

Ethnic minorities

Key literature

- [Dancygier \(2010\)](#): considers: does the state control resources + scarce resources + political power size, access to franchise, voting system (e.g. FPTP is easier to swing)
- [Dancygier \(2017\)](#): inclusion dilemma: Muslims are more socially conservative if they are 1st generation (hence less integrated)
- [Heath et al \(2013\)](#): fundamentally, there is not a distinct EM agenda
Muslims have quite different value systems
1st gen immigrants are more satisfied with democracy compared to their homeland but less so compared to natives
- [Jacobsmeier \(2015\)](#): not direct discrimination / prejudice
the perception / stereotypes of blacks as being more leftist than they are puts off moderate voters
- [Bergh and Bjorklund \(2011\)](#): **supply-side** argument: immigrants vote centre-left because of co-ethnic effects and not ideology
- [Wilson and Davis \(2018\)](#): racial double standards

1.1 What is race?

- A group of common origin with common genetic characteristics

1.2 What is ethnicity?

- The concept of ethnicity: a common consciousness of shared origins and traditions
 - Markers: language, skin colour, religion, homeland, shared experiences
 - But the concept is inherently cultural and not biological
- Measurement of ethnicity
 - Self-identification
- Ethnic group: people who identify as a group based on common descent
 - Mostly focused on non-white immigrants in Western Europe

1.3 What is the relationship between race and ethnicity? (Dominic Burbidge)

- Race is always an ethnicity, but ethnicity is not always described as a race. The common traits identified in an ethnicity are usually more open-ended than the more scientific or genetic approach to race.
- So, in the case of racial politics, such as debates about African American identity, one can describe being African American as both a racial identity and an ethnic identity. But in the case of Ugandan Asians who emigrated to the UK, one would not say "race" because there may be a number of different Asian races or identity groups within that category being talked about. So while they are not a race, they are an ethnicity in terms of an identifiable group of common descent and shared experiences.
- In general, it is becoming much more normal in the social sciences to describe genetically-related identity categories in terms of ethnicity rather than race, as race is quite a politically-loaded term and sometimes presents a scientific veneer that may not actually be true to reality. Nevertheless, it's important to retain the term race if it's seen as an important part of that group's political identity as they use it themselves.

2.1 What is the existing trend in Europe regarding ethnic voting?

- In virtually all cases, non-Western immigrant groups in Europe tend to disproportionately support centre-left parties compared to native voters, even for second- and third-generation immigrant communities

2.2 What might explain ethnic voting?

- Demand-side explanations: focus on voters
 - Compositional effect: it's not ethnicity but other factors (which happen to be correlated with ethnicity) that explain vote choice e.g. EMs tend to be poorer and less educated, hence economically left-wing
 - Alternatively, EM groups have different preferences on religion, diversity, economic redistribution, etc compared to natives
 - Hence, differences in groups are due to differences in other variables rather than the groups themselves; if so, ethnic differences should vanish after controlling for these factors
 - Ethnic differences in typical household incomes by ethnicity in the UK are longstanding [stable gap over time] ([Resolution Foundation 2017](#))
 - Group / institutionalized effect: EM voting is not just based on ideology but on group membership
- Supply-side explanations: focus on parties

- Left-wing parties have traditionally been more active at mobilising minority communities, nominating EM candidates (thus promoting EM representation), promoting favourable policies and anti-discrimination legislation
- **Example** Labour passed all minority protection legislation in Britain; EMs were consistently ~80% Labour from 1974-2001, but this vote share dropped, especially among Pakistanis; probably due to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars

2.3 How can we distinguish between composition effects and group effects?

- Remove compositional factors (e.g. SES, education) and see if there is any effect
- Measure co-ethnic effects in constituencies in which the same party fielded candidates of different ethnicities – EMs vote for co-ethnic candidates
- Most recent immigrants should show strongest effect since EM identity more salient
- **Example** Ethnic differences in Labour partisanship are explicable by the extent of pro-Labour attitudes in the group – a group contextual effect that goes beyond individual-level attitudes ([Heath et al 2013](#)) → group effects
- **Example** Norwegian immigrants use the PR open-list preferential voting system to vote for candidates from their native country ([Bergh and Bjorklund 2011](#))

2.4 Why might we see a co-ethnic effect?

- Descriptive representation as a heuristic for substantive representation: someone who looks like you *should* share the same experiences as yours and understand your problems; hence being an EM is a credible commitment to be interested in EM issues
- EMs have a different agenda: e.g. interest in affirmative action, religious freedom, etc

Table 4.3. Attitudes to minority opportunities and affirmative action by ethnic group
Percentage favouring the 'progressive' side of the debate (cell percentages)

Ethnic background	Improve opportunities for minorities	Give priority to minorities	N
White British	20	1	2761
Indian	65	26	586
Pakistani	71	28	665
Bangladeshi	70	37	271
Black Caribbean	74	20	603
Black African	75	36	530
Mixed white/black	62	25	80
All ethnic minorities	70	28	2775
Majority/minority difference	-51	-27	

Notes: For the scale item on improving opportunities, the percentage gives those who place themselves to the left of the mid-point. For the item on giving priority, it is the percentage who agree or agree strongly with the statement. Figures in bold are ones where there is a significant difference from the white British percentage. χ^2 for improving opportunities = 1543.2, for giving priority = 1010.9, 6 df, $p < 0.001$ for both analyses.

Sources: BES 2010, EMBES 2010, weighted data

- ([Heath et al 2013](#))
- But in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire ethnic priming leads to preferences for local goods, while religious (Muslim vs Christian) priming leads to preferences for high moral standards ([McCauley 2014](#)); the author supposes this is because ethnic groups are more geographically bounded in these countries
 - Religion is often seen as part of ethnic identity, but in this case, ethnicity and religion are cross-cutting divisions, associated with different policy preferences
- EMs take pride in seeing a co-ethnic in position of power (e.g. Obama)
- Out-group prejudice → EMs prefer someone in their own group

- In-group social pressure
- See [Fisher et al \(2014\)](#)

2.5 Why might we expect a greater co-ethnic effect in some countries than others?

- FPTP – winner takes all → trade-off between ideology and ethnicity → less likely
- PR closed list – can only choose party (party ranking + vote share determines whether EM MP is elected) → least likely
- PR open list – not just choose party but choose candidates from that party → no trade-off between ideology and ethnicity → most likely to generate co-ethnic effect

3.1 What are the different forms of coexistence of ethnic groups?

- Segregation: groups live apart, either by minority choice or majority imposition
 - De jure segregation: legal sense of segregation
 - De facto segregation: construction of neighborhoods leading to reduced interaction with other ethnicities → stronger sense of identity
- Assimilation: disappearance of cultural and other distinctions and restrictions of movement and marriage between ethnic groups
 - Assimilation could be conducive to social unity
 - However, there could be segregated assimilation: minorities may be assimilated, but not equally into all sections of society (Portes 1995)
- Integration: occurs when all barriers to full participation in a society have been dismantled (Kymlicka 1995)
 - Society demands acquiescence of local laws and customs whilst EMs retain some autonomy
 - Integration may happen faster in certain spheres (e.g. integration in the public sphere but differences maintained in the private sphere)
- Multiculturalism: diversity of groups which are expected to remain culturally distinct and differences may even be supported by the state
- Multiculturalism, assimilation and segregation have all been held as normative ideals

