefits his friends, and takes better care of the gods than the most just
- Hence it is likely that the gods treat him more favourably
- **Implication** The unjust life is preferable to the just life; how could anyone prefer justice for itself?

ADEIMANTUS' CONTRIBUTION (362d-368a)

- People praise justice not only for its social (earthly) consequences but also for its religious (divine) consequences
- Greek poets have suggested that “the unjust deeds of the living or the dead can be absolved or purified through sacrifices and pleasant games”
- (Link to critiques of poetry: the ideology that justice is a burden is due to this kind of poetry)
- If gods don't exist or don't care about human affairs, the above applies
- Otherwise, compare:
 - Living a just life simply means you are not punished
 - Living an unjust life and persuading the gods means you are not punished AND you reap the profits of injustice
- So injustice is preferable to justice in both cases

2.2 What are the problems with Glaucon's challenge?

THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUACY

- Is Glaucon's classification adequate?
- **Exhaustiveness:** If the classification is not exhaustive, why assume justice must be in one of the classes?

Intrinsic good, instrumental good (G2, Platonic view of justice)	Intrinsic good, instrumental neutral (G1)	Intrinsic good, instrumental evil (popular view of injustice)
Intrinsic neutral, instrumental good		Intrinsic neutral, instrumental evil
Intrinsic evil, instrumental good (G3, popular view of justice)	Intrinsic evil, instrumental neutral	Intrinsic evil, instrumental evil (Platonic view of injustice)

- Glaucon never says the classification is exhaustive (White)
- Intrinsic neutrals are ignored because they play no role in the argument of the *Republic* (Heinaman)
- The three classes of goods “are meant to include all the goods that might be considered as ways of achieving happiness” (Irwin)
- “The good things taxonomized are evidently understood by Glaucon as subordinate to some further good, the ultimate good, whatever that may be” (Shields)

- Are third-class goods necessarily intrinsic evils? Yes (Heinaman, White)
- **Mixed consequences:** It seems to be that G2 does not admit of things with any degree of instrumental bad; all consequences (in the relevant sense) must be good, nothing can be 'on balance' an instrumental good (White)

THE PROBLEM OF CONSEQUENCES

- What is the difference between valuing something for its own sake and valuing something for its 'consequences'? What 'consequences' do the brothers want excluded?
 - If there is a general distinction, it must apply to justice
 - Or, if not, at least there needs to be a distinction in the case of justice
- The specific case: justice
 - The brothers want the 'reputations and rewards' of justice to be excluded
 - At the same time, some 'consequences' seem to be included, e.g. the benefits of having justice in itself
- Artificial consequences: those that depend on the existence of human practices and conventions, and would not accrue to the possession of justice in the absence of these (Foster, Annas 1981)
 - Artificial consequences are advantages that result from social institutions
 - Natural consequences include the internal psychological effects of justice
- Alternative view: Plato is distinguishing between 'what justice causes, in the Platonic sense, all by itself, and certain things that emerge from it in conjunction with other factors' (White)
 - By its own capacity justice causes happiness and pleasure in the soul
 - When justice occurs in conjunction with certain other factors, such as the reputation for being just, there emerge such additional things as wealth, public honours, and so forth
 - **Simulator-accessible consequences:** such consequences as could equally well be consequences of reputed justice (Reeve)
- **Problem** Other second-class goods, such as knowledge and sight, only have natural consequences but not artificial ones; the same goes for third-class goods, such as dieting [this was challenged by Jonny McIntosh]
- **Response** This is merely a fact about justice, and need not introduce a new principle of division (Annas 1981)
- Thus Glaucon is really asking Socrates to exclude only the artificial consequences; he remains very interested in the natural ones. He wants Socrates to show that justice is both intrinsically good and that it has good natural consequences

RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN GLAUCON'S CHALLENGE TO SOCRATES THROUGH DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONSEQUENCES

- If praising justice in terms of itself is, then, to include praising it for the consequence that it makes men happy, Glaucon and Adeimantus must imply a distinction between different kinds of consequence: some are to be excluded, others not.
- Characteristics of the consequences Adeimantus and Glaucon wants excluded (Foster)
 - (1) Consequences that are artificial, not natural: that is, they do not follow the possession of justice without human intervention.

