

Religion

Definitions

- Islamic orthodoxy: e.g. Saudi Arabia with sharia law
- Islamic modernism: e.g. Turkey: Islam is compatible with democracy and economic development
- Religious extremism: distance from ideological mainstream; impose beliefs on others (demanding perfection/purity); violent tendencies to achieve goals; usually orthodox (e.g. ISIS, al Qaeda)
- State atheism, state secularism, state religion: e.g. Communist Europe (prevented people from bonding over religion) / France / Singapore (neutral) / UK (Lords peerages and religious education) / Iran and Saudi Arabia (law based on Sharia law)
- Modernisation-secularisation theory: modernisation leads to secularisation through several mechanisms such as education levels, information, science, affluence, etc

Key literature

- [Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan \(2012\)](#): belief, behaviour, belonging → political implications
social capital of religious leaders e.g. King / black preachers
- [Norris and Inglehart \(2004\)](#): modernisation-secularisation theory
generational effects
- [Müller and Neundorff \(2012\)](#): **supply-side** argument
the state could promote or underline religion
- [Tilley \(2015\)](#): religion is still relevant
parental transmission and frozen cleavages
- [Davis and Robinson \(2006\)](#): internal variations: orthodox religions are more likely to be economically communitarian since they view people as a group c.f. modernist religions are more individualistic
- [Best \(2011\)](#): size, turnout, loyalty
small size → irrelevant → parties do not appeal along religious lines → voters are discouraged

1.1 What is religion?

- The concept of religion: A collective system of beliefs, symbols and practices based on the idea of the sacred
 - Three dimensions: Belief, behaviour, belonging
- Measurements of religion:
 - Self-identification
 - Attendance (also marriages, christenings, etc)
 - Beliefs

1.2 Why is religion important?

- There is a long history of religious wars (e.g. early Muslim conquests, Christian Crusades, Protestant-Catholic wars of religion)
- The development of ideologies, political institutions and political competition have been shaped by religion
- It is not easy to change one's religious affiliation e.g. to leave a church – social pressure, threat of eternal damnation (which class/ethnicity do not have)

1.3 What is secularization?

- Three dimensions (Dobbelare 1981)
 1. Level of society and institutions [e.g. disestablishment of churches]
 2. Within religious institutions [e.g. more participation for laity, less rigid division between clergy and congregation]
 3. Individual level association with religious institutions [i.e. membership or beliefs → might be reflected by laws being more secular e.g. gay marriage]

1.4 What are the possible causes of secularization?

- Demand-side: societal reason, especially modernization → three mechanisms
 - Social differentiation: especially adoption of health and education by the state, taking over from the church (now the church mainly hosts weddings, funerals)
 - Societalization: a reduction in the importance of community relative to the wider society (as social life becomes less organized around geographical location, the church has had a smaller role in social life)
 - Rationalization: reduces the need for coordination and ordering by values (the rise of science, education, meritocracy etc → we organize things by rational, secular principles instead of religious principles e.g. we emphasize critical thinking over belief in authority)
 - Also, people worry less about survival, tragic events become less frequent → decline in insecurity (see Inglehart's post-materialist theory)
- Supply-side: behaviour of political elites and the state
 - The state can encourage or weaken religion
 - Policies: state privileges e.g. access to education, tax deductions; encouraging scientific education (or not); secular or non-secular laws
 - Religion as a tool for nationalism in Eastern Europe ([Müller and Neundorf 2012](#))
 - Christian (Catholic) parties can no longer market themselves as such because these groups are in decline (mirror the class argument)
 - The US: two-party system + salience of religious issues → religious cleavage still going on

- When parties take different positions, they make people take a side → both UK parties quite socially liberal, and if the parties say the same thing, voters can't use these values to make vote choice

1.5 What is [Norris and Inglehart's \(2004\) theory](#)?




Figure 1.1. Schematic Model Explaining Religiosity

- H1: Basically the secularization argument: improved security reduces religious values
- H2: Different religions have different effects
- H3: Security coupled with the particular religion(s) determine religious participation
- H4: Religious participation has knock-on effects for religious political activism
- H5: Fertility is higher in poorer countries and poorer countries are more religious, hence globally the proportion of religious people will not fall


1.6 What are the problems with secularization theory?

- Globally religion is on the rise
 - It is primarily Western Europe where it is in decline
 - The US is modern but not secular
- Within Western Europe, measures of secularization may indicate changing religious practice and not a general decline of religion (Martin 1978)
 - However any increases in these are too small to compensate for decline in traditional religious activity in those countries that have secularized
- There has been no decline in *demand* for religion, it is just that some European countries have problems with the *supply* in the market for religious services (e.g. Stark and Finke)
 - Plurality of religions & free competition explains high religiosity in the US
 - **Response** Norris and Inglehart counter that the US has low levels of security due to limited welfare state [e.g. no national healthcare] & it is just one case
 - The US is also a country based on immigration of religious refugees: more immigrants → different religions → salience of religion stronger for all; also immigrants tend to have more insecurity → bring their religion with them
- **Important!** Gorski and Altinordu (2008) criticise [Norris and Inglehart \(2004\)](#) for
 1. Using 'existential security' to mean basic physical needs in non-Western countries but higher-order psychological needs (predictability, protection against risk) in the US

2. Making a temporal argument based on cross-sectional data [the problem is that it is a big jump to say “as poor countries richer they should get closer to rich countries”; especially consider the next point]
- In many European countries, secularization was linked to path-dependent historical developments
 - **Example** In France, since the revolution the state has been strongly anti-clerical, most notably in the education policy
 - **Example** In England, the early victory of state over church (in the 16th century) meant that the Church remains established but politically weak
 - **Example** In the US, Ireland, Greece and Poland, the separation of (majority) church from state has allowed religion to flourish
 - It is the association with the political elite, rather than religion, that led to rejection of the church (Martin 1978)
 - These factors are relevant for trends in secularization as well as the politicisation of religion

1.7 What are the trends of religiosity / secularization in the West?

- Between 1960 and 1990, virtually all Western countries became more secular, and the diversity of religions increased (Crouch 1999)
- In Britain: ([Voas and Bruce 2019](#))
 - Substantial gender gap in each cohort (in terms of identification, attendance, and belief in God)
 - Weak cohort effect for attendance, but stronger for the other two items
- In Europe: ([Müller and Neundorf 2012](#))
 - In Central and Eastern Europe, Cold War cohorts are less religious than pre-CW cohorts in all countries
 - Bigger cohort differences with more communist repression of religion
 - There has been a post-CW religious recovery over time in Eastern Europe, despite secularisation in Western Europe (in terms of proportions of believers)
 - In Eastern Europe, all cohorts (pre-CW, CW, post-CW) have been more religious over time; but in Western Europe, all cohorts have been less religious over time
 - Religiosity increases with GDP in Central and Eastern Europe, but declines with GDP in Western Europe
 - Religiosity moves with religious legislation, but in different directions in East (increasing) and West (decreasing)
- In the US: ([Djupe et al 2018](#))
 - From 2006-2016, there is a general trend of increasing numbers [i.e. proportions] stating their religious affiliation as “None” in the 50 states
 - More secularisation occurred where the Christian right was strong enough to institute same-sex marriage bans [in 29 states] – possibly as moderate Christians were alienated – but the effect was small
 - “As a result”, religion “lost 2 to 8 % of the population”
 - Only statistically significant for “unclaimed” but not “nones”




2.1 How might religion be conducive to democracy?

- Religion provides mobilisation networks – common institutions, solve collective action problems
- Protestantism promoted literacy (Woodberry 2004)
- Mass organizational church helped Europe democratize before east Asia (monarchy had to share power with the church)

2.2 How might religion be detrimental to democracy?

- Lack of tolerance conflicts with pluralism
- Belief in transcendental truths may conflict with man-made laws
- Religion: Rule of God vs democracy: rule of man
- Bridging and bonding capital: only bonding with people you know → could be detrimental

2.3 What is [Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan's \(2012\)](#) model?



- More religious belief may be bad for democracy via undermining rational values and via social conservatism
- More religious behaviour may be good for democracy

2.3 What are the arguments for Islam NOT being compatible with democracy?

EXPLANATION 207

Table 7.1 Type of regime in Muslim countries, 2001

Type of regime	Number
Presidential-parliamentary democracies	10
Traditional monarchies	9
Authoritarian presidencies	9
Dominant party states with token opposition	7
Presidential-parliamentary with authoritarian elements	6
One-party states	3
Military ruled	1
Theocracy	1
Parliamentary democracies	1

Source: The Freedom House Survey Team, 'Freedom in the World 2002: the democracy gap'

Table 7.2 Political rights and civil liberties in Muslim and non-Muslim states, 1981 and 2001 (%)

State	Muslim		Non-Muslim	
	1981	2001	1981	2001
Free	3	2	41	59
Partly free	51	38	25	28
Not free	46	59	34	14
TOTAL	100	100	100	101
No. of states	39	47	123	145

Totals not 100 owing to rounding.
Source: The Freedom House Survey Team, 'Freedom in the World 2002: the democracy gap'


- There is a substantial difference between the level of democratization between the Islamic and non-Islamic regions with Arab states especially unlikely to be democratic

(Bruce 2003) → perhaps showing that Islamic political thought / legalism is inevitably anti-democratic

- Tunisia seems to be the only example of a moderate Islamist party coming to power and acting in accordance with constitutional democratic norms (March 2015)
 - The Islamist Turkish AK Party has curtailed press freedom
 - Apart from Tunisia, Arab Spring democratisation movements were either (eventually) suppressed or led to ongoing conflict
- Most recent armed conflicts have been in Muslim countries and they have a higher than average participation in interstate conflicts (Gleditsch and Rudolfson 2016)
 - However, data for the whole period after WWII suggests Muslims countries are not particularly war prone
 - Other factors help explain the pattern: colonial history, major power intervention, economic and political developments
 - Most victims are Muslim – hence not a “clash of civilizations”

2.4 What are the arguments for Islam being compatible with democracy?

- Plenty of peaceful and thoughtful debate about democracy in Islamic countries and Islamic democracy (March 2015)
- Support for implementation of Sharia law is associated with economic communitarianism, whereby the state should provide for the poor, reduce inequality, and meet community needs via economic intervention (Davis and Robinson 2006)
- Non-violent Islamist groups often successful in elections due to reputation for good governance built up in opposition to autocratic regimes (Cammett and Luong 2014)
- Public support for democracy is not noticeably lower in the Muslim world (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 2012)
 - Muslim migrant’s attitudes are between their Muslim (origin) country and their high-income Christian (Destination) country