3.2 Why do ethnic groups conflict?

- Economic competition: conflicts over material resources e.g. jobs, welfare state
- Cultural competition: people might think of their culture as an asset they want to preserve from mixture / different religions, values, or norms are hard to compromise
- Social trust requires some level of similarity → predictability
- It also depends on whether political parties choose to mobilize ethnic groups

3.3 When might we expect greater immigrant / native conflict?

- Conflict is an interactive product of resource scarcity and immigrant electoral power + where houses etc are provided by the state (then natives feel they are betrayed by the government) ([Dancygier 2010](#))

3.4 Why might Muslims face more prejudice than other EM groups / why might there be more conflicts between whites and Muslims than other EM groups?

- Cultural distance (resulting from ethnic differences) could be a determinant of conflict
 - Significantly more conservative values
 - More visible
 - Associated with terrorism

- More controversial religion (Islam)
- Compare: consider black immigrants from Jamaica
 - Similar political system (democracy)
 - Less divergence in values
 - Similar language (English is spoken in Jamaica)

3.5 How might ethnicity impact the ability of groups to cooperate together and participate in politics?

- Networks - facilitate mobilization e.g. churches
- Shared experiences and values
- Get around the free-rider problem / collective action problem

4.1 How are EMs underrepresented in European parliaments?

- **Example** In the UK, EMs constitute 10% of MPs but 14% of the population, 11% of people eligible to vote, 10% of the electorate
 - Tories increased EM representation mainly by placing more EM candidates in safe seats despite an electoral penalty, initially as part of a 'modernisation' drive in 2010 (e.g. Rishi Sunak: swing against Tories in Richmond in 2015)
 - Labour EM candidates tend to do at least as well as white candidates in diverse areas, and EM Labour MPs tend to be elected from diverse constituencies [so not much of an electoral penalty]

4.2 Why are EMs underrepresented in European parliaments?

- Demand-side factors: what voters want
- Supply-side: strategies of political parties, resource barriers for potential candidates
- However, the political integration of Muslims seems to be far more contentious than that of nearly all other minority groups → EM experience is heterogeneous

4.3 What are the demand-side explanations for EM underrepresentation?

- Direct effects
 - Discrimination, negative attitudes towards EMs in society from natives
 - Co-ethnic effect (for natives)
 - **Example** [Fisher et al \(2014\)](#)
 - Ethnic minority candidates suffered an average electoral penalty of about 4% of the three-party vote from whites, mostly because those with anti-immigrant feelings were less willing to vote for Muslims
 - No significant effects of candidate ethnicity for non-Muslim Indian and black voters
 - Pakistani candidates benefited from an 8-point average electoral bonus from Pakistani voters
- Indirect effect: black candidates are perceived to be more liberal than white candidates, thus giving black Democrats a disadvantage ([Jacobsmeier 2015](#))
 - Direct racial prejudice by Whites against African American candidates is *outweighed* by the indirect effects via perceived candidate ideology
 - This logic works in a two-party context / single-member constituency context, as the aim is to capture the median voter
 - **Objection** Wouldn't this then benefit African American Republicans by the same logic? Or consider EM Conservatives such as Rishi Sunak, Priti Patel

4.4 What are the supply-side explanations for EM underrepresentation?

- Institutional factors (electoral systems, need for campaign finance)
- Party strategies: see below
- EM political attitudes (e.g. levels of political efficacy, knowledge of / support for political system) may lead them to be less enthusiastic about entering politics
- EM barriers
 - People who stand in politics tend to be wealthier, more knowledgeable etc, and EMs are disadvantaged in these aspects
 - EMs are less likely to be in feeder professions (e.g. lawyers)
 - Discrimination
 - Additional barriers (which natives don't have): language, understanding of home country political system / politics

4.5 What factors affect EM political participation?

- Historically and on average EMs have been less likely to participate in protest politics in the US and elsewhere
- Norms
 - Social norms and neighbourhood context matter in US ethnic participation patterns ([Anoll 2018](#))
 - Anoll argues that Blacks value and reward turnout more than other groups because of the Civil Rights movement, while Latinos value protest participation more than Whites
 - But note, survey data is from the Obama era → problematic
 - Whites are less likely to vote when there are fewer people from their own ethnic group ([Leighley and Vedlitz 1999](#))
- Discrimination / xenophobia
 - Xenophobic rhetoric against Latinos raises the salience of ethnic identity; identity threat leads high-identifying group members to trust government less and engage in political efforts that assert their group's positive value (Perez 2014)
 - Personal experience of discrimination has a negative effect on Labour voting, but those who have high levels of British cultural practices and also perceive other members of their group being discriminated against are more likely to vote Labour ([Sanders et al 2013](#))
- Compositional factors
 - The differences in turnout in the US can be explained by differences in education, class and religious activity (Verba et al 1993)
 - Many of the same factors related to high turnout for whites (e.g. SES, political interest, efficacy, social connectedness) also apply to EMs
- In the UK, political participation levels of EMs is slightly lower than those of Whites but the turnout gap is largely explained by registration rates (partly due to citizenship and temporary status)
 - Ethnic differences in turnout are much larger than those of class, housing tenure or religion. Age, educational qualifications, social class and organisational involvement are not the strong predictors of turnout among minorities that they are among the majority (Heath et al 2011)

4.6 Why do some parties ever choose EM candidates given there is an electoral penalty?

- Co-ethnic vote > white backlash: this depends on the size and concentration of EM groups, and the values of white core voters
- Centre-left parties' **dilemma of inclusion**: trade-off between socially liberal policy and EM representation (e.g. attracting the Muslim vote might mean losing core voters on the left, as Muslim social conservatism conflicts with socially liberal values)
 - Left more open to diversity than right
 - Muslim immigrants tend to be more WC / tend to be concentrated in cities where social democrats tend to do well
 - Symbolic vs vote-based inclusion ([Dancygier 2017](#)); which type depends on concentration and number of EMs, and the electoral system
 - **Caveat** The argument depends on there being a block Muslim vote and the strategic logic might not work the same way at the national level
- Electoral system
 - FPTP → elections more competitive → Muslim bloc vote really counts → parties must get a candidate that really appeals to them (i.e. candidate has to be conservative)
 - In general, Majoritarian systems can help if minorities are clustered
 - PR → larger district → Muslim bloc doesn't matter as much (just one type of voter amongst many) → symbolic representation more likely
 - Some countries have quotas for gender and/or ethnicity ([Hughes 2011](#))
- The dilemma of inclusion also explains why more parties do not stand more EM candidates if EM groups prefer to vote for candidates from a similar background
- **Caveat** Comparative work is difficult due to data availability and considerations of functional equivalence e.g. Norris (2004) compares the England-Scotland-Wales ethno-national division in Britain with Jewish-Arab division in Israel