- They are rewards in the sense in which a prize or a bribe is a reward for work or service
 - Mabbott notes that natural ≠ inevitable: Relief of headache is the natural of taking aspirin, since no one has to intervene in order that it shall have this effect. But the relief does not always come, and could easily be prevented. (Mabbott, p.470) (p.164)
- (2) Consequences that follow from the appearance, even if it is a pretence, of justice rather than from the thing itself.
 - i.e. consequences that follow from the reputation of justice rather than justice itself
- “These two distinctions seems to me, as evidently to Plato, to be coincident. What is the natural consequence of an action or character will never be the consequence of its counterfeit, and artificial consequences will always follow successful pretence.” (p.164)
- Glaucon’s challenge to Socrates/Plato (showing that a thing is good for its own sake will be the same as praising it ‘itself in terms of itself’) can be taken as praising it for its natural consequences.

THE PROBLEM OF EUDAIMONIA

- To what extent, if at all, is Plato utilitarian (*eudaimonist*)?
- **Yes:** the classification of goods presupposes the supremacy of happiness (Irwin)
 - The state of *eudaimonia* is treated as *ex hypothesi* the best state it is possible for a man to be in
 - The three classes of goods are meant to include all the goods that might be considered as ways of achieving happiness; they are not meant to include happiness itself
 - But Plato never says that justice is a component of happiness (White)
- **Not quite:** Plato isn’t utilitarian in the Benthamite / Millian sense (Creed)
 - Eudaimon means something more like ‘well-being’ than ‘happiness’; so it is logically tied to what is valued for a person (c.f. pleasure/pain are subjective)
 - Mill assumes the need for morality and asserts the value that is utility
 - Plato assumes the good and asserts the need for morality (since they are logically connected)
- **No:** Plato is neither deontologist or consequentialist (Annas)
 - If the argument is that justice is a moral good, neither view would be compatible with justice being placed in the second class
 - First-class and third-class goods have different good-making powers, which could explain why the second class is held as the ‘finest’ (Williams)
- Specifically, is justice good because it brings eudaimonia?
- **Yes**
 - Justice is identified with happiness, so arguing that one possesses happiness if one possess justice is arguing eo ipso that justice is good for its own sake (Mabbott)
 - Justice is not identified with happiness, but it is a vital part of eudaimonia (justice is to happiness what having a healthy heart is to having a healthy body) (Irwin)

- **Not quite:** justice in one's soul makes one happy or makes one's life pleasant in the same way as fire makes things hot (White)
 - The link between justice and happiness is somewhere between a purely empirical connection and a definitionally established one (so the argument has both empirical and a priori premises)

THE PROBLEM OF CONSISTENCY

- **Verbal consistency:** Glaucon wants to hear justice praised 'itself by itself', while Adeimantus wants justice to be praised for the way it 'benefits the man who has it itself on its own account'.
 - There is no conflict if we do not retain the assumption that showing justice desirable for itself must exclude showing it desirable for its consequences (Annas 1981)
- **Conceptual consistency:** In the beginning, the challenge was just to show that justice was an intrinsic good; by the end, the challenge became to show that justice has overriding intrinsic value (e.g. choice of lives)
 - So the comparison becomes justice and nothing else is better than having everything else but no justice → has Glaucon switched the challenge?
 - We may agree that justice has some intrinsic value, yet when weighed out is not more important than getting your eyes taken out, for example
 - Compare: if we wish to show that health is a second-class good, we need not also show that we would always choose a healthy but wretched life over an unhealthy but otherwise rewarding life; this is sufficient but not necessary (Shields)

3.1 What is Socrates' answer to Glaucon's challenge? (367e-612b)

The best approach is to come to the exam with a clear and concisely explicable answer – that you can set out on the basis of a few textual references – of what Socrates' answer is