3.1 Is religiosity a good predictor of partisanship?

- Religion is a strong cleavage (perhaps except in Britain): where religion, class and linguistic divides co-exist (e.g. Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland), religion is the most important and we can find both effects (Lijphart 1979)

- While generational replacement tends to reduce the overall salience of the religion cleavage across Europe, there has been a recent increase in the effect of religion within each generation (van der Brug et al 2009) → religious voting still holds
- Both denominational and religiosity effects on voting are modest (Dalton 2014, 2019)
 - Differences are mostly due to religiosity rather than denominations
- Support for the majority religion is linked to support for Conservative and Christian Democratic parties, and negatively predicted with support for Socialists / Communists

3.2 Why might religion be a good predictor of partisanship? (TBD)

- Religious belief influences values on things like abortion, stem cell research
- Religious behaviour (socialization) reinforces values / beliefs → affects vote choice
- Religious belonging also means religious leaders may mobilize on religious lines
 - Religious priming leads to values voting ([McCauley 2014](#))
- Compositional effects may also be present i.e. the religious and the non-religious differing in other salient ways which is in turn linked to partisanship
 - Age effects: people may be more religious as they age
 - Cohort effects: younger cohorts may be less religious
 - Gender: women tend to be more religious
 - Class and ethnicity: e.g. Muslims tend to vote for the left
 - Religiosity may also predict one's level of social capital, political interest and knowledge, and hence levels of political trust and the density of one's social networks
 - See [Voas and Bruce \(2019\)](#)
- **Example** Religious denominational effects in Britain can depend on belief and on class identity, e.g. greater Labour voting among Catholics seems to be weaker among stronger believers and among the working class identifiers ([Kotler-Berkowitz 2001](#))
- However, different aspects of religiosity may point in different, and sometimes contradictory, directions e.g. social conservatism + communitarian values pushing people to the economic left (but this also depends on whether your religion has a majority in the country) ([Davis and Robinson 2006](#))
- Also, not all religions prioritise the same types of actions, and not all voters identifying with religion will be particularly active or influenced by the church
 - Catholics much less Nazi in 1932 ([Spenkuch, Jörg and Tillman 2017](#))

3.3 What is the difference between denominational and religiosity cleavages?

- Confessional divisions: divides between different religions and denominational divides between the same religion (e.g. the Netherlands, Germany)
- Secular-clerical divisions: divide over the role for the majority religion wrt the state in the provision of some social goods (notably education) (e.g. France, Italy)

3.4 Has religious voting decreased?

- Not a lot of fluctuation across these countries – see right (Brooks et al 2006)




Fig. 1. Changing magnitude of the class, religion, and gender cleavages.

- Decline in contributions mainly due to declining loyalty among Christians as a whole, and declining numbers of church goers ([Best 2011](#))
- In England
 - Little decline in the strength of the religion-vote association since the 1960s; the main change is the increase in no-religion or non-attendance (Heath et al)
 - Stable religious differences in terms of propensity to vote LAB ([Tilley 2015](#))

3.5 What might explain the stability of religious voting in Britain? ([Tilley 2015](#))

- Religious identity, religiosity and partisanship are all transferred from parents to children through socialisation. This process explains some of the religious cleavage in Britain, but ideological differences (socialism or liberalism) do not
- In other words, people are not voting on the basis of current religious issues; rather, their ancestors' preferences pass on
- Whereas Catholics in Europe usually vote for the centre-right, Catholics in the UK are uniquely pro-Labour because lots of them have Irish heritage
 - Labour stood for Irish independence; Catholics mostly Irish
 - Conservatives opposed Irish independence

4.1 Fisher's conclusion

- Secularisation may be peculiar to Christianity in (parts of) Western Europe.
- Despite the fact that in much of Western Europe . . .
 - Christian religious affiliation and participation is in decline,
 - there are relatively few material inequalities that can clearly be attributed to religious identity, and
 - the state operates on largely secular principles,
- Religion is still a major factor in electoral politics, perhaps due to 'freezing' of the party system (Lipset and Rokkan) or simply that moral values matter in politics
- Developments in political Islam raise interesting about the relationships between religion and both political violence and democracy

Readings

[Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan \(2012\) Religion and Support for Democracy: A Cross-National Test of the Mediating Mechanisms](#)

[*Best \(2011\) The Declining Electoral Relevance of Traditional Cleavage Groups](#)

[Brooks and Manza \(2004\) A Great Divide? Religion and Political Change in U.S. National Elections, 1972–2000](#)

[Bruce \(2003\) Politics and Religion Ch 1 Religion](#)

[Bruce \(2003\) Politics and Religion Ch 4 Party](#)

[Bruce \(2003\) Politics and Religion Ch 7 Explanation](#)

[Cammett and Luong \(2014\) Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?](#)

[Davis and Robinson \(2006\) The Egalitarian Face of Islamic Orthodoxy: Support for Islamic Law and Economic Justice in Seven Muslim-Majority Nations](#)

[Djupe, Neiheisel and Conger \(2018\) Are the Politics of the Christian Right Linked to State Rates of the Nonreligious? The Importance of Salient Controversy](#)

[Gleditsch and Rudolfson \(2016\) Are Muslim countries more prone to violence?](#)

[Grzymala-Busse \(2012\) Why Comparative Politics Should Take Religion \(More\) Seriously](#)

[Hayes \(1995\) The impact of religious identification on political attitudes: an international comparison](#)

[Horowitz \(2015\) The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing](#)

[Just, Sandovici and Listhaug \(2014\) Islam, religiosity, and immigrant political action in Western Europe](#)

[Kotler-Berkowitz \(2001\) Religion and Voting Behaviour in Great Britain: A Reassessment](#)

[Lijphart \(1979\) Religious vs. linguistic vs. class voting: The “crucial experiment” of comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland](#)

[McCauley \(2014\) The Political Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Africa](#)

[Müller and Neundorff \(2012\): The Role of the State in the Repression and Revival of Religiosity in Central Eastern Europe](#)

[Norris and Inglehart \(2012\) Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations](#)

[*Norris and Inglehart \(2004\) Sacred and Secular Ch 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and Conclusion](#)

[Paterson \(2018\) Any Room at the Inn? The Impact of Religious Elite Discourse on Immigration Attitudes in the United Kingdom](#)

[Putnam and Campbell \(2012\) American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us](#)

[Savage \(2020\) Religion, partisanship and preferences for redistribution](#)

[Spenkuch, Jörg and Tillman \(2017\) Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis](#)

[*Tilley \(2015\) We don't do God? Religion and party choice in Britain](#)

[Van der Brug, Hobolt and de Vreese \(2009\) Religion and Party Choice in Europe](#)

[Voas and Bruce \(2019\) Religion](#)

Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2012) Religion and Support for Democracy: A Cross-National Test of the Mediating Mechanisms

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000427>

Abstract

- Religion can be a source of undemocratic attitudes but also a contributor to democratic norms
- The private aspect of religious belief is associated with traditional and survival values, which in turn decrease both overt and intrinsic support for democracy
- The communal aspect of religious social behaviour increases political interest and trust in institutions, which in turn typically lead to more support for democracy
- Data from 54 countries from waves 4 and 5 of the WVS suggest there is some regularity in these mechanisms that extend beyond religious denomination

Theoretical arguments

- There are three dimensions of religiosity
 - Belief: theology and social theology
 - Behaviour: private practice (e.g. prayer) and social practice (e.g. services)
 - Belonging: identification with a particular denomination and/or movements
- Religious belief is associated with conservative and traditional values, incompatible with democratic values → value conflict → negative effect on support for democracy
 - Religion is based on belief and transcendent truth; democracy encourages scepticism and the belief that laws are contextual and open to change
 - Religion emphasizes the duties of believers to God and their surroundings based on laws of behaviour, thought and faith; democracy emphasizes the right to believe, act and think independently
 - **Evidence** A meta-analysis of 15 countries and 3 main monotheistic traditions finds positive association of religiosity with conservation and security values, and negative association with openness to change and self-expression values (Saroglou et al 2004)
- Religiosity as an institution influences one's social network and political behaviour
 - Involvement in social religious networks contributes to democratic attitudes due to the traditional role of religious institutions as agents of mobilization – great potential for deliberative democracy, organisational and philosophical bases for a wide range of social movements, aid in developing civic skills and democratic norms
 - Elites often act to politicize religious group identity and mobilize the corresponding constituency → encourage their public to practice their democratic rights as citizens
 - Religious institutions are frequently used as mobilization venues → frequent participation in religious networks increases a group's political salience and political awareness, and individual interest in politics + increases the likelihood of political representation and resources → enhanced political efficacy and confidence and political institutions
- Overt democratic support: citizens' declaration of general endorsement of the democratic regime and of deeming it desirable for their country
 - Overt support is still viewed as a necessary condition for the thriving of a democratic culture and the legitimacy of democratic regimes

- Overt support may not manifest genuine support for democratic values; possibly supported due to social desirability / hope for potentially beneficial institutional outcomes in terms of material benefits [so could be instrumental, not intrinsic]

Data and methodology

- Data: Waves 4 and 5 of the WVS, collected in 1999–2001 and 2005–07 respectively
- Methodology: Multilevel path modelling, a variant of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), was used to test the argument that traditional and survival values mediate the effect of religious belief, while confidence in institutions and interest in politics (social capital) mediate the effect of social religious behaviour on support for democracy

Findings

- Basically all the results support the theoretical argument
- There is conclusive support for the positive mediating effect of political interest, while the mediating effect of trust in institutions is positive only for overt support and negative for support for democratic procedures (also, no effect on non-instrumental support)
- As opposed to the case of religious belief, the direct effect of social religious behavior typically remains positive and statistically significant. That is, involvement in religious social networks has an independent positive effect on pro-democratic attitudes that is not accounted for by political interest and confidence in institutions

Conclusions

- It has been argued that advancement of religious freedom may promote the return of religion which in turn may undermine democratic political culture
- Religiosity, depending on its dimension, has differential effects on both overt and intrinsic support for democracy
- The effect of private devotion on support for democracy is due almost fully to the association of religious belief with traditional and survival values, while the effect of religious behaviour on democratic attitudes is due largely to the increased interest in politics and trust in democratic institutions
- Once values are accounted for, religious belief has no direct effect on support for democracy, suggesting that specific religious teachings contribute to anti-democratic sentiments only insofar as they enshrine traditional and survival values
- Social religious behaviour, however, often holds a positive direct effect on support for democracy even if the mediating effects of political interest and institutional trust are taken into consideration
- The mechanisms through which social religious behaviour affects support for democracy seem to depend more on the context: mediation process is mostly replicated for Catholics, Muslims, Evangelicals and Buddhists, but to a lesser extent among Orthodox Christians and not at all among mainline Protestants