5.1 Fisher's conclusion

- Ethnicity is perhaps the most important cleavage in terms of arbitrary inequality, strength of identity, and political polarization
- Despite their in-group cohesion and distinct political preferences, their relatively small numbers limit the electoral power of ethnic minorities in Western Europe
- Political representation of ethnic minorities varies between countries partly as a result of institutional differences, especially quotas, and party strategies

Readings

[Anoll \(2018\) What Makes a Good Neighbor? Race, Place, and Norms of Political Participation](#)

[Bergh and Bjorklund \(2011\) The Revival of Group Voting: Explaining the Voting Preferences of Immigrants in Norway](#)

[*Dancygier \(2010\) Immigration and conflict in Europe](#)

[*Dancygier \(2017\) Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics](#)

[Farrer and Zingher \(2018\) Explaining the nomination of ethnic minority candidates: how party-level factors and district-level factors interact](#)

[Fisher et al \(2014\) Candidate Ethnicity and Vote Choice in Britain](#)

[Habyarimana et al \(2007\) Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?](#)

[*Heath et al \(2013\) The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain](#)

[Hughes \(2011\) Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women's Political Representation Worldwide](#)

[Jacobsmeier \(2015\) From Black and White to Left and Right: Race, Perceptions of Candidates' Ideologies, and Voting Behavior in U.S. House Elections](#)

[Leighley and Vedlitz \(1999\) Race, ethnicity, and political participation: Competing models and contrasting explanations](#)

[Martin and Blinder \(2020\) Biases at the Ballot Box: How Multiple Forms of Voter Discrimination Impede the Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Ethnic Minority Groups](#)

[Martinez i Coma and Nai \(2017\) Ethnic Diversity Decreases Turnout. Comparative Evidence From Over 650 Elections Around the World](#)

[McCauley \(2014\) The Political Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Africa](#)

[Parker and Towler \(2019\) Race and Authoritarianism in American Politics](#)

[Pérez \(2014\) Xenophobic Rhetoric and Its Political Effects on Immigrants and Their Co-Ethnics](#)

[Philpot \(2018\) Race, Gender, and the 2016 Presidential Election](#)

[Sanders et al \(2013\) The Calculus of Ethnic Minority Voting in Britain](#)

[Wilson and Davis \(2018\) The Racial Double Standard: Attributing Racial Motivations in Voting Behavior](#)

Anoll (2018) What Makes a Good Neighbor? Race, Place, and Norms of Political Participation

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000175>

Summary

- Both race and neighbourhood context moderate the social value of political participation in the United States
- Whites, Blacks, and Latinos conceptualize participation differently, but also asymmetrically reward those who are politically active, with minority Americans often providing more social incentives for participation than Whites
- Neighbourhood characteristics outpace individual-level indicators in predicting the social value of political participation

Data and methodology

- Original survey of roughly 2000 respondents
- Original survey experiment asking people to judge hypothetical community members involved in various political activities on likability and respectability
- Survey data merged with info from the 2009-2013 American Community Survey

Theoretical argument

- **Social norms** are the informal rules or standards of a group that develop through human interactions and help individuals build and maintain relationships
- Contrary to assumption, citizens across the country do not experience their government the same way
- Racial groups continue to face different constraints in access to the franchise → minorities have turned to alternative means of political involvement → they assign additional value to protest methods, that have been uniquely important + additional symbolic weight on voting that extends beyond instrumental value
- Segregation encourages the development of group-based norms (e.g. increase ease of spreading information, levels of group cohesion, and willingness to trust and interact with neighbours → increase the enforcement power of norms)

Findings

- On average, both minority racial groups value contentious, grassroots political participation more than Whites
- Black Americans are significantly more likely than Whites to see voting in presidential elections as valuable (but no significant difference for Latinos)
- Both minority groups evaluate political rally attenders as significantly more likable and respectable than their White counterparts
- Black Americans, on average, socially value voters more than do their White counterparts
- Despite having lower resources and facing higher costs for political activity, Blacks may encounter social incentives that prioritize and reward political action at a higher degree; Latinos provide either slightly more or the same incentives to vote as Whites
- Thus, the social value of political actions varies in substantively meaningful ways

Bergh and Bjorklund (2011) The Revival of Group Voting: Explaining the Voting Preferences of Immigrants in Norway
 doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00863.x>

Summary

- They test two hypotheses for explaining why immigrants from the non-Western world hold a strong preference for left-of-centre parties, and find strongest support for the group voting hypothesis

Theory

- H1: Composition effects, i.e. ideological and socio-economic composition of the immigrant electorate explains the preference for centre-left parties
- H2: Group effects, i.e. ethnic or immigrant background is significant and trumps other concerns when voting
- The group voting hypothesis finds the strongest support

Data and methodology

- Data from 2007 Norwegian local elections
- The Norwegian Local Election Survey from 2007 provides data on native voters, while a small survey of immigrant voters from the same election provides a means of comparison. Data for both surveys were collected through phone interviewing by Statistics Norway after the September 2007 local elections

Findings

- **Socioeconomic background** For the most part, the differences in voting between natives and immigrants remain when controlling for the social background variables (gender, age, income, education and place of residence)
- **Ideology** Immigrants are not motivated by ideology when they cast their vote, at least not to the extent that natives are
- **Ethnic voting** Immigrant voters engage in ethnic voting in the sense that they support candidates who have the same ethnicity as themselves. Most minority candidates are on left-of-centre party ballots, so this contributes to immigrants voting for these parties
 - Note: There is no equivalent to ethnic voting among ethnic Norwegians, because all ballots have a majority of candidates with Norwegian backgrounds
- In sum, these findings point towards a pattern of group voting among immigrants; ethnicity and group adherence are more important on Election Day than ideology and social background [in opposition to the trend in found the literature over the last few decades of diversification of group loyalties]

Table 4: Support for Candidates with Immigrant Backgrounds, among All Voters and Voters with an Immigrant Background

	<i>All voters, weighted*</i>		<i>Immigrant voters</i>			
	<i>Chose a ballot with immigrant candidate(s)</i>	<i>Chose another ballot</i>	<i>Chose a ballot with immigrant candidate(s)</i>	<i>Chose another ballot</i>	<i>Chose a ballot with candidates from native country†</i>	<i>Chose another ballot</i>
Total percentage	75	25	86	14	62	38
Percentage who cast a preferential vote	36	42	65	61	76	58
Percentage supporting one of the three left-wing parties‡	51	14	79	36	84	78
N	1,519		392		190	

*Dancygier (2010) Immigration and conflict in Europe

Link: <https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2102/10.1017/CBO9780511762734>

Summary

- Addresses how economic conditions interact with electoral incentives to account for immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict across groups and cities within Great Britain as well as across Germany and France
- Highlights the importance of national immigrant's economic position and political behaviour, demonstrating **how economic and electoral forces, rather than cultural differences**, determine patterns of conflict and calm

Review: Jurgenliemk, H. *International Affairs*, 2011 Nov, Vol.87(6), pp.1538-1540

- Two main variables, **local economic scarcity and electoral power of immigrants**, can lead to two different stages of conflict: conflict between immigrants and natives or conflict between immigrants and the state
- Conflict only occurs if immigrants and 'natives' compete for scarce resources at the local level – higher immigrant population places higher strain on resources such as housing or state-provided accommodation, employment, education and social welfare
- If immigrants have no electoral power to make their voice heard, immigrant-state conflict occurs; if they gain political power by electing a representative or by gaining support from one party, the indigenous population will fight back against redistribution of scarce resources towards immigrants, leading to immigrant-native conflict

Review: Sasaki, Yu. *Comparative Political Studies*, February 2012, Vol.45(2), pp.267-271

- Immigrants possess electoral power → gain priority for resource allocation over natives → natives resist → immigrant-native conflict
- Immigrants not numerous enough to constitute swing votes → natives retain priority → immigrants may engage in anti-state behaviour → immigrant-state conflict
- Argues against the predominant notion among scholars that identity is more significant than economics in explaining the European public's opposition to non-European immigration

Review: King, L. *Mobilization*, 2011 Jun, Vol.16(2), pp.245-246

- The moral of the story seems to be that, to avoid conflict, the state must ensure that immigrants are provided for economically (and are forced out of the country), and are denied political power. Dancygier emphasizes the need for states to guarantee some level of economic security to both natives and immigrants

Methodology

- It is placed in the rational, political economy and methodologically 'positivist' tradition, employing a range of qualitative and quantitative methods
- She makes extensive use of survey data and population statistics that establish patterns of immigrant settlement in urban settings. She then draws on archival documents to show how politicians from immigrant-heavy districts became aware of, and responsive to, the growing demands immigrants put forth

Introduction

- **The Muslim Question** Europeans fret that Muslims will not integrate into domestic societies and politics. Because of religiosity, communalism, social conservatism and illiberalism, critics allege, Muslims are not ready to participate in the politics of advanced liberal democracies. But parties face growing electoral incentives

Three inclusion outcomes

- The incorporation of Muslim candidates into the European parties is primarily driven by votes (so parties consider the size of the minority electorate)
- The nomination of minority candidates will increase minority votes but trigger defections among those who dislike diversity
 - The Right's core constituencies contain ethnocentrists (do not want to be members of multicultural coalitions) but few cosmopolitans (want to be that)
 - The Left's core constituency contains both but it is increasingly dependent on support of cosmopolitans, whose socially liberal views are incompatible with those of Muslims → antagonises left voters who typically favour inclusiveness
- **Exclusion** is most probable where the minority group is electorally insignificant
- **Symbolic inclusion** happens at low/moderate presence of a minority electorate: they select a small number of minority candidates that please cosmopolitans who value diversity, but that do not necessarily appeal to a large number of minority voters
 - Signals that the party is mindful but not too mindful of the minority electorate and need to diversify its ranks; appeals to minority but also sections of the majority core voters → candidates adopt values and preferences that are in line with what core voters want
- **Vote-based inclusion:** Muslims are electorally significant (net vote gains exceed losses), so parties privilege minority candidates who can attract sizable portions of the minority electorate
 - Associated with higher degree of representational parity
 - But these candidates tend to be the most ideologically distant from the Left's cosmopolitan core and not sit well with the Right's ethnocentrists

Problems in the long run

- In sum, parties' short-run inclusion strategies undercut their ideological coherence and electoral performance in the long run
- 1. The candidates do not generally embrace socially liberal values and therefore undermine the Left's ideological coherence
- 2. Vote-based inclusion leads to religious parity but diminishes gender parity since Muslim candidates tend to be men
- 3. Bad for the Left in the long run, as they miss opportunity to build cross-ethnic, class-based coalition: by cultivating ethnic cleavages, class cleavages are weakened → these ethnic votes are no longer tied to partisan labels (of economic left/right) and people prize personalistic over programmatic politics → votes are more easily lost
- Europe's Muslims being embedded in traditional ethno-religious communities enhances their chances of becoming central players in subnational party politics

Farrer and Zingher (2018) Explaining the nomination of ethnic minority candidates: how party-level factors and district-level factors interact
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2018.1425694>

Summary

- Farrer and Zingher find that “the nomination of ethnic minority candidates is best explained by an interaction between district-level factors and party-level factors.” They argue that the effect of district minority percentage is different for different political parties, drawing empirical evidence from the US, UK and Australia

Theoretical argument

- Centre-left parties are expected to be increasingly more likely than centre-right parties to nominate minority candidates, as a district’s visible minority percentage increases
 1. Electoral Mechanism: Parties that ethnic minorities identify with tend to nominate candidates of ethnic minority which attracts those voters; central-right parties do not experience this because their ideology is less supportive of ethnic minorities
 2. Recruitment Mechanism: Center-left parties may find it easier to recruit ethnic minority candidates from districts with large ethnic minority populations but centre-right parties still find it hard because the ethnic minorities tend to support centre-left

Data and methodology

- Data: electoral data beginning in the early 2000s from the US, the UK and Australia
- Methodology: multilevel logit regression for each country

Findings

- “Center-left parties are more responsive to district minority percentage than their centre-right counterparts.”
- US and UK data fit with the hypothesis better than Australian data, perhaps because the ethnic minorities in the US and UK are more homogeneous than in Australia

Evaluation

- **Strengths** Cross-national analysis; more generalisable and therefore better for policy
- **Weaknesses** Issues with comparability of minority groups; Farrer (2017) argues that different ethnic minority communities, both between and within countries, face different obstacles, and use different tools to overcome these obstacles

Abstract

- The authors develop and test a set of theoretical mechanisms by which candidate ethnicity may have affected the party vote choice in the 2010 British GE
- Ethnic minority voter responses to candidate ethnicity differed by ethnic group. There were no significant effects for non-Muslim Indian and black voters, while Pakistani candidates benefited from an 8-point average electoral bonus from Pakistani voters

Introduction

- Britain's main EM groups (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black Caribbean, black African) are mostly entitled to vote and tend to vote at similar rates as white majority
- EMs are consistently more likely to vote Labour perhaps because all legislation advancing rights and opportunities of EMs has been passed by Labour governments
- EMs may face a disadvantage in the political arena due to prejudice and discrimination (see evidence in the labour market), or at the candidate selection stage

Symmetrical mechanisms (apply to all groups, works to a similar event)

1. Pure prejudice for one's own group
2. Voters may believe a candidate of the same ethnicity or religion will represent their views and interests better on the basis of shared experience
3. Voters may trust co-ethnics (as in-group members) more than members of out-groups because of a shared social identity, and in-group members are also likely to benefit from other positive attitudes, emotions and feelings e.g. black candidates sparked group loyalty, pride and political interest among black citizens in the US (Tate)
4. Voters are more likely to be mobilized by co-ethnic candidates, perhaps because of their social networks or bonding social capital

Asymmetrical mechanisms

1. **Statistical discrimination:** belief that not all EM groups are equally good at being an MP → all groups of voters may favour the 'best' ethnic group
2. **Ethnicity may be a heuristic:** for traits, values or ideology in the context of an election in which British voters typically know very little about the candidates

Potential moderating factors (some)

1. **Preferences for descriptive (symbolic) representation** may have an effect
2. **Constituency competitiveness** → less willingness to compromise on ideology
3. **Incumbent effect** → better known to constituents → ethnicity less likely as heuristic

Results

- White voters were less likely to support EM candidates, especially Muslim candidates
- The anti-Muslim candidate effect is predominantly driven by those with anti-immigrant sentiments; together with the known positive association between anti-immigrant sentiment and Islamophobia, suggests that the Muslim-candidate electoral penalty is driven by prejudice and discrimination
- For Pakistanis, co-Muslim voting is entirely driven by strong co-ethnic voting

Habyarimana et al (2007) Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?
doi: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27644480>

Summary

- Conducting games in Kampala, Uganda, Habyarimana et al. find that “successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism.” They also find evidence in support of the technological mechanism – “co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction” – but find no evidence supporting the preferences mechanism

Theoretical argument

- Preferences Mechanism: (1) Co-ethnics have common tastes; (2) Tajfel (1974): individuals may attach positive utility to the welfare of fellow ethnic group members but no utility (or negative utility) to the welfare of non-group members
- Technology Mechanism: (1) Easier for co-ethnics to cooperate with shared language etc.; (2) It is easier for co-ethnics to find and punish non-cooperators on social media
- Strategy Selection Mechanism: Individuals will behave differently depending on the ethnicity of the people with whom they are interacting.

Data & Methodology

- Data: 300 subjects from Kampala, Uganda; the slum is characterised by high ethnic diversity and low public goods provision
- Methodology: subjects play a series of games designed to isolate each mechanism; standard surveys

Findings

- Successful collective action among homogeneous ethnic communities can be attributed to the existence of norms and institutions that police the defection of non-contributors
- Implications: generating high levels of public goods provision does not rely on segregation and the preferences or technology based explanations may suggest

Evaluation

- **Strengths** (1) generalisable to collective action; (2) random sampling → representative
- **Weakness** Experimental games so participants may be affected by their situation

Summary

- Based on the largest and broadest academic survey of EM political attitudes and behaviour, the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) in conjunction with the nationally representative British Election Study (BES) and other surveys
- Despite its close links with discrimination, prejudice and racism, which might lead minorities to feel alienated, social exclusion does not preclude political integration
- Moreover, while some bemoan that multiculturalism can encourage minorities to lead separate lives, bonding social capital can strengthen political engagement
- Also, generational changes occur which mean that political parties cannot take the continued support of ethnic minorities for granted

Ch 1 Exclusion or integration

- The main factors that might be relevant for ethnic minority political integration: positive selection of immigrants, processes of assimilation and convergence across generations with the white British, racial discrimination, social exclusion, substantive and descriptive political representation, potential alienation and disaffection, multiculturalism and within ethnic group bonding social capital, and within ethnic group socio-economic heterogeneity and social stratification

Ch 3 Political Orientations: Home or Away?

- Those who migrated to Britain as adults show higher levels of duty to vote than the white British and quite high levels of interest in the politics of their homeland, but their interest in and knowledge of British politics is rather lower than that of the British majority group. Interest in homeland and British politics often go together, and bonding social capital within ethnic groups often goes with increased interest in politics generally. There is a major decline across generations in levels of interest in homeland politics, and a convergence towards British levels of political interest, political knowledge, and duty (possibly due to improved English fluency, greater social contact with British, greater exposure and participation in British institutions) There is no sign that particular minorities, for example Muslim groups, are more resistant to change than others
- Possible reasons for low engagement: British politics may appear to be irrelevant to their main life-concerns; many still have families in country of origin and strong ties with them; barriers for involvement, notably linguistic ones; EMs don't share British democratic norms and values

Ch 4 The Ethnic Minority Agenda(s)

- Is there a distinct ethnic agenda (or agendas)? Not really
- On the mainstream agenda, minorities on average differ from the majority in the priority that they assign to various issues, but don't represent a fundamentally distinct ethnic agenda
- Distinct and dramatic majority/minority difference on the issues of securing equal opportunities for ethnic minorities and redress for racial discrimination
 - General agreement on the objective of equality of opportunity

- Raises the question of whether this central minority concern is excluded from the mainstream political agenda

Ch 6 Partisanship

- Britain's ethnic minorities are just as likely as their white counterparts to identify with a party – overwhelmingly Labour
- These differences cannot be explained by differences in socio-economic status or ideology, but best by enduring collective norms, and sentiments that 'Labour is the party of ethnic minorities'
- **Individualistic approach** to partisanship: electors as rational egoists, who prefer the party that will most likely advance their individual welfare (so the party whose position is closest to them on key policy issues)
- **Sociotropic (collective) approach**: electors' perceptions of how well a party has taken care of the overall finances of society / overall unemployment is most crucial
 - One's party allegiance is expected to be linked to one's **social milieu**: the norms and sentiments of the people one mixes with and respects, as well as to their individual interests or past experiences
- Ethnic group contextual effects seem to be stronger for those with greater ethnic group bonding social capital

Ch 9 Varieties of Political Engagement: Activists and Dissidents

- The profile of minority non-electoral participation (e.g. organizations, petitions, protests and demonstrations, donations to political causes, participation in boycotts) looks very similar to that of other British citizens, with most not participating. Minority social exclusion and ethnic residential concentration does not seem to reduce participation or increase protest and conflict

Ch 10 Satisfaction or Disaffection from British Democracy?

- Reviews how minorities feel about British democracy and how much they trust British political institutions
- Convergence across the generations towards the white British profile
- Key exception: young second-generation people of black Caribbean or mixed heritage are notably more disaffected from British democracy and institutions than are others; disaffection clearly linked to feelings of exclusion and unfairness in the allocation of rewards

Hughes (2011) Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women's Political Representation Worldwide

Link: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41480860>

Summary

- Hughes analyses the effects of gender and minority quotas on minority women’s representation in national legislatures. She finds that policies aimed at promoting women and minorities have a beneficial interaction effect for women ethnic minorities, but quotas are ineffective in challenging male dominance

Theoretical argument

- Minority women’s dual identities benefit them because with tandem quotas, having them in parliament means the quota is easier to fulfil and men can retain more seats e.g. in Burundi’s 2005 National Assembly 57% of the women representatives were minorities, quite striking given that minorities only make up 15% of the population

Data and methodology

- Data: composition of national legislatures in 81 countries w/ at least 500k population
- Methodology: used hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) to investigate the political representation of majority and minority women

Findings

- Tandem quotas (minority quotas together with national gender quotas) are five-fold more effective (2.5% vs 13.9%) in increasing minority women's election because they are more likely to facilitate interactions between gender and minority policies
 - Contingent on (1) the quotas being effectively enforced and (2) the size of the quota is sufficiently big such that not only minority men are voted in
- Mixed quotas (minority quotas together with party gender quotas) do not significantly reduce the effectiveness of minority quotas.

Evaluation

- **Strength** The first worldwide analysis of the effects of gender and minority quotas on minority women’s representation in national legislatures
- **Weakness** The set of countries analysed underrepresented sub-Saharan Africa and countries without a single majority group. Hughes was unable to obtain data on those countries; was only able to collect data on ‘visible’ minorities – but many people with indigenous heritage do not identify themselves as ethnic minority on paper

Quota Type	Primary Beneficiaries	Not Beneficial For
Party gender quotas	Majority women	Minority men
National gender quotas	Women (majority more)	Minority men
Minority quotas	Minorities (men more)	Majority women
Mixed quotas	Minority men and majority women	Minority women
Tandem quotas	Minority women	Majority men and women

Jacobsmeier (2015) From Black and White to Left and Right: Race, Perceptions of Candidates' Ideologies, and Voting Behavior in U.S. House Elections

Link: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43653506>

Summary

- Examining data on the US, Jacobsmeier finds that white citizens misperceive Black candidates to be more liberal than White candidates who adopt similar policy positions, thereby disadvantaging Black candidates. These indirect effects outweigh the direct effects of racial prejudice

Theoretical argument

- Perceived ideology of incumbent = $f(\text{revealed ideology of incumbent, education, race, partisanship, respondent ideology, interaction terms, random error})$
- Perceived relative ideological closeness to incumbent = $|\text{perceived ideology of challenger} - \text{ideology of respondent}| - |\text{perceived ideology of incumbent} - \text{ideology of respondent}|$
- Vote choice = $f(\text{perceived ideological closeness to incumbent, race, partisanship, interaction terms, random error})$

Data and methodology

- Data: Pooled survey data from American National Election Study (ANES) and the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) between 1978 and 2004
- Methodology: Spatial model of voting behaviour and representation; Recursive mixed process system >> no simultaneity and single direction of causal flow

Findings

- “In the district composed of typical voters and candidates, the Democratic candidate is expected to win 67.0 % of the white vote when that candidate is white.”
- However, when the Democratic candidate is black, albeit with identical revealed ideology, the expected Democratic vote share among white voters is reduced to 60.4%

Evaluation

- **Strength** Non-experimental so participants' ‘social desirability bias’ not present
- **Weakness** Only addresses in passing the potentially larger disadvantage to Blacks (1) in a moderate district with many ideologically similar voters (2) because the biased vote share is an obstacle to attracting capable African Americans into politics

Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) Race, ethnicity, and political participation: Competing models and contrasting explanations

Abstract

- The authors test the validity of five models across four racial/ethnic groups (Anglos, African-Americans, Mexican-Americans, Asian-Americans) with empirical data to see whether factors associated with Anglo and African-American participation are also associated with Mexican-American and Asian-American participation
- Although the models apply differentially to each of the four groups, they nonetheless account for participation differences across racial/ethnic groups

Models of minority political participation

- Socioeconomic status (SES): often cited as the primary factor accounting for variations in rates of political participation across racial and ethnic groups
 - Those with high levels of socioeconomic resources (e.g. education, income) are more likely to adopt psychological orientations that motivate their participation in the political system
- Psychological resources
 - Emphasize the importance of individuals' psychological orientations
 - The most consistent results are the significant relationships between political interest and efficacy on participation in electoral politics
- Social connectedness
 - Psychological factors: e.g. alienation, trust, estrangement, prejudice, apathy
 - Structural / behavioural factors: e.g. organizational involvement, church attendance, home ownership, marital status as indicators of connectedness
- Group identity, or consciousness
 - Heightened levels of group consciousness influences individual political behaviour → more participation
- Group conflict
 - Central themes: competition for limited resources, in-group identification, out-group hostility; all of which are reflected in individuals' social, political, and economic behaviours
 - Power threat hypothesis: as the threat to the dominant group from the minority group increases, individuals belonging to the dominant group will act to protect their interests

Data, hypotheses and operational definitions

- Public opinion survey conducted using randomly selected telephone households in Texas that oversampled African-Americans, Mexican-Americans, & Asian-Americans

Conclusions

- The SES, psychological resource, and social connectedness models receive strong support as predictors of overall participation across all four ethnic/racial groups
- The group consciousness model fails to account for individuals' level of political engagement
- The group conflict model is supported only in the case of Anglos, but the threat depresses, rather than enhances, participation

Martin and Blinder (2020) Biases at the Ballot Box: How Multiple Forms of Voter Discrimination Impede the Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Ethnic Minority Groups

Summary

- EM candidates may face discrimination based on their policy positions
- Pro-minority policy positions incur a greater penalty than candidate's ethnic background itself
- Some ethnicities may be penalised directly for ethnic background, some only when they express support for pro-minority positions
- Penalty also depends on voter characteristics e.g. cosmopolitan views and strong commitment to anti-prejudice norms may prefer minority candidates
- Pro-minority candidates are penalised more if they are ethnic

Theoretical arguments

- Discrimination may stem from prejudice, in-group favouritism or desire for descriptive representation
- Substantive Representation Hypothesis: Majority-group voters oppose substantive representation of minority interest by any candidate, regardless of candidate's ethnicity
 - Heath et al (2013): 70% of EM respondents favoured improving opportunities for black and Asian people, compared to 20% of white British
 - If candidates cannot promote pro-minority policies then there will always be a deficit of substantive representation for EMs
- Conditional Ethnic Penalty Hypothesis: White voters fear minority leaders will prioritise minority interests at their expense. Taking a pro-minority policy position would reinforce the fear that EMs will prioritise group loyalty. Therefore, EM candidates are disproportionately penalised for pro-minority positions

Data and methodology

- Data from April to May 2017 before the GE was held in June but after it was called on 18 April surveying 7903 respondents
- Used hypothetical candidates and got respondents to pick between them, varying ethnicity and policy positions (on immigration and anti-discrimination law)

Findings

- Pakistani candidates suffer an electoral penalty on the basis of ethnicity alone (categorical discrimination)
 - Due to high levels of Islamophobia (Storm et al, 2017)
- Liberal immigration policy most penalised, with 14% penalty, in contrast to candidate ethnicity (6%), advocacy for race equality laws (7%) and affirmative action background (3%)
- Black Caribbean candidates suffer discrimination only if they take pro-minority positions
- Pro-minority policy positions are penalised even more when offered by a black Caribbean candidate – 8% penalty as opposed to 4% penalty for similar white British candidates
- Some voters are positive motivated by anti-prejudice principles to vote for EM candidates even when they could opt out of choosing altogether

Evaluation

- Comes from an artificial survey environment but their results do concur with observational evidence on ethnic penalties in British elections
- Important when individual candidates are important (e.g. single member district plurality rules, PR systems with explicit voting for or against candidates)

Martinez i Coma and Nai (2017) Ethnic Diversity Decreases Turnout. Comparative Evidence From Over 650 Elections Around the World

Summary

- Elections in countries with more fractionalised, more polarised and more concentrated ethnic groups have significantly and substantially lower turnout

Theoretical argument

- 3 dimensions of ethnicity:
 - Number of groups (measures fractionalisation)
 - Concentration of ethnic groups
 - Size of ethnic groups (measures polarisation)
- Effects of a large number of groups
 1. **Negative effect** Reduces social interactions (such as turnout) as there are less shared interests, shared cultural norms and less empathy towards individuals who are different (Costa and Kahn 2003)
 2. **Negative effect** Reduced social capital due to lower participation by minority groups in personal interactions. Minority groups have to join larger groups so often they refrain from participating, unless they are large enough to become an independent group
 - a. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) showed that in US cities, racial and ethnic heterogeneity reduced the propensity to participate in social activities
 3. **Positive effect** If minority groups form their own group, according to Alesina and La Ferrara's (2000) model, turnout may increase. This is because different ethnic groups may have different (and contradictory) interests. In order to ensure their interests are represented, ethnic groups have greater incentive to vote in a more diverse heterogeneous society
 4. **Positive effect** Parties have an incentive to mobilise along ethnic lines due to large number of groups, which would increase voter turnout. This increases the salience of ethnic cleavages to mobilise the electorate
- Effects of high concentration of groups
 1. **Negative effect** According to theories of acculturation, if a concrete disadvantaged ethnic group is concentrated, they are less likely to participate (Lien 1994)
 - a. Massey and Denton (1989) state that the segregation of urban blacks in the US in 1970s led them to withdraw from society, resulting in less political participation
 - b. Gomez Fortes and Trujillo Carmona (2011) high relation between abstention levels and gypsy concentration
 2. **Positive effect** Social capital theory predicts the opposite; there will be higher levels of bonding social capital in more spatially concentrated communities. The social capital facilitates the growth of political organisations and makes it easier to mobilise the community
 - **Evaluation** The reality is that many minority groups cease to see the political process as a means through which their needs can be represented. Therefore, even with increased social capital which minorities do not mobilise for voting.

We are more likely to observe this social capital used to support community solutions and support e.g. community gardens, watch groups

- Effect of large group size
 - When minority groups are large and majority groups are small, turnout will be larger as outcome is more contestable + parties are more likely to mobilise along ethnic line (note that this is disproved in the data)

Data and methodology

- Data from over 650 parliamentary elections in 102 democracies over a 50-year period

Findings

- Increased diversity measured through structural ethnic fragmentation has negative effect on turnout
- Increased territorial concentration has negative effect, Increased group dispersions has positive effect → higher average concentration = lower turnout
- Higher ethnic polarisation, lower the turnout, controlling for religious polarisation → at odds with theoretical predictions
- All dimensions point in the same direction → lower turnout

McCauley (2014) The Political Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Africa

Link: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44154194>

Summary

- McCauley argues that changes in the salience of ethnicity and religion in Africa are associated with variation in policy preferences at the individual level. He tests this claim using a framing experiment, which revealed that “group members primed to ethnicity prioritise club goods, the access to which is a function of where they live. Otherwise identical individuals primed to religion prioritise behavioural policies and moral probity.”

Theoretical argument

- Ethnic identity in Africa is geographically bounded in the sense that membership implies a special, lineage-based entitlement to local territory and resources in the ethnic group's stronghold. McCauley, thus, expects this tie to link ethnic identity more closely with preference for local development, compared to religious identity

Data and methodology

- Data: 300 subjects randomly selected from each enumeration area in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana using a multistage, clustered sampling procedure with stratification by gender.
- Methodology: Random assignment to treatment/control groups; Treatments consisted of 5-minute radio news reports regarding local society, followed by a series of questions regarding the content of the reports, aimed at priming either religious or ethnic identity; Post-treatment questions regarding sociological priorities

Findings

- “In the African context, a distinction in the geographic boundedness of identity types inspires differences in the goods that group members seek under ethnic and religious contexts.”
- Religious context pro moral policy; Ethnic context prioritise local development and individual advancement over transparency
- Subjects receiving the ETHNIC treatment are eight percent less likely than the control group to support the moral issues candidate over the development candidate ($p < 0.05$)

Evaluation

- **Strengths**
 1. Experimentally priming an identity “isolates preferences along different dimensions in a way that respondents may be unable to truthfully do themselves, and it controls for contextual factors”;
 2. Experiment replicated across multiple sites in two countries producing similar results
- **Weakness** Some may treat religion as their ethnicity e.g. for Arab Muslims in Chad

Parker and Towler (2019) Race and Authoritarianism in American Politics

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-064519>

Summary

- Parker and Towler examine, qualitatively, how authoritarianism drives racism. They consider how scholars understand the circumstances under which people of colour (POC) come to be exposed to authoritarianism and how they are subsequently affected by it. Furthermore, while acknowledging the spatial and temporal differences, they maintain that micro and macro level authoritarianism have a lot in common in the US context

Theoretical argument

- Macro-level Authoritarianism: “a regime type in which the power to govern is concentrated in a single party or run by a single figure”
- Micro-level Authoritarianism: Adorno et al. (1950): submission to authority and punish those who do not; Feldman (2003): social conformity, punish deviants

Data and methodology

- Data: Twentieth-Century America; Jim Crow Laws
- Methodology: Examined authoritarianism through the lens of comparative politics (state and political systems) and political psychology (individuals and groups)

Findings

- Micro authoritarianism is necessary for macro authoritarianism to take place
- “The relationship between generalised intolerance and authoritarian positions holds only for whites” ... “authoritarian enclaves were indissolubly linked to Jim Crow, macro-level authoritarianism was expressly anti-black”
 - Micro authoritarianism is generally measured by child-rearing practices and fail to capture authoritarianism in the black community

Evaluation

- **Strength** Examined the issue from both macro and micro perspectives
- **Weakness** Very US-centric and therefore not generalisable to other parts of the world

Pérez (2014) Xenophobic Rhetoric and Its Political Effects on Immigrants and Their Co-Ethnics

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12131>

Abstract

- Xenophobic rhetoric raises the salience of ethnic identity and impugns its worth
- Identity threat leads high-identifying group members to engage in political efforts that assert their group's positive group value, whereas low identifiers shun political opportunities to bolster their group's devaluation
- Pérez finds that relative to low identifiers, high-identifying Latinos become less politically trusting, more ethnocentric, and increasingly supportive of policies that emphasize ingroup pride

Introduction

- **Xenophobic rhetoric:** political communication that raises the salience of ethnic identity while devaluing its worth
- Studies have found that anti-immigrant contexts are associated with greater levels of political knowledge, heightened political participation, and increases in the salience of ethnic identity

Theory: Social Identity Theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory

- SIT: individuals are motivated to uphold a positive self-image
- Threats to a group's worth elicit specific reactions from group members that depend on one's level of identification with a group
 - High identifiers are more invested in a group because it is crucial to their self-image → typically respond to group devaluation by engaging in collective efforts that bolster their group's **positive distinctiveness** (ensuring ingroup compares favourably against outgroup)
 - Low identifiers are not as committed, so may dissociate themselves if possible
- Independent variable: xenophobic rhetoric
- Three dependent variables: political trust, ethnocentrism, pro-group politics

Research design

- Online survey of a nationally representative sample of Latino adults, ages 18+
- Three conditions: control group, xenophobic condition, non-xenophobic condition
- In the latter two groups, participants are shown a bit of text

Results

- In light of xenophobic rhetoric, high-identifying Latinos become less politically trusting, more ethnocentric, and more supportive of pro-group politics than their low-identifying peers
- These findings are stronger among less acculturated Latinos and robust to replacement of Latino identity with national origin identity
- Latinos' bolstering of their ingroup does not produce chauvinism toward outgroups

Philpot (2018) Race, Gender, and the 2016 Presidential Election

Summary

- In the 2016 election, the gender gap was bigger than any other in recent history, but a disaggregation of the vote by race indicated that not all women equally supported Clinton, suggesting the existence of a racialized gender gap
- What is the source of this gap? The Age of Obama racialized politics, exacerbating the gender gap between black women and white men, by making race more salient and by exploiting preexisting differences about racial issues
- This racialized gender divide is not easily bridged, even when black women and white men hold the same policy positions

The gender gap in the Age of Obama

- Historically, black women find themselves politically marginalized by both their gender and their race → they have developed a distinct orientation towards politics → higher levels of political awareness, greater willingness to seek public office, higher propensity to support black female candidates (Philpot and Walton 2007)
- Race is also more salient to white men in the Age of Obama, e.g. white men are significantly more likely to dislike a black candidate (Reeves 1997)
- Using survey data from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File and the ANES 2016 Time Series Study (ANES 2010; 2016), the role of race in the Age of Obama gender gap can be determined

Conclusion

- From 2000 to 2008, there was a significant downward trend in the gender gap. In the post–Age of Obama, however, there is a trend reversal because differences between men and women are beginning to increase again. Furthermore, an examination of the gender gap by race illustrates that its widening is as significant among whites as among blacks in recent elections
- One lesson learned from the 2016 election is that there is no such thing as “the women’s vote”

Abstract

- There is a distinctive calculus of party choice among Britain's overwhelmingly Labour-supporting ethnic minorities
- EM voters accord partisanship and valence considerations similar importance to whites, but place less emphasis on ideological spatial calculations
- In 2010, experience of (egocentric) discrimination tended to damage Labour as the incumbent, where perceptions of (sociotropic) discrimination against fellow EM citizens interacted with participation in British cultural practices to increase support

- On the one hand, since EM voters live in the same society as white voters and are confronted with choosing among the same set of politicians, it might be expected that the basic calculus of voting would be similar across both groups
- On the other hand, it can be argued that ethnicity matters; that distinctive experiences and feelings of EM citizens may produce a distinctive calculus that reflects exposure to discrimination and people's sense of ethnic identity and communal solidarity
- Used post-election cross-section data from the 2010 British Election Study (BES) and its companion 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES)
- Standard model: Party choice = f(Party identification, valence calculations, spatial calculations, demographic controls, election-specific issues)
 - **Valence calculations:** voters' evaluations of the likely performance capabilities of rival parties on key issues of the day where there is a broad consensus on policy goals
 - **Spatial calculations:** parties' positions in some fundamental issue position space, e.g. economic left-right, liberal vs authoritarian, and (!) *the perceived need for government to take action to improve ethnic minority opportunities*
 - Demographic controls: sex, log of age, educational qualifications, trade union membership, occupational class
 - Election-specific variables: tactical voting, attitudes towards Afghan war
- EM party choice = f(Party identification, valence calculations, spatial calculations, demographic controls, election-specific issues, *EM-specific attitudes and experiences*)
 - Egocentric (personal) experience of discrimination vs sociotropic experience (that there is discrimination against EMs / respondent's group in particular)
- EM voters have distinctive calculus but it is also quite similar to whites' calculi
 - Partisanship and valence considerations have the same weighting
 - Spatial reasoning less common among EM voters
- EM experiences and attitudes do matter over and above the variables included in the standard model, especially discrimination
 - Discrimination does not stop being important for EMs even for those who have been relatively successful and integrated – they care about the racial discrimination against others enough to influence whom they vote for, even if they themselves have not suffered discrimination
- The key sources of the ethnic gap in vote choice in Britain lie in the high levels of Labour partisanship and positive valence judgments about Labour among EM voters
 - It is Labour govts that historically have legislated to protect EM interests

Wilson and Davis (2018) The Racial Double Standard: Attributing Racial Motivations in Voting Behavior

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfx050>

Abstract

- **Racial reductionist stereotype:** African Americans were motivated by race above all considerations in political voting (see Obama's election in 2008 and 2012)
 - Trivializes Obama's election & African Americans' political decision-making
- There is indeed a racial double standard in the application of the racial reductionist stereotype, which is connected to racial resentment

Development of the racial reductionist stereotype

- Human cognition is limited, cannot process all available information → we must think with the aid of categories e.g. ingroup and outgroup
- This may harm those who are different: individuals seek positive distinctiveness or a positive self-concept (or identity) that is usually strengthened by the derogation of outgroups
- In theory, any outgroup might be the target of negative stereotypes and reductionism, but racist beliefs may amplify reductionism through the positive distinctiveness process
- Empirical implication: we expect to observe a double standard whereby common stereotypes (e.g. being lazy, violent, unintelligent) are applied to African Americans far more than to other groups

Data and methodology

- Two sets of experiments embedded in two different national public opinion surveys to explore the endorsement of the racial reductionist stereotype
- Data come from the 2010 and 2012 waves of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), which included, respectively, 1,366 and 1,125 self-reported non-Hispanic White respondents

Results and conclusion

- Whites perceive that African Americans are motivated by race to the exclusion of other considerations, and such perceptions are most likely among Whites scoring high on the racial resentment scale. Moreover, the racial reductionist stereotype is more likely to be applied to African Americans, and in the case of the 2008 and 2012 elections, trivialized African American political behaviors and diminished the significance of the election of Barack Obama
- The racial reductionist stereotype appears to be inspired by Obama's success as well as the unwillingness of racially resentful Whites to accept that others might see qualities beyond his race. That is, holding racially resentful beliefs about African Americans motivates a perception that race is the only legitimate motive for voting for Barack Obama; the roles of ideology (conservatism) and Republican identity function in a similar fashion
- Evidence abounds that African Americans are not reflexively biased toward race (see African American candidates that didn't get co-ethnic support)
- The sting of racism lies in the perception of Blacks' choices as neither nuanced nor sophisticated