- On the surface, the Republic seems to present four independent attempts to support the conclusion that justice pays apart from its consequences (Kraut 1992)
 1. At the end of Book IV, we learn that justice is a certain harmonious arrangement of the parts of the soul. It is therefore related to the soul as health is related to the body, and since life is not worth living if one's health is ruined, it is all the more important to maintain the justice of one's soul (444c-445c)
 2. In Book IX, Plato compares the five types of people [and] declares that the happiest of them is the philosopher, since he exercises kingly rule over himself (580a-c)
 3. Book IX immediately proceeds to argue that the philosophical life has more pleasure than any other, since the philosopher is in the best position to compare the various pleasures available to different types of people and prefers philosophical pleasures to all others (580c-583a)
 4. The pleasures of the philosophical life are shown to be more real and therefore greater than the pleasures of any other sort of life (583b-588a)
- Plato himself makes it clear that these two segments – Books II-IV on the one hand, Books V-IX on the other – cannot be isolated from each other. For at the beginning of Book VIII we are told that the victorious pronouncement of Book IV - that the best person and city had been found - was premature (543c7-544b3) (Kraut 1992)
 - My suggestion is that for Plato the Forms are a good—in fact they are the greatest good there is. In order to live well we must break away from the confining assumption that the ordinary objects of pursuit – the pleasures, powers, honors, and material goods that we ordinarily compete for – are the only sorts of goods there are. We must transform our lives by recognizing a radically different kind of good – the Forms – and we must try to incorporate these objects into our lives by understanding, loving, and imitating them, for they are incomparably superior to any other kind of good we can have
 - Plato equates health, the good condition of the body, with a certain harmony among its elements; and he argues that justice, the good condition of the soul, is also a certain kind of harmony among its parts; and so the thought suggests itself that he takes the goodness of anything of a certain kind to be the harmony or proportion that is appropriate for things of that kind. According to this suggestion, the goodness of Forms consists in the fact that they possess a kind of harmony, balance, or proportion; and their superiority to all other things consists in the fact that the kind of order they possess gives them a higher degree of harmony than any other type of object
 - Plato's portrait of the tyrant makes it clear that his argument for justice does not rest solely on the metaphysics of the middle books and the political theory of the early books but also relies on various assumptions about human psychology. Certain desires, if unchecked, lead to the sorts of consequences – frustration, fear, pain – that everyone tries to avoid and that no one regards as compatible with a fully happy human life. What Plato is assuming is that the life of the completely just person is not marred by these same features. Fear, frustration, and chaos are not the price philosophers must inevitably pay

for having a love of the Forms and for giving this passion a dominant role in their lives. On the contrary, those who are in the best position for studying the Forms will have modest and therefore easily satisfied appetites, and will be free of the competitive desire for power that typically sets people at odds and destroys their tranquillity. So the philosophical life will include the felt harmony of soul that everyone can recognize and value, as well as the more complex kind of harmony that one can understand only through a philosophical investigation of the parts of the soul and of the metaphysical objects that enter one's life when reason rules

- I said at the beginning of this chapter that there is something powerful in Plato's argument that justice pays. What I have in mind is his thesis that the goodness of human life depends heavily on our having a close connection with something eminently worthwhile that lies outside of ourselves. To live well one must be in the right psychological condition, and that condition consists in a receptivity to the valuable objects that exist independently of oneself. If one is oblivious to these objects and devotes oneself above all to the acquisition of power, or the accumulation of wealth, or the satisfaction of erotic appetites, then one will not only become a danger to others but one will fail to achieve one's own good

3.2 What are the problems with Socrates' answer to Glaucon's challenge?

- **Consequences** Arguably, Socrates shows that justice is intrinsically good in book IV, then uses books VIII-IX to show the natural consequences of justice and injustice for the agent
- **Two conceptions** When Glaucon and Adeimantus posed their challenge in book II, they had in mind a conventional notion of justice: a just person is one who abstains from performing certain acts (e.g. robbery); but at the end of book IV, justice is defined in terms of the internal structure of the soul. This is a distinctively Platonic notion of justice
 - Conventional justice seems essentially to involve relations between individuals; whereas Platonic justice is an intrinsic quality of an individual
 - Conventional justice is an act-centered theory, where a just soul is defined in terms of its actions, but the Platonic notion of justice is an agent-centered theory, where a just action is defined in terms of the state of the soul
 - Socrates: "Each one of us in whom each part is doing its own work will himself be just and do his own" (441d-e; see IV 443c-444a)
 - It is claimed that someone who is Platonically just will be conventionally just (at IV 442e-443b). Is this equivocation (Sachs), or is there an argument for it?

3.3 What are the arguments for equivocation over the two conceptions of justice? (Sachs 1963)

- Two requirements for Plato's conclusions to be relevant to Glaucon's challenge
 1. He has to prove that Platonic justice entails vulgar justice
 2. He has to prove that vulgar justice entails Platonic justice
 - If he meets the first requirement but not the second, there is the possibility of Platonically unjust men who were vulgarly just and yet no happier, perhaps less so, than vulgarly unjust men