Evaluation

- **Strength** The authors are able to account for both individual and national-level variation in attitudes towards democracy
- **Strength** The study simultaneously examines the interrelations between these three variables: religiosity, values, democracy

*Best (2011) The Declining Electoral Relevance of Traditional Cleavage Groups

Summary

- Best defines electoral relevance as group contributions to party vote share
- Best finds pervasive, cross-national declines in working classes and religious citizens' (i.e. the traditional cleavage groups') contributions to party vote shares
- Best attributes these declines to structural changes in Western European societies, thus they are irreversible; he then concludes that the changes observed in election results and party strategies are likely to be long-lasting alterations

Social cleavages and election results in Western Europe

- The number of traditional cleavage groups have declined as a result of structural changes in the economies and societies of Western Europe (e.g. secularization)
- Changes in behaviour of cleavage group members → lower electoral relevance
 - Dalton's theory of cognitive mobilization: educational increases and prevalence of mass media → voters rely less on social cues when voting
 - Inglehart: increases in material well-being → value changes and emergence of new issues (move away from traditional cleavage politics)
- Changes in size → lower electoral relevance
 - Structural changes in the economies and societies of Western Europe → working class has diminished and societies are increasingly secularized
- **Electoral relevance = size of the group * turnout * loyalty** (hence, strong loyalty rates do not necessarily translate into high levels of electoral relevance)

Data and analysis

- Data gathered from Eurobarometer series from 1975-2002 on eight countries
- Religious affiliation measured by denomination and frequency of church attendance; focus on manual and non-manual members of the labour force
- 1970s: Manual workers contributed rather low percentages of support to social democratic vote shares; in sharp contrast to their social democratic counterparts, Christian democratic parties derived almost all of their support from their cleavage base: the Christian population
- 1975-2002: Declines in all three factors have driven the declines in the contributions of manual workers, and the most consistent results are found regarding size; declines also found in the contributions of both Christians and church-goers to Christian democratic parties in all countries, substantially and statistically significant, and the largest contributor often size (Germany, Netherlands) or loyalty (GB, Italy)

Conclusion

- While patterns of voting behaviour may vary cross-nationally, the declining electoral relevance of traditional cleavage groups does not
- Socio-demographic changes (likely irreversible) → pervasive, cross-national declines in the electoral relevance of traditional cleavage groups (likely irreparable) → consider party strategies: there is little incentive for parties to employ electoral strategies that encourage traditional patterns of cleavage voting, so parties become increasingly catchall. Parties themselves weaken cleavage attachments themselves by de-emphasising cleavage issues
- **Example** Protestant and Catholic parties in the Netherlands had to merge in the 1970s

Brooks and Manza (2004) A Great Divide? Religion and Political Change in U.S. National Elections, 1972–2000
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.2004.tb02297.x>

Summary

- Brooks and Manza (2004) contrast various statistical models to analyse the impact of religion on (1) voting behaviour, (2) partisanship, and (3) the representation of religious groups within the Democratic and Republican parties' electoral coalitions in the US

Theoretical argument

- Layman (2001): evangelical Protestants have become steadily more Republican in both their partisanship and voting behaviour over time
- Catholics are viewed as supporters of the Democratic party but they have switched to vote more Republican since the 1960s (Layman 2001), perhaps due to increased affluence among Catholics (Pomper 1997) and perhaps due to liberal policy adoption on issues of abortion, homosexuality etc. (Kenski and Lockwood 1991)
- Layman (2001): steady decline of mainline Protestant support for Republicans since the 1970s

Data and methodology

- Data: 1972-2000 National Election Studies (NES)
- Methodology: modelled voting behaviour using a dichotomous DV coded "1" for the choice of the Democratic candidate and "0" for the choice of the Republican candidate
 - Controls: church attendance level, gender, race, class (via occupation), region, marital status, household income, age, and education

Findings

- No group-specific shift in pattern of voting behaviour for both evangelical Protestants and Catholics, but their partisanship has shifted towards the Republican party; Republican party coalition is less based on support from mainline and more from evangelical Protestants since the 1970s
- Moderate (15%) decline in religious cleavage

Evaluation

- **Strength** Improved on previous studies by comparing different statistical models whereas preceding studies tended to only use a single model
- **Strength** Did not use data from before 1972 because they risk conflating patterns of political change affecting evangelicals versus mainline Protestants, since distinction between groups was unclear
- **Strength** Used relative measure of vote choice, so can separate out trends that affect all voters from those that impact specific religious groups

Bruce (2003) Politics and Religion Ch 1 Religion

Summary

- There are important differences between secular and religious politics
- Major religions differ in the sorts of politics they promote and legitimate

The significance of religion

- **Religion and ethnicity** Between 1945 and 1960 just over half the world's civil wars were to some large degree informed by religio-ethnic identity. Between 1960 and 1990, with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the proportion rose to three-quarters
- **Class** Where religion was not a force because of its close ties with ethnic or national identity, it often remained powerful because of indirect links through social class
 - **Example** Catholics in Britain have tended to support Labour since the history of Irish migration meant that Catholics entered the labour market at the bottom
- **Moral issues** Even once religion ceases to be closely associated with other major cleavages such as socio-economic class, it can still be a potent political force in struggles over moral issues such as divorce, gender roles, homosexuality and abortion

Caution about method

- We need to be mindful of the political flexibility of religious traditions
 - **Example** In Germany in 1930s, leading Lutherans could be found supporting, tolerating and vigorously opposing Hitler
 - Religious principles can bear a variety of interpretations; there may be divisions even between subdivisions within a religious group
 - Even within one very narrow strand of one small religion, clerics can reason themselves from the same texts to entirely different views of what is required in a situation of political choice
- Social science depends on the quasi-experimental method of the selective comparison
 - **Problem** We may make too much of a pattern that is perhaps the result of accident (e.g. what if Churchill had died earlier and Lord Halifax took power)
 - **Problem** Compared to the natural sciences, the social sciences are perpetually short of comparable cases from which to generalize

Definitions

- Politics = the nature and actions of states and governments, to political parties, to the actions of groups intended to influence the government, and to the basic liberties that states are supposed to protect
- Religion = beliefs, actions and institutions that assume the existence of supernatural entities with powers of judgement and action

Why religion is important

- Religion is often socially conservative
 - Binding people together under a shared god → creates order and stability
 - Shared rituals → create stability
 - Promises of rewards after death to the pious → discourage people from rebelling against their condition
- Religion can inspire radicalism and rebellion, as it claims an authority higher than any available on this world

Bruce (2003) Politics and Religion Ch 4 Party

Introduction

- The chapter is mainly concerned with the role of religion in party politics within modern states

Closed Catholic politics

- The political behaviour of Catholics differed quite markedly depending on the size and power of the Catholic community relative to the rest of the population
 - **Closed** In Belgium and Austria, where Catholics were a majority, they acted in concert and in tune with official Catholic Church social thought
 - **Open** In the USA where Catholics were a minority, their politics were much less obviously Catholic and were marked more by class interests
- The distinctive political vision promoted by the Church offered an alternative to both the individualism of the liberal right and the class solidarity of the left. Its key theme was *corporatism*
- In summary, the association between Catholicism and right-wing extremism is probably best explained, not so much by specific features of Catholic teaching, but by a more abstract structural feature of Catholicism, which it shares in great measure with Orthodoxy and to a lesser extent with Lutheranism. Two principle conditions for the rise of authoritarianism are a communalist attitude to society and political extremism. The 'church' form of religion deliberately encourages the former and, by ensuring that radicalism cannot be accommodated within the religious culture, inadvertently permits the latter

Open Catholic politics

- Insofar as Catholicism does encourage a particular political vision, it is one of the right not the left. That in Britain and in its former white colonies Catholics are generally found on the left owes nothing to Catholic ideas and everything to the patterns of social evolution and migration (and specific disputes about Ireland) that saw Catholic migrants enter labour markets at the bottom, where they became involved in labour unions and left-wing party politics

Religious dissent and class formation

- The important difference between the UK (and it was repeated in the USA) and European mutations is that Protestantism readily permits schism. It allows political dissent to remain within the Christian ambit and thus softens the divisions. Catholicism, because it insists on a central organization, forces dissent out into anticlericalism

Religion and West European politics post-1945

Conclusion

- Religion might inform political preferences in three areas: the privileges of churches, left-right divisions and moral issues

Bruce (2003) Politics and Religion Ch 7 Explanation

Seems to be helpful for Christianity vs Islam

Introduction

- Are there observable differences between Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhist, Shinto and Muslim politics? This [...] will be examined in this final chapter
- **Regimes** Since representative democracy became at all widespread, the vast majority of Christian countries have had democratic governments [...] Of the 192 states in the world in 2002, 121 (63%) of them have democratically elected governments, [but] less than a quarter of the 47 countries with an Islamic majority have [such govts]
- While [non-Muslim countries] experienced significant gains for democracy and freedom over the last twenty years, the countries of the Islamic world experienced an equally significant increase in repressive regimes (208) (Freedom House 2002)
- **Social movements** Contemporary Christianity imposes a powerful constraint on what could be jihadi movements [...] Even those Protestant fundamentalists & traditionalist Catholics who are inspired to campaign to restore God to the centre of Western public life [...] accept that there is an important difference between morality and the law

Models of explanation

- The Pygmalion method [argues that religion is epiphenomenal and circumstances are everything.] It is the economic, political and social context that explains the different attitudes to violence (and everything else)
- **Argument** All major religions are so broad that they can legitimate almost any course of action. Hence, what course of action is chosen cannot be explained by the faith in question.
- **Argument** Religions are embedded in everyday lifeworlds and have to deal with common problems with a limited repertoire of ideas → have to tolerate considerable variation in quality of religious observance
- **Objection** Many variation ≠ infinite variation
- **Objection** The assertion that the major religions are so internally diverse that we cannot impute any characteristics to them is actually more salient for Christianity, to which it is rarely applied, than it is for Islam (217)

The variables

- Nature of the divine – singular or multifaceted, monotheistic or polytheistic
 - Whether a religion is monotheistic or polytheistic [...] determines the rigidity of social divisions and the cohesion of communities. If there is just one God, it is a lot easier to divide the world into [dichotomous halves] and to suppose that the one true God requires his believers to impose the correct religion on everyone else. [Also, polytheistic religions tend to create diffuse structures with a multitude of points of power e.g. religious officials in Tibet]
- Reach of the religion [which influences how divisive it is, and the consequences]
 - Christian states are stronger, and able to command loyalty of citizens, while Muslim states have remained fragile due to nature & organisation of economy
 - Islam retains a global consistency that Christianity lacks. One characteristic that helps [is the common language of Arabic]
 - Organisations like schools, courts and colleges for Muslims, invade every aspect of life; whereas Christians have too many differences

- **Qualification** The effect of circumstance: a strong sense of being under threat will encourage members of any group to downplay what divides them & unite
- The politics of orthopraxis (right actions, as contrasted to right beliefs)
 - Religions that stress orthopraxis are more likely to be concerned about dissenters and the public status of the faith than those that stress orthodoxy
 - Christianity has some general ethical principles but no body of religiously sanctioned law; whereas Muslims have Sharia law which must take precedence over all other forms of law, and Muslims historically have always wanted to either take over the state or secede from it to impose sharia
 - Orthoprax religions are less humane than orthodox ones. A society governed by rules written 10 centuries ago will be less pleasant than one that can evolve
- Religions of the powerful and the impotent
 - Historically Christianity was a religion of weakness → good reason to take separation of church and state seriously
 - Historically, early leaders of Islam found themselves head of empires → almost every state in which Muslims are in a large majority are theocratic

The Burns doctrine: secularization and liberty

- If we were to single out the greatest contribution of religion to liberal democracy, it would be that the decline of religion permits the freedom of the individual
- The Protestant Reformation in Western Christianity was a vital component in the rise of liberal democracy
 1. It played an important part in the rise of capitalism & the growth in prosperity
 - a. No way for sinners to remove the burden of sin + cannot transfer religious merit (by transferring money in will for example) → people care more about their personal salvational status
 - b. Any honest occupation engaged in diligently, glorified God → people encouraged to work hard
 - c. This all cultivated people who worked hard and did not indulge extensively, rather they reinvested and worked harder → personality suited to rational capitalism
 2. It encouraged individualism and egalitarianism
 - a. Rejected that the clergy possessed any particular access to divine power; all were equally capable of discerning the will of God → strengthened the individual against the community and hierarchy → laid foundations for egalitarianism
 - b. This potential was fulfilled by the fragmentation of the lifeworld, as economies become more complex, people take on new positions. One could be low status in one sphere, high status in another
 - c. In contrast, Muslims in Ottoman Empire and India opposed the use of printing presses, as they worried it might dilute the message of the Quran due to interpretation by the layman
 3. It created a context of religious diversity (by leading to its own downfall)
 - a. The democratic view of religion meant competing visions and the removal of special status of the clergy meant that the religion split into different sects
 - b. The pluralism created sapped the confidence of believers and undermined the necessity to impose on others and sapped the states' enthusiasm to impose orthodoxy

Cammett and Luong (2014) Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?

Summary

1. Due to a dearth of both empirical evidence and systematic analysis across countries, the existence of an Islamist political advantage has been widely presumed rather than demonstrated
2. To the extent that Islamists have a political advantage, the primary source of this advantage is reputation rather than the provision of social services, organizational capacity, or ideological hegemony

Islamist political advantage

- Tunisia and Egypt's founding elections suggest Islamists enjoy a benefit over other non-state actors: broad mass appeal under conditions of political repression
- MENA elections since late 1990s suggest Islamist parties are more popular and more credible alternatives to incumbent governments than their opponents

Two spheres that constitute the Islamist political advantage

- Generating mass appeal under repressive regimes (capable of challenging incumbent)
 - The nature of this advantage is the Islamists' position relative to other oppositional groups when it comes to both dominating social discourse and marshalling resistance to the incumbent regime
 - Hard to measure: Islamists often forced underground; mass demonstrations do not necessarily indicate broad popular support beyond some specific issue; hard to measure popular attitudes towards Islamists
- Performing well in postauthoritarian elections (likely to win in regime transition)
 - The nature of this advantage is that Islamists are better positioned to exploit revolutionary moments and win founding elections than their challengers
 - May question the assumption that Islamists face little competition in founding elections e.g. in Indonesia, after the Suharto regime fell in 1998, no overtly Islamist party won a significant share of the vote compared to secular ones

Possible explanations for the advantage (link to Islamists' ability to generate mass appeal and win elections)

- Non-state social welfare provision
 - The causal link between social welfare provision and support for Islamists rests on a crucial assumption that has not been empirically substantiated – namely, that Islamists supply social services both more effectively and more extensively than other providers [both the state and other non-state actors]
 - This superiority may be due to the retreat of the state, creating a void they could fill – but why do they fill this void and why are they good at doing so?
- Organizational capacity
 - Resources: physical infrastructure, human capital, cell-like organisational structure, apparent management and technical skills, independent source of financing that their nonreligious competitors lack (including donations)
 - Organizational resources facilitate the establishment and maintenance of robust networks of activists, which in turn generate support for the movement
 - Two types of networks: bonding (community networks play a role in building local-level support) and bridging (physical institutions such as mosques link

- separate clusters of supporters and sympathizers across localities to form a larger, national network) [c.f. churches in the US civil rights movement]
 - Authoritarian regimes simply can't close the mosques → enable Islamists to expand organizational structure and thus rise over other forms of oppression (but the Mubarak government did shut down mosques)
 - Organizational capacity alone cannot explain mass appeal or broad electoral support (spreading message is not the same as the message resonating)
- Ideological hegemony
 - Ideological hegemony is used to explain ability to generate mass appeal
 - Islamists are the only opposition group or non-state actor able to credibly claim that social welfare provision is an integral part of their doctrine
 - They advance a unique claim to represent the Islamic faith in office; electoral support often driven by a desire to see a greater role in religion in state affairs as the only authentic alternative to the status quo (not about specific policies)
 - Ideological hegemony is much less effective, however, at explaining the ability of Islamists to win elections beyond a rejection vote [rejecting SQ]

Reputation [for good governance] as the proximate cause




Figure 1

- Organizational strength conveys a sense of capability and efficacy to actual / potential adherents, regardless of their religious beliefs → Islamists' message more appealing
- Investment in social welfare provision can foster a reputation for competency and promote an aura of trustworthiness and financial integrity; generates communal benefits rather than personal enrichment (strong contrast with corruption)
- In their professed desire to create a society based on Islamist norms, Islamists automatically gain a reputation for honesty, fairness, and incorruptibility; by promoting a social justice agenda, they convey their pure and benevolent intentions
 - Having a reputation for purity reinforces credibility and promotes appeal
 - Ideology provides informational shortcut about policies; reputation provides informational shortcut about the type of moral character
- Reputation for good governance is compelling particularly when population holds deep grievances against incumbent rulers for favouring the interests of privileged elites in the neglect of the general population

Conclusion [implications]

- The key to explaining the variation in Islamists' ability to enjoy widespread support, therefore, lies in their ability to sustain and exploit the reputational source of their political advantage; it does not automatically transfer to the democratic context
- Clandestine nature of operations could diminish reputation of trustworthiness
- Real or perceived vote-buying could undercut reputations of purity, authenticity
- The ability of Islamists to provide a slogan but not a solution could also backfire

Davis and Robinson (2006) The Egalitarian Face of Islamic Orthodoxy: Support for Islamic Law and Economic Justice in Seven Muslim-Majority Nations

Summary

- Test two theories linking religion and economic beliefs; accept MC, reject alternative
- 1. MC: Religious orthodoxy disposes people toward economic communitarianism
- 2. MC: Modernists are inclined toward economic individualism
- 3. Islamic orthodoxy (measured as the desire to implement Islamic law) is associated with the broad economic communitarianism expected by Moral Cosmology theory

Theory

1. The religiously orthodox are theologically communitarian, they view individuals as subsumed by a larger community of believers. They are disposed toward economic communitarianism – the state should provide for the poor, reduce inequality and meet community needs via intervention
 2. Modernists view individuals as having to make moral decisions in the context of the times, see religious texts and teachings as human creations that should be considered in cultural context and regard individuals as largely determining their own fates
- Theoretical alternative: The Quran is very specific about the obligation of every Muslim to give to the poor, orphaned and widowed. The third of 5 pillars of the faith, *zakat* (purification), requires Muslims with the financial means to give at least 2.5% of their net assets annually to the needy → limits the effect of orthodoxy only to government aid to the needy, which is supported by *zakat*, and has no effects on equalising incomes or government ownership of businesses

Data and methodology

- National surveys (fourth wave WVS, conducted from 1999-2003) of Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia,

Discussion

- In all 7 Muslim nations, orthodoxy, measured as support for the implementation of Islamic law as the sole legal foundation of the state, is associated with support for one or more of the following economic reforms: greater govt responsibility to provide for everyone, equalisation of incomes, or increased govt ownership of business
- Orthodoxy is linked, not only with support for govt provision for those in need, but with support for other progressive economic policies that are not enjoined by Islamic texts → supports MC theory linking orthodoxy to communitarian economic policies
- **Caveat** Depressed economic conditions in Muslim countries may strengthen the link between orthodoxy and economic communitarianism
- **Caveat** In politically repressive societies, the support for Islamic law is less strongly related to desire for more governmental responsibility; instead orthodox Muslims may prefer that Islamic NGOs rather than the secular state address the economic needs of the citizenry → “state within a state”, a model adopted throughout the Muslim world
- **Conclusion** *Zakat* may reinforce the tendency for Muslims who support implementation of the sharia in all realms of life to be more economically egalitarian. But the tendency of such Muslims to go beyond the tenets of their faith cannot be attributed to Islam per se, but rather the economic communitarianism that characterises the orthodox of all Abrahamic faith traditions

Djupe, Neiheisel and Conger (2018) Are the Politics of the Christian Right Linked to State Rates of the Nonreligious? The Importance of Salient Controversy

Summary

1. The decision to be religiously unaffiliated in the presence of a visible, salient and controversial policy issue is linked to the influence of the Christian Right
2. Specific policy skirmishes gather public attention and shape decision making

Theory

- Definition of Christian Right: “a social movement that attempts to mobilize evangelical Protestants and other orthodox Christians into conservative political action” (Wilcox and Larson 2006, 6)

1. Influence of the Christian Right

People, probably those without strong relationships with houses of worship, use the Christian Right as a proxy for religion as a whole and discontinue their religious identities as a result, as they view it too extreme

2. Specific policy skirmishes gather public attention and shape decision making

The presence of opposing groups expands the scope of the conflict and make the presence of the Christian Right known e.g. the absence of gay rights groups, makes the relationship between number of Christian right groups and the number of religiously unclaimed people weakens

- Key mechanism: **salient controversy**
 - Institutions that invite public participation (e.g. ballot measures) boost the salience of participant groups and shine a light on the policy controversies that divide them
 - Fights between groups that expand the scope of conflict encourage the public to take positions on these issues and form opinions about the groups involved

Data and methodology

- Observational data: elite observers in the electoral moment regarding whether Christian Right organizations were active and influential in their state's politics
- Other data: survey estimates, religious census, and U.S. Census data, etc

Gleditsch and Rudolfsen (2016) Are Muslim countries more prone to violence?

Summary

- Muslim countries are not necessarily more war-prone, if we look at data for the whole period after WWII

Possible reasons to account for the violence among Muslims

- History of colonialism with its legacy of artificial boundaries imposed by European colonial powers
 - Territorial conflicts are harder to resolve than other conflicts
 - Juergensmeyer (2010) interprets the rise of religious nationalism as a counter-reaction to a secular nationalism promoted by the colonial powers and associated with corrupt and inefficient governments in the post-colonial world
- The interventionist policy of major powers, generally with a Christian majority → stable dictatorships replaced w/ unstable semi-democracies in some Muslim countries
 - The increase in conflicts in Muslim countries after 2001 in absolute terms, but even more so in relative terms, suggests a reaction in the Muslim world to interventions by major powers
- Islam as a religion more prone to fundamentalism and thus also to violence
 - **Objection** There are violent and peaceful elements in all religions
- Muslim countries failed to adopt some of the changes that have led to a decline of violence in other parts of the world, such as secularisation and increased respect for human rights or how they lag behind in economic and political development
- Muslim countries also have a larger than average youth bulg
- Study by Sorli et al (2005) found that Islam did not make a significant contribution to explaining the frequent incidence of conflict in the Middle East, once regime type, level of development, and other variables had been accounted for

Why this is important

- Because of higher fertility rates in many Muslim countries, Islam is likely to grow faster than any other religion (Pew 2015). Accounting for violence in Muslim countries is an urgent topic for scholars, and resolving religious conflicts is a priority task for policymakers

Summary

- The relationship is mutual: religion influences political attitudes and institutions, and politics affects religious practice and political activity
- Religion is defined as a public and collective belief system that structures the relationship of the individual to the divine and the supernatural. It often implies particular practices and behavioral constraints, a moral code, and a division between the sacred and the secular

The power of religion?

- Religion as a unique identity: religions make transnational claims across enormous populations; religion is an unusually demanding identity; religion can withstand secular onslaught that would eradicate other communal identities
- Taking doctrine seriously: doctrinal differences further differentiate one religious group from another; these affect political expectations, institutional configurations, religious political coalitions, and the fungibility of religion (the theological or social costs of converting to another religion)

How religion affects politics

- Impact on political behavior: religion influences political behavior in both directly shaping views on political issues (through doctrinal affinities) and indirectly implying support for specific policies and regimes (through the organizational support and mobilization of religious authorities and institutions)
- Religious authorities as political players: they engage in alliances, support specific political formations, and structure social and political cleavages
- Impact on institutional origins: religion [and doctrinal differences] can influence both the choice of institutions and the long-term outcomes (e.g. Woodberry 2011)
- Impact on political economy: (1) the conflict between church and state over poverty relief has led to distinct patterns of subsequent welfare-state structure and provision; (2) religious electorates are less likely to support welfare-state provisions, presumably confident in religious institutions' capacity to protect individuals from the vicissitudes of economic downturns
- Religion and regimes: religious bodies can legitimate and lend support to secular regimes—or conversely, withdraw that support and oppose particular secular incumbents and governing structures; thus, churches and regimes mutually influence and constitute each other's development and strategies
- God is not dead; religious loyalties continue to structure political thought and action

How politics influences religion: the political economy of religion

- Supply-side explanation: where the religious market can freely offer diverse alternatives to heterogeneous religious beliefs and preferences, rates of religious participation and denominational affiliation increase
- But monopolies flourish and liberalization does not result in the predicted upsurge
- Demand-side explanation: the differences in religious participation can be the result not of supply-side competition and offerings, but of demand-side forces, contrary to the explanations in the political economy of religion

Hayes (1995) The impact of religious identification on political attitudes: an international comparison

doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/3711762>

Abstract

- Cross-national comparison of the United States, Great Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, West Germany, East Germany, Northern Ireland, and Italy
- The results show a marked variation in patterns of religious identification and significant effects of religious identification on political attitudes
- For these nations at least, it is a religious non-affiliation, or the current lack of a religious identity, that constitutes the key differentiating factor in distinguishing political attitudes

Introduction

- There is now considerable evidence that religious non-affiliates may be considered a distinct group at least as far as North American society is concerned. They tend to be predominantly young, male, well-educated, of higher social class background, less likely to marry than religious affiliates; they remain significantly more committed to new morality issues, such as sexual freedom and abortion rights, as well as being more cynical of government or political institutions generally
- Throughout this analysis, religious identification is treated as a causally prior variable to political attitudes, [not least because] the former is a relatively stable attribute contrary to the transitory nature of the latter → perhaps not reciprocal causality

Data and methods

- International Social Survey Program's (ISSP) Religion survey, conducted in 1991
- Four ME categories: (1) Catholic; (2) Protestant; (3) Stable Independent; and (4) Apostate (raised with religious affiliation but no current religious identification)
- Controls: gender, current marital status, age, education, employment status

National differences in religious identification

- Clear Protestant majority in the US, GB, Norway, and NI; Catholic majority in Italy
- In contrast to Norway, there is a sizable Catholic minority in both the US and NI
- West Germany & the Netherlands: roughly equal proportions of Protestants/Catholics
- Non-affiliation is most prevalent in GB, Netherlands, and East Germany

Summary and conclusions

- Religious identification is a differential predictor of political attitudes
 - Religious affiliates were consistently more inclined to disapprove of abortion or female employment, to express higher of institutional confidence, and to favour the influence of religion in politics than their apostate colleagues
 - For Catholics and Protestants alike, these effects exist [i.e. they are independent and statistically significant] net of other plausible determinants of political attitudes, such as gender, age, education and employment status
 - Except for capital punishment, no significant differences emerged between stable independents and apostates
- The causal origins of the relationship between religious identification and political attitudes remains unclear

Horowitz (2015) The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing

doi: <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-062813-051049>

Summary

- Horowitz (2015) provides a literature review on the motivations behind suicide bombing, focussing in particular on the role of religion. He finds that the decision by violent non-state actors to use suicide bombing appears strategic and that social networks appear to play a large role in predicting who becomes a suicide bomber and whether a group uses suicide bombing. A significant positive relationship appears to exist between religious groups and the use of suicide bombing, although the details remain unclear

Theoretical argument

- Suicide bombing = “an attack where the death of the bomber is the means by which the attack is accomplished” (merely ‘unlikely to survive’ is insufficient to qualify)
- Time-series data on suicide bombing drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows an enormous growth in suicide bombing in the early 2000s, although suicide attacks as a % of all terrorist attacks remain below their peak in the mid-2000s

Findings

- Individual-level motivations (Horowitz endorses Pedahzur 2005)
 - Pedahzur (2005): Suicide bombers tend to come from many different types of communities and situations, making individual-level generalisations difficult
 - Merari (2012): suicide bombers are depressed; Brym and Araj (2012): suicide bombers are not more depressed than the average person
 - Rosendorff & Sandler (2010): individuals are more likely to join terrorist groups when the benefits outweigh their exogenous economic opportunities; Azam (2005) models suicide bombing as an intergenerational wealth transfer, where suicide bombers attempt to protect more wealth for future generations by making sacrifices today
- Group-level motivations
 - Pape (2005): suicide bombing used to raise the costs to the occupier and raise the media profile of their struggle to coerce the occupier into leaving; Piazza (2009): although the link between democracy and suicide bombing is not robust, occupation does make suicide bombing, as opposed to other types of terrorism, more likely
 - Religion
 - Pape (2005): religious differences between a group and the target makes adoption more likely, because religious differences can intensify nationalist sentiments
 - Iannaccone and Berman (2006): “club” model; Extreme religious groups risk having suboptimal distribution of resources if they have to provide social services to all members including soft supporters; the possibility of having to commit suicide bombing removes soft supporters
 - Hoffman (2004): the theology of the Salafi Jihadis facilitates the globalisation of suicide campaigns, including suicide bombing; Moghadam (2009): “martyrdom operations” are a central element of al Qaeda’s (part of Salafi Jihadis) ideology

- Social networks
 - Sageman (2004): Horizontal networks (not focused on niche topics as vertical networks are) facilitate recruitment across families, friends, and groups
 - “Religion can be a unifying point through which that networking occurs, although its role, in this case, is not necessarily causal”
 - Hoffman (2006): Al Qaeda and its affiliates stand out in this network, playing a prominent role in diffusing suicide bombing knowledge to partner groups and theological-affinity groups
 - Acosta and Childs (2013): the use of suicide bombing itself generates a snowball effect of mimicry and more future adopters

Evaluation

- **Weakness** Omits discussion on the relationship between social capital and likelihood of suicide bombing
 - It is possible that low social capital leads → dissatisfaction → suicide bombing but also that high social capital (high trust) → willing to give up one’s life for group aims

Just, Sandovici and Listhaug (2014) Islam, religiosity, and immigrant political action in Western Europe

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2013.09.005>

Abstract

- The authors argue that religion has a capacity to mobilize immigrants politically but the strength of this relationship depends on immigrant generation, religiosity, and the type of religion
- The authors find that religion is indeed linked to political engagement of immigrants in a complex way: while belonging to a religion is generally associated with less political participation, exposure to religious institutions appears to have the opposite effect. Moreover, we find that, compared to foreign-born Muslims, second-generation Muslim immigrants are not only more religious and more politically dissatisfied with their host countries, but also that religiosity is more strongly linked to their political engagement. This relationship, however, is limited to uninstitutionalized political action.

Introduction

- Muslims have increased their presence in Europe → more concerns about their integration

Data and methodology

- Data: survey data collected as part of the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002–2010 in 18 West European democracies

Findings

- Second generation Muslim immigrants have stronger religiosity and a stronger relationship between religiosity and uninstitutionalised political action than those foreign born
 - Due to the differing attitudes towards the host country
 - First generation immigrants self-select into migration, choosing countries they view positively
 - Second generation immigrants are born into their status instead of becoming immigrants by choice → they are more inclined to rediscover and embrace the roots of their identity as they feel they do not belong in their host countries → reactive identity

Kotler-Berkowitz (2001) Religion and Voting Behaviour in Great Britain: A Reassessment

Abstract

- Dispute the general consensus that religion has weak or no effects on the voting decisions of British citizens [whereas it is held that class plays a primary role]
- Religious belonging, behaviour and belief, as well as the religious context of households, continue to influence British voting behaviour
- Interaction effects among religious variables and between religious variables and class also operate to influence vote choice

Theoretical perspectives

- Belonging: affiliation with a religious community, denomination or tradition
 - May socialize individuals to certain political and partisan preferences
- Behaving: the practice of faith
 - Increases the likelihood that socialized preferences will be reinforced
- Believing: acceptance of the religious tenets or doctrine that the tradition upholds
 - May be a source of social and political values and attitudes that in turn influence political behaviour
- Parties may form to represent distinctive religious groups or traditions
- Parties may appeal generally to those who practice religion and have strong beliefs
- Religious group leaders may reinforce party mobilization efforts and the connection between party policy positions and the group's values and beliefs
- Complementary framework: structural theories which focus on social contexts
 - Social contexts: social environments in which people are located and within which they interact with each other
 - Networks: specific types of social interactions arising in social contexts that are direct, frequent, voluntary and purposeful
 - Contexts are crucial for the study of political behaviour, because they structure social interactions and the flow of political information and cues
 - Religious context may not necessarily reinforce religious affiliation, because people with different affiliations may be in the same context
- Historical context: CON generally represented the interests of the dominant Anglican group in British society and of the established church (also linked to Church of Scotland); LAB appealed to Catholics, whose location in the working class and status as a religious minority made them susceptible to its mobilization efforts
- Today, none of the parties makes overt appeals to religious groups, and social divisions between Anglicans, Catholics and dissenting Protestants have faded

Data, measures and methods

- Data: 1991 and 1992 waves of the British Household Panel Study (BHPS)
- Methods: multinomial logistic regression analysis
- Belonging: Anglican, Catholic, Protestant, Church of Scotland, others (Hindus, Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, etc), secular
- Behaving: 6-point scale which combines church attendance with membership and activism in a religious group
- Believing: 3-point scale asking for level of agreement with the statement that the Bible is the word of God and true
- Religious contexts of respondents' homes also measured (homo- / heterogeneity)

- Controls: political, social class, economic and demographic
- Dependent variable: a categorical measure of voting for CON / LAB / LD

Empirical analyses: bivariate and multivariate

- Belonging: Relative to Anglicans, Catholics, seculars and members of other religious minorities are more likely to vote LAB than to vote either CON or LD, and dissenting Protestants are more likely to vote LD than CON
- Behaviour: Church attendance and membership and activism in religious groups reduce the likelihood of voting LAB, consistent with initial expectations
- Belief: Increases CON support only against LD but not against LAB; indeed, it consistently reduces LD support, against CON but also against class-mobilizing LAB

Interaction effects in the multivariate models

- Class and religion: varying effects of behaviour and belief
- Three effects concentrated in the middle class, not the working class
 - Catholic effect in promoting LAB support against CON
 - Pro-LD effect against CON among dissenting Protestants
 - Pro-LD effect against CON among middle-class seculars
- Working class effects: working-class members of the Church of Scotland disproportionately support CON – an indication of the historical link between the two
- Behaviour: the only class concentration occurs in promoting LD rather than CON voting, where the effect is found in the middle but not the working class

Conclusions

- Belonging: For Catholics and dissenting Protestants – particularly middle-class members – contemporary divisions from Anglicans reflect the highly structured cleavages of an earlier era; homogeneous households contexts further reinforce traditional electoral distinctions from Anglicans
- Among small religious minorities, electoral patterns reflect LAB's mobilizing efforts in ethnic communities, while among seculars – particularly middle-class – party division reflect more contemporary sources of social division from Anglicans, the established church, and their traditional party ally
- Behaviour: consistently reduces LAB support, increases LD support
- Belief: moderates traditional anti-CON tendencies among Catholics in particular, with similar effect in the LD-CON trade-off among seculars
- Among small religious minorities and seculars, belief promotes higher rates of LAB voting at the expense of LD, relative to Anglicans

Evaluation

- Kotler-Berkowitz measures religion and its links to party very carefully using data from the 1990s, but fails to analyse whether this has changed over time and does not distinguish between the very different political and religious traditions of England and Scotland ([Tilley 2015](#))

Lijphart (1979) Religious vs. linguistic vs. class voting: The “crucial experiment” of comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland

Link: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1954890>

Abstract

- Crucial experiment: all three cleavages are present in all four countries
- Religion emerges as the victor, language a close second, class a distant third
- The surprising strength of the religious factor can be explained in terms of the “freezing” of past conflict dimensions in the party system and the presence of alternative, regional-federal, structures for the expression of linguistic interests

Data and methods

- Data: recent survey data collected in the 1970s
- Variables: manual / non-manual workers, left / right parties, Protestants / Catholics, frequent / infrequent churchgoers (2+ a month), majority language speakers vs minority language speakers; dichotomization of parties along the Protestant-Catholic, religious-secular, and linguistic dimensions

Empirical analysis

- Religion and language are mutually reinforcing determinants of party choice in Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland; in South Africa, language and religion do not reinforce each other
- Religion is the better predictor in Canada and Switzerland; language is stronger in South Africa; and the two factors have approximately the same strength in Belgium. In this group of four, religion therefore emerges as the more important determinant
- Tree analysis: splitting the samples into subgroups until no predictor could be found that reduced the variance by at least another 0.3 percent
 - In the Belgian, Swiss, South African cases, much variance in party choice is explained with only 4 IVs (class, church affiliation and attendance, language)
 - Class factor turns out to be extremely weak; religion is the strongest factor
 - All country trees show a relatively simple pattern, with 4-6 instead of 2ⁿ end groups → variance is explained especially by the first split

Conclusion

- Religious and linguistic loyalties may be extremely tenacious even in the modern world, and they constitute a formidable obstacle to the development of competing cleavages based on objective socioeconomic interests
- Social class is clearly no more than a secondary and subsidiary influence on party choice, and it can become a factor of importance only in the absence of potent rivals
- Interesting finding: in the four countries, the linguistics-ethnicity cleavage has been more salient, but religion is the stronger determinant of party choice
 - One explanation: party systems tend to reflect the political cleavages of the periods in which the parties came into existence, instead of the dimensions of contemporary political conflict (Lipset and Rokkan)
 - Another explanation: political parties are important, but not the only, vehicles for the articulation and representation of various kinds of interests e.g. religious / linguistic interests could be represented by parties / subnational govts respectively, especially if the latter has a high degree of autonomy

McCauley (2014) The Political Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Africa

Link: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44154194>

Summary

- McCauley argues that changes in the salience of ethnicity and religion in Africa are associated with variation in policy preferences at the individual level. He tests this claim using a framing experiment, which revealed that “group members primed to ethnicity prioritise club goods, the access to which is a function of where they live. Otherwise identical individuals primed to religion prioritise behavioural policies and moral probity.”

Theoretical argument

- Ethnic identity in Africa is geographically bounded in the sense that membership implies a special, lineage-based entitlement to local territory and resources in the ethnic group's stronghold. McCauley, thus, expects this tie to link ethnic identity more closely with preference for local development, compared to religious identity

Data and methodology

- Data: 300 subjects randomly selected from each enumeration area in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana using a multistage, clustered sampling procedure with stratification by gender.
- Methodology: Random assignment to treatment/control groups; Treatments consisted of 5-minute radio news reports regarding local society, followed by a series of questions regarding the content of the reports, aimed at priming either religious or ethnic identity; Post-treatment questions regarding sociological priorities

Findings

- “In the African context, a distinction in the geographic boundedness of identity types inspires differences in the goods that group members seek under ethnic and religious contexts.”
- Religious context pro moral policy; Ethnic context prioritise local development and individual advancement over transparency
- Subjects receiving the ETHNIC treatment are eight percent less likely than the control group to support the moral issues candidate over the development candidate ($p < 0.05$)

Evaluation

- **Strengths**
 1. Experimentally priming an identity “isolates preferences along different dimensions in a way that respondents may be unable to truthfully do themselves, and it controls for contextual factors”;
 2. Experiment replicated across multiple sites in two countries producing similar results
- **Weakness** Some may treat religion as their ethnicity e.g. for Arab Muslims in Chad

Müller and Neundorf (2012): The Role of the State in the Repression and Revival of Religiosity in Central Eastern Europe

Link: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23361101>

Summary

- Müller and Neundorf (2012) use the state-driven secularisation of socialist societies as an empirical opportunity to investigate the decline of religious beliefs

Theoretical argument

- Berger (1969): theory of plausibility structures
 - Societies create and maintain social conditions that are either benevolent or erosive to the maintenance of religious beliefs and their intergenerational transfer; The stronger religious beliefs are embedded in people's daily lives, the more plausibility they gain; The stronger religion is oppressed and persecuted, the more will religious plausibility be undermined
- [Norris and Inglehart \(2004\)](#): “existential security”
 - The demand for religious value systems is determined by the levels of “existential security” experienced; individuals use religious values and belief systems, which provide rigid, predictable rules, as a mean to cope with fear and uncertainty
- Modernisation theory: (1) As countries develop economically, religious beliefs will decrease over time; (2) modernisation of a country leads to decline in the plausibility structure of religion and therefore to a decline in the role of church in public life

Data and methodology

- Data: East and West European samples of the “Religion” module of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which was repeated in 1991, 1998 and 2008
- Methodology: Split citizens into three cohorts: those socialised pre-socialism (born before 1932), during socialism (Cold War cohort; born between 1932 and 1976) and post-socialism (born after 1976); Put respondents into the following categories in order to count them up for each country: (1) atheists, (2) agnostics and (3) those that at least to some extent believe in God

Findings

- Eastern European countries varied in their religiosity trends; Pre, during and post cold war, constantly around 95% of Polish were classified as true believers; East Germany absolutely least religious
- West Europeans countries saw a clear inter and intra generational decline in religiosity but there is no clear trend for Eastern European countries: pre-Cold War religiosity remains high, interesting religious revival visible for generation socialised during the Cold War (not due to this generation simply getting older because the same is not observed in Western Europe), and slight increase in belief in God between 1998 and 2008 for Eastern post-Cold War generation
- Fixed effect regression model on religiosity of cohorts supports modernisation theory
 - Tightened relationship between state and church in Eastern Europe (positive coefficient significant to the 5% level); level of belief in God for each cohort declined in Western Europe (negative coefficient significant to the 10% level)

Evaluation

- **Strength** Used Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to distinguish between true believers and true atheists → use unobserved variation in two proxies for the variable as the true value of the variable, which in this case is religiosity (no covariance between proxies)

Norris and Inglehart (2012) Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00951.x>

Abstract

- Origins: Islamic countries of origin for Muslim migrants, including 20 nations with plurality Muslim populations
- Destinations: countries of destination for Muslim migrants, including 22 OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations
- On average, the basic social values of Muslim migrants fall roughly midway between those prevailing in their country of origin and their country of destination
- Muslim migrants do not move to Western countries w/ rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb much of the host culture, as assimilation theories suggest

Theoretical background

- Theories of cultural integration suggest that immigrants gradually absorb the values & norms that predominate in their host society, especially on an intergenerational basis
- Theories of divergence suggest that distinctive social values and norms are enduring and deep-rooted within each nation, shaped by collective histories, common languages and religious traditions, so that migrant populations are unlikely to abandon their cultural roots when they settle in another country

Data and methods

- WVS / EVS data set, pooled across five waves from 1981 to 2007
- Four indicators of culture: attitudes towards gender equality and sexual liberalization, religious values, democratic attitudes
- Potential underlying drivers: (1) individual-level Muslim religious identities, controlling for many factors that may shape both social values and transnational mobility, including levels of education and socio-economic status, marital status, labor force participation, religiosity, age and gender; or (2) living within Islamic or Western societies, at macro level, controlling for world region

Findings

- As expected, compared with Western nations, Islamic societies prove highly conservative on issues of sexuality and gender equality; they are far less tolerant towards issues of sexual liberalization; they are strongly religious in their values, while by comparison most Western countries are almost always more secular
- The basic values of Muslims living in Western societies fall roughly halfway between the dominant values prevailing within their countries of destination and origin
- Living within an Islamic or Western society has a far stronger imprint on values than individual-level religious identities, or indeed the effects of an individual's education, age, gender and income

Implication

- In the short term, one reason why Muslim migrants express values located between their countries of origin and destination may be self-selection: people already sympathetic towards Western cultures, and those with the higher skills and status that facilitate mobility, are more likely to move to live in affluent post-industrial societies

Summary

- A demand-side argument that revises traditional secularization theory
- Development → **existential security** → secularization (but not linear / universal)
- Analysis is based primarily on 20 years of data from the WVS and the EVS

Ch 1 The Secularization Debate

- Demand-side theories: industrialization → erosion of religious habits → public indifference to spiritual appeals
- Supply-side theory: religious organizations and leaders play a strategic role in aggressively building and maintaining congregations
 - Religious pluralism → competition → vitality of religious beliefs & practices
- **Existential security hypothesis:** Religious enthusiasm is driven by the human need for security, safety, and predictability. Where the individual or community feels itself subject to existential threat, he/she is more likely to experience the sort of significant stress that propels one into the arms of religion
 - Economic growth, socioeconomic equality, human development → long-term changes in existential security → erosion of religious values, beliefs, practices
 - Poverty, socioeconomic inequality, lack of human development → uncertainty, risks, threats to survival → increased religiosity
- The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years

Ch 4 The Puzzle of Secularization in the United States and Western Europe

- There are variations in religiosity among post-industrial nations, in particular contrasts between America and Western Europe
- The US case is very significant because it supports the religious market approach by combining deregulation, religious pluralism, and high religiosity
- **Religious market theories:** assume relatively constant demand for religious products; but religious pluralism fails to explain high levels of religious participation in such homogeneous societies as Ireland and Italy
- **Functional theories:** the public gradually deserted churches as societies industrialized due to the process of functional differentiation and specialization, where the church's comprehensive role for education, health, and welfare was gradually displaced by other institutions offering an extensive series of public services; but again, no direct support for such theories
- Main argument: religion in the US is far more robust than in Western Europe because existential security dilemmas remain much more prevalent in American society (due to limited provision of welfare safety nets, insecurity of employment, greater level of economic inequality)
- Secondary arguments: (1) there is a certain level of secularization even in the US; (2) surveys overemphasize religious participation; (3) migrants who originally came from poorer nations in the Americas and Asia [where religious devotion remains strong] have brought strong religiosity to the US – but they need to explain why African and Asian migrants do not create a similar influence in Western Europe

Ch 5 A Religious Revival in Post-Communist Europe?

- The generational comparisons suggest that there has been a long-term decline of religiosity across succeeding generations in post-Communist Europe; no convincing evidence of a curvilinear pattern, suggesting that the younger generation has not experienced a significant revival of religious values, beliefs, or behaviour
- The cross-national comparisons indicate that the cross-national differences that are important today can be satisfactorily explained by levels of human development among post-Communist nations, just as others [thus reject supply-side theories]
- The post-Communist states with the greatest regulation of the church turn out to be the most religious, not the least. This is no accident; it reflects that human security encourages secularization, together with the political rights and civil liberties associated with religious freedom in transitional and consolidating democracies

Ch 6 Religion and Politics in the Muslim World

- Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" argument: there is a cultural clash between democratic values held in Western Christianity and those held by the Muslim world
- The Muslim world diverges with the West on issues of sexual liberalization and gender equality; but there is support for democratic governance in Muslim societies

Ch 8 Religious Organizations and Social Capital

- Social capital theory: religious institutions play a role in generating social capital
- Membership in religious organizations (but not attendance at religious services) was significantly associated with various indicators of civic engagement
- Evidence suggests that the decline of traditional hierarchical associations in postindustrial societies, including churches as well as labor unions and political party organizations, has been at least partially offset by complex societal developments that have transformed the nature of political activism → thus, cannot prove or disprove that the process of secularization has weakened social capital and civic engagement

Ch 9 Religious Parties and Electoral Behavior [basically dealignment]

- Lipset and Rokkan: European nation-states were stamped by social divisions established decades earlier → 'frozen' patterns of party competition
- Traditional linkages between social groups and party support have weakened; possible explanations include: secularization → erosion of religious identities; intergenerational value change → new cleavages; social and geographic mobility → weakened community social networks; migration → growing multiculturalism
- In earlier stages of history, religious identity was a cognitive shortcut which linked voters to parties, often persisting throughout an individual's lifetime (like class)
- In recent years, as secularization has progressively weakened religious identities in advanced industrial societies, parties with formerly strong organizational links to the Catholic Church became more secular in their electoral appeals, moving toward "bridging" strategies that enable them to win support from many diverse social groups
- Religious values continue to predict a sense of affiliation with the political Right in most industrial and postindustrial nations, but these have weakened during the last twenty years, with some exceptions such as the United States and Austria

Evaluation "Security" is non-testable; its link to development / secularization isn't explained; overemphasis on economics, little emphasis on agency-based politics

Paterson (2018) Any Room at the Inn? The Impact of Religious Elite Discourse on Immigration Attitudes in the United Kingdom
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118778956>

Summary

- Paterson (2018) attempts to uncover, through discourse analysis, whether discourse by the Church of England (CoE) impacts the immigration attitudes of ‘their’ audience in the United Kingdom during 2005–2015. He finds that non-threatening migration frames dominate. Moreover, through regressions based on the European Social Survey (ESS), it was revealed that greater exposure to elite cues, via attendance at religious services, is consistently related to more positive immigration attitudes. Hence, despite their previous neglect, religious elite actors have the capacity to shape immigration attitudes

Theoretical argument

- Securitisation theory: rather than being something real, security is socially constructed through discourse (Buzan et al. 1998)

Data and methodology

- Discourse analysis using four-axes model: (1) societal/national identity (Identitarian), (2) border security/sovereignty/crime (Securitarian), (3) economic security, covering employment, wages and welfare (Economic) and (4) political stability (Political); Sources from the period analysed (2005-2015) were identified through extensive Internet searches of Church website archives and the use of Internet search engines
- Linear regression using European Social Survey (ESS), rounds 3-7 (2006-2014)

Findings

- Despite two actors (Michael Nazir-Ali, Bishop of Rochester, and George Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury) promoting securitising threat frames, desecuritising actors, who suggest that migration is not a threat, are far more numerous; the official CoE line universally framed migration in non-threatening terms
- Positive relationship between Anglicans (CoE message recipients) and positive attitudes to immigration, with attendance as the most influential variable; positive relationships between immigration attitudes with prayer and with religious feeling not statistically significant once controls are added
- Top-down process because Anglicans, on average, hold more negative attitudes than atheists; if Bottom-up then Church would have to adjust attitudes to fit negative attitude of followers, but Church elite messages are overwhelmingly positive

Evaluation

- **Strength** Overcomes some of the Copenhagen School’s (CS) weaknesses on securitisation theory: (1) CS overemphasises the role of political and security elites → examines religious actors which may also be important, (2) CS prescribes discourse analysis as the ‘obvious method’ to study security but Hansen (2011) suggest that the opinions of people exposed to the discourse can be detected through surveys, polls or elections → uses mixed methods (discourse analysis + quantitative methods)
- **Weakness** Church attendance used as proxy for exposure to elite cues but maybe church attendance signifies higher levels of social capital and thus more inclusivity

Putnam and Campbell (2012) American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us

I read reviews but not really the book

Summary

- The book outlines the trajectory of lived religion in the United States since the 1950s
- Since the 1950s one major shock and two major aftershocks have shaken and cleaved the American religious landscape— three marked shifts, each of which came about in reaction to the one before it
- Americans remain religious while growing increasingly tolerant

Historical context

- The initial “seismic societal shock” (1960s): The baby boom generation came of age, and the emergence of the “sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll” counterculture shook the religious establishment to its core. Although later in life boomers would move up the conventional life cycle toward somewhat greater religious observance, they would always remain much less observant than their parents had been at an equivalent age
- First aftershock (1970s-1980s): the rise of religious conservatism. The evangelical movement gained traction in response to this sexually liberal counterculture
- Second aftershock (1990s-2000s): youth disaffection from religion, marked by the rise of the “nones” after 1990. In those two decades “young Americans came to view religion [as] judgmental, homophobic, hypocritical, and too political”

Social and political implications

- These two aftershocks have polarized Americans along religious and political lines: at midcentury, religiosity and politics had been barely correlated; political and religious divides now reinforce rather than cross-cut each other
- The highly religious confront the overtly secular in public struggles over abortion and homosexuality. The Republican Party molds its platform to attract social conservatives, while the Democratic Party, with pro-choice and gay-friendly positions, provides secular Americans a home
- Most Americans see a proper and continuing role for religion in American society and believe that, on the whole, it is and will remain a positive role. However, when it comes to tolerance, secular Americans are more tolerant than those showing a high level of religiosity
- The reason why Americans ‘feel warm’ toward Jews, mainline Protestants (hence not the fundamentalist evangelicals) and Catholics is also largely influenced by their life conditions—that is, there is a very high likelihood that each American has friends and relatives belonging to a different religious affiliation [e.g. the authors]
- **America’s grace:** a “web of interlocking personal relationships among people of many different faiths”, that fosters the coexistence of religious diversity and personal devotion, in the wake of growing religious polarization

Data and methods

- “Faith Matters” panel survey, interviewed 3108 Americans from 2006-2007
- Half a century of survey data on American religious attitudes (e.g. GSS)
- Criticism: white people are overrepresented
- Criticism: the narrative is dependent on surveys of individual attitudes & behaviours; institutional developments receive little attention → the story may be a partial one

Summary

- Savage (2020) finds evidence supporting the partisan motivated reasoning hypothesis, showing that religiosity has a fundamentally different effect on preferences for redistribution in CEE compared to established democracies. Notably, religious individuals in CEE are found to be more likely to favour state intervention to increase redistribution

Theoretical argument

- Scheve and Stasavage (2006): religious individuals are less likely to support redistribution because religion provides a substitute for state welfare provision
- De La O and Rodden (2008): religious individuals less likely to support redistribution because religiosity increases the salience of a moral dimension for low income voters, drawing them into coalitions with the upper and middle classes, against their private economic interests; economic interests has higher salience for the rich than moral
- Taber and Lodge (2006): Partisan motivated reasoning; individuals process information in a way that enables them to defend and maintain their partisan identity
 - Arzheimer and Carter (2009): In advanced democracies, religious individuals are more likely to support right-wing parties → thus, party motivated reasoning would predict religious individuals in advanced democracies voting against redistribution
 - In the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), nationalist populist right adopt positions that emphasise both religiosity and left-wing economic policies → partisan motivated reasoning predicts religious will support redistribution

Data and methodology

- Data: European Social Survey (ESS) (2002–2014); N = approx. 52,000

Support for redistribution = α

+ β_1 Religiosity_{ij}

+ β_2 PartyID_{ij}

+ β_4 Individual level controls_{ij}

+ β_5 Macro level controls_{ij}

+ β_6 (Religiosity_{ij} × PartyID_{ij})

- - Note: β_3 not present in the regression presented in the paper

Findings

- Individuals that identify with parties of the centre (liberals) and mainstream right (Christian democrats and conservatives) are less likely to favour redistribution, while supporters of social democrats and the radical left are more likely to favour redistribution

- Religiosity significantly increases probability of support for redistribution among individuals that identify with Christian democratic (+4.5%) and nationalist populist (+4.1%) parties
- Conversely, religious supporters of extreme right and radical left parties are less likely to favour redistribution; those that identify with extreme right parties are less likely to support redistribution, probably due to narratives on the position of ethnic minority groups in countries such as Slovakia (Bustikova 2014)

Evaluation

- **Strengths**
 - Large sample size so higher validity
 - There is an interaction effect term for Model 3, which acknowledges there is a close affiliation between religion and political parties which can influence people's policy positions
- **Weaknesses**
 - Party motivated reasoning sometimes not as important as issue motivated reasoning [acknowledged]; Mullinix (2016): when parties take non-traditional positions on an issue, partisan motivated reasoning and issue motivated reasoning pull in opposite directions, individuals are more likely to engage in issue motivated reasoning if the policy at hand is salient to them personally or if elites are not polarised on the issue
 - Used individual level controls mixed with macro level controls → standard errors will be too small and coefficients will be too significant ([reference](#))

Spenkuch, Jörg and Tillman (2017) Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis
doi: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/J2FA5R>

Summary

- The authors investigate the influence of religion on votes for the Nazi party – the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP). Through econometric methods and data collected by Falter and Hänisch (1990), they find that Catholics were much less susceptible to the allure of the Nazis than their Protestant counterparts, and that the effect is not due to socioeconomic differences

Data and methodology

- Data: Official election results combined with information from the 1925 and 1933 censuses compiled by Falter and Hänisch (1990)
- Methodology:

$$v_c = \mu_d + \beta \widehat{Catholic}_c + X'_c \theta + \epsilon_c$$

- v_c = NSDAP vote shares (among all eligible voters) in county c
- μ_d = electoral district fixed effect

$$\widehat{Catholic}_c = \kappa_d + \alpha_0 \text{HistoricallyCatholic}_c + \alpha_1 \text{HistoricallyMixed}_c +$$

- $X'_c \phi + \eta_c$
 - Predicted share of Catholics
 - β indicates the % change in the NSDAP's vote share associated with a 1% increase in a county's share of Catholics
- X_c = a comprehensive vector of controls

Findings

- Constituencies' religious composition accounts for a greater fraction of the differences in NSDAP vote shares than all other available variables (e.g. economic variables)
- A standard deviation increase in the share of Catholics is associated with a reduction in Nazi vote shares by 9.6 percentage points, relative to a basis of 26.7% (2SLS not used)
- Catholics were much less susceptible to the allure of the Nazis than their Protestant counterparts, and that this difference cannot be attributed to systematic socioeconomic differences between both groups, as previous literature has suggested
- The Catholic hierarchy was able to effectively combat National Socialism because, in the eyes of the radicalised citizens, the Zentrum (Centre Party) constituted a less extreme but ultimately acceptable alternative to the Nazis

**Tilley (2015) We don't do God? Religion and party choice in Britain*

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000052>

Abstract

- This article shows that religion has been consistently important in predicting voters' party choices in Britain over time
- The religion–vote choice relationship is not primarily due to the social make-up of different groups, nor to ideological differences between them
- Instead, particular denominations are associated with parties that represented those groups in the early 20th century when social cleavages were frozen within the system
- Main mechanism: parental transmission of party affiliations within dominations

The religious cleavage over time

- Britain is an important test case: if religious cleavages are alive and well, this suggests that the religious cleavage can survive in even the most unpromising of circumstances

Why might religion matter? [Three explanations]

- Religion is correlated with other dominant explanations of voting behaviour e.g. cohort effect: religious people are typically older; older ppl more likely to vote CON
- Religion produces / is correlated with a set of values (socially conservative, opposed to redistribution): belief → ideological differences → differences in party choice
- Frozen cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan): four main historical associations
 - Conservatives and the Church of England
 - Liberals and Nonconformists (19th - early 20th centuries)
 - Labour explicitly mobilized Catholics (early 20th century)
 - In Scotland: Presbyterians and Tories, Catholics and Labour

Data and methods

- British Election Study (BES) surveys since 1964, except 1974, 2001 and 2005
- British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA), fielded almost every year since 1983
- Religion is measured using both a question about religiosity (church attendance) and a question about denominational identification
- Controls: socio-structural factors (e.g. class, education, housing type), ideological values (economic / social / national identity), measures of parental party identity

Findings

- Religious cleavages in Scotland and England are large and stable over time
- The inclusion of social structural controls such as class makes very little difference to the patterns of association between religion and party; the inclusion of parental party identification does not eliminate the effect of religion, but it does drastically reduce it

Conclusion

- The class cleavage is about inequalities in society: class → ideology → party choice
- Religion is not like that: it is a relic of past associations between groups and parties
- Religion is a stronger, more resilient cleavage because it is not about contemporary politics and party policy, but because it is rooted in parental socialization processes
- Caveat: the number of people effectively socialized into a religious identity, and thus a matching party identity, has fallen dramatically in most countries [see [Best \(2011\)](#)]

Van der Brug, Hobolt and de Vreese (2009) Religion and Party Choice in Europe
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380903230694>

Summary

- Van der Brug, Hobolt and de Vreese (2009) find that while generational replacement tends to reduce the overall salience of the religion cleavage across Europe, there has been recent increase in the effect of religion within each generation

Theoretical argument

- Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996): religion is more important to European Parliament (EP) party choice than social class, post-materialist attitudes and even EU approval; Rose and Urwin (1969): religious divides were more important than class or social status in determining electoral behaviour
- Two aspects of religiosity: (1) Religious denomination (the various religious communities of which people are members) and (2) Religious attendance and belief (how religious people are, independent of the religious community they belong to)

Data and methodology

- Data: European Election Studies 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004

Findings

- Religion has continued to have a significant impact on party choice in EP elections
- Religiosity has a positive effect on the propensity to vote for Christian Democratic and Conservative parties and a negative effect on the propensity to vote for Socialist and Liberal Parties, but only a limited effect on the propensity to vote for 'new politics' (Green and Eurosceptic) parties
- The effect of religion is expected to decrease over time due to generational replacements
- The effect of religion over time is expected to increase within each generational cohort in the 2000s
- The effect of religion on party choice is moderated by the national context and is greater, the higher the level of religious fractionalisation

Evaluation

- **Strength** Multilevel modelling technique allows data to be pooled across countries without introducing statistical biases, which are otherwise caused by nested data

Voas and Bruce (2019) Religion

Link: https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39293/1_bsa36_religion.pdf

Summary

- We find a dramatic decline in identification with Christian denominations, particularly the Church of England; a substantial increase in atheism and in self-description as “very” or “extremely” non-religious; and very low confidence in religious organisations, but tolerance of religious difference

Overview

- Rise of the ‘nones’: most of the shift in the religious profile of the nation has been towards non-affiliation, with 52% of the public now saying they do not regard themselves as belonging to any religion
- Consolidation of attendance: two-thirds (66%) of people in Britain never attend religious services, apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms
- Little time for religion, but prepared to be tolerant: most people show little enthusiasm for institutionalised religion, although there is evidence that the public are, in general, prepared to be tolerant of the faith of others

Religion in Britain

- **Religious identity:** the proportion of the British population identifying as Christian has fallen from two-thirds (66%) to just over one-third (38%) since 1983; religious decline in Britain is generational [lack of religion passes on better than religion]
- **Religious practice:** over the last two decades reported weekly attendance has remained stable at ~11% of the general population; the centre ground of claimed occasional participation is vanishing (due to behavioural change and/or honesty)
- **Religious belief:** around half of the population (55%) express some sort of belief in some kind of God; trends from ‘98-‘18 indicate both secularisation and consolidation; there has been an increase in the certainty and assertiveness of responses [to religious questions], with the confidently negative growing faster than the confidently positive
- **Patterns of identity, practice and belief:** it is tempting but wrong to think that people become more religious with age; at every age, men are less likely than women to say that they have a religion, or go to church, or believe in God

The public reputation of religion

- **Religion and public life:** confidence in religious institutions has fallen over the last two decades; around a third (35%) feel religious organisations have “too much power” (26%) or “far too much power” (9%); 72% of professing Christians agree that religious leaders should not try to influence voting behaviour
- **Religious tolerance:** only 17% agree that “all things considered, people belonging to different religions cannot get along with each other when living close together”; those aged 55 or over are more inclined to view Muslims negatively (22%) when compared with those who are 18–34 (13%)

Conclusions

- Data shows that secularisation continues past the point where people stop identifying with a religion or going to church regularly – the non-religious carry on becoming less and less religious; however, it should not be interpreted as a growth in intolerance