- If he meets the second requirement but not the first, there is the possibility of there being men who were Platonically just, and consequently as happy as anyone else, yet capable of vulgar injustices and crime
- The first requirement is unfulfilled
 - Plato merely assumes that having the one involves having the other. The assumption, moreover, is implausible
 - In Books VIII and IX, the motives Plato uses to characterize the timocratic, oligarchical, and democratic types of soul are motives which, especially when strong, may lead to vulgar immorality and crime. But Plato, it should be noted, does not state or even suggest that it is inevitable for them to do so [...] neither separately nor conjointly do the theses of Books VIII and IX about other types of soul exclude the possibility of men whose souls are Platonically just committing what would ordinarily be judged immoral acts
- The second requirement is unfulfilled
 - An examination of Socrates' reply to Glaucon and Adeimantus fails to uncover any claim whose import is that vulgar justice entails Platonic justice
- Socrates says, "And isn't the cause of all this that every part within him does its own work, whether it's ruling or being ruled?" (443b1-2). Socrates is here stating that the cause of the Platonically just man's vulgar justice is precisely that he is Platonically just. Perhaps someone might be tempted, on the basis of the remark, to think that Plato was suggesting that Platonic justice is a necessary condition for vulgar justice. There is, however, no warrant for extending the remark in this way [...] A more likely construction of those lines would take them as equivalent to the claim that Platonic justice is sufficient to insure conventional justice [→ cannot be taken as *proof*]
- Apart from the fact that Plato never states that being vulgarly just entails being Platonically just, one may wonder if such a claim is at all plausible. It does not seem to be; for instance, scrupulous, rule-bound men of the very type evoked by Plato's portrait of Cephalus at the beginning of the *Republic* provide examples of men who are vulgarly just but whose souls lack Platonic justice, and men with timocratic souls might provide additional Platonic counterexamples to the claim that vulgar justice entails Platonic justice

3.4 What are the arguments for there being a connection between the two conceptions of justice?

- The psychological strategy: books II-IV and more explicitly VIII-IX show why the appetitive goals undermine psychic health: the appetitive grows in strength the more it is indulged, and it has a tendency to undermine the evaluating power of reason (see IX 588b-592b)
- The metaphysical strategy: books VI-VII present a conception of the good for the individual in terms of the philosophic or contemplative life. If so, someone with psychic health will be indifferent to the goals that motivate the unjust person. (See VI 484a-487a; also the second pleasure argument in IX 583b-588a)
 - Indulgence → mammoth desires → conventional injustice

- Restraint → fewer resources needed for satisfaction → no need for conventional injustice
- “The *Republic* does indicate a conceptual connexion between justice in the soul and just action ... I shall argue that Plato’s theory implies an intrinsic relation between justice in the soul, and the very paradigm of morally good action, namely action for the good of others” (Waterlow 1972)
 - The role of justice is "to rule, being wise and having forethought on behalf of the whole soul" and "that small part which rules in him and transmits these commands, it too having within itself knowledge of what is to the interest of each part and of the common whole composed of the three of them" (442c); this suggests that the just man as defined not only could be but must be governed entirely by self-interest
 - Plato would himself agree that there is no purely conceptual connexion between his definition of justice and kinds of action and refraining from action; because there cannot be [see discussion with Cephalus and Polemarchus]
 - The *Republic* first presents the equation of justice with the well-functioning state of the soul, and then the equation of the latter with human well-being; [if we reverse the order, the second equation supports the first]
 - If the inner state of justice has the self-replicating property, that is, this condition *tends to reproduce itself*, this state could be properly be called moral goodness, since to reproduce itself in others is, *ex hypothesi*, to produce others’ good
 - It does: the just man, as Plato defines him, is someone for whom other’s good no less than his own is an object of action, because the scope of any one man’s practical reason encompasses as many beings (men and communities) capable of justice as he can affect directly or indirectly so as to promote justice within them
- There is no simple answer to whether Plato changes subject and commits the fallacy of equivocation when he answers a question posed in terms of just actions in terms of the just agent (Annas 1981)
 - It is implausible right from the start to claim that Plato thinks that ordinary justice entails Platonic justice. If he had thought this, he would have defended the likes of Cephalus and Polemarchus and tried to show that their views are defensible either as they stand or without basic adjustment
 - Plato has not changed the subject, but he has changed the method of approach. He is trying to replace the inadequate act-centred concept of justice, held by people like Cephalus and Polemarchus, by a more adequate theory, which he thinks must be agent-centred
 - We have to reject the idea that Socrates is either answering Thrasymachus in the latter’s own terms, or changing the subject entirely
 - The Book 4 account meets the first part of Glaucon’s challenge: justice has been shown to be a state that is worth having for itself and not only its consequences
 - Plato will try to show, in Books 8 and 9, that justice also has good consequences, in particular that it makes the agent